Source: Trud
During a recent trip to Dresden, Germany Russian President Vladimir Putin said he was committed to building democracy in Russia and respecting press freedoms. Do you believe him?
Mr. Putin’s principal mission has been to stabilize the Russian state, whose power and authority reached a nadir in 1999, when he became prime minister. As President, Vladimir Putin has been more interested in establishing control than in expanding freedom. In his view, there had been too much freedom under Boris Yeltsin, leading to loss of control and chaos. Today, the Kremlin controls central TV broadcasting: opposition TV channels are history. Local stations find themselves in a similar situation with respect to the local authorities. Radio broadcasting is less constrained. The written press is basically free, though Kremlin-friendly businesses have been recently buying up the major newspapers.
Many observers, including you, contend that Russia is growing increasingly authoritarian under Putin. Can you substantiate that and explain the reasons why Russia is moving in that direction?
I prefer the word czarist. That means that there is only one functioning institution in today’s Russia. All other constitutional bodies, whether the parliament with its both houses, or the high courts, or the federal and regional governments, basically function on behalf and at the behest of the President. Russia has again embraced czarism for a number of reasons. One, this rests on a long tradition of undivided and almost sacred power. Two, democracy has earned a bad name in the popular Russian mind as a synonym of laissez-faire unlimited, in which only thugs and crooks thrive. Three, most people want stability and peace, which they associate with strong leadership. Four, most are not yet ready to assume responsibility for governance and prefer to be ruled from above. Five, the more successful people in Russia don’t care about politics: they are busy making money.
How do current Russian presidents differ from former czars?
By the method of their selection. I doubt that Russian presidents would adopt the hereditary principle.
The Teflon Leader
What did Putin change in Russia? How does he differ from his predecessors? He has an impressive approval rating? What does he owe it to? Are Russians predominantly fond of firm-hand rulers?
Putin established bureaucratic rule. His predecessors were revolutionaries, each in his own way. Putin is a conservative. However, in historical terms, his role is as important as that of Yetsin and Gorbachev. They marched two steps forward, and created much turmoil. Putin made the proverbial step backward, but this backward movement consolidated the most important achievements of the revolutionary era. These are, in my view, property, personal freedom and open borders.
Putin’s approval rating is several times higher than the ratings of the government and other state bodies which he directs. In other words, people like him, but not his policies. This popular approval does not rest on the president’s record. For ordinary people, Putin is a symbol of stability, predictability, authority. They also protect this symbol from anything that may tarnish it, making this somebody else’s responsibility. Thus, Mr. Putin is the ultimate Teflon president – courtesy of the Russian political psyche.
Vladimir Putin’s annual televised “dialogue with Russia” was another case of political therapy. In a situation in which the only functioning national political institution is the person of the President this “direct line” is deeply symbolic. This is modern czarism in action.
In terms of substance, the most important statement Putin has made concerned the transfer of power in 2008. By announcing that he will leave office but retain political influence, the President has said, in effect, that, while the written Constitution will remain unchanged, the living basic law of Russia will be fundamentally altered. After 2008, there will be someone standing behind and above the czar-president, and that “someone” will be Vladimir Putin. His role will be that of the country’s supreme arbiter and guarantor of stability.
In other words, the two surrogate “political parties”, Gazprom and Rosneft, will not be allowed to install one of their own in the Kremlin. Putin may have already decided what he is looking for. The successful candidate shall be a generally likeable figure that will “reign, but not rule” and be a symbol of state power. Of the current roster of potential hopefuls, Governor Valentina Matvienko of St. Petersburg would fit the description best.
Closer to God
As to Putin’s own position it is unlikely to be the prime minister, who in reality is but a presidential envoy in charge of the cabinet of ministers. It is equally unlikely to be leader of the dominant political party. Putin is also on record in rejecting the position of a CEO of a major corporation.
On October 25 Putin said he will help “develop the country’s political system”. The position of the chairman of the Constitutional Court could be developed into the pinnacle of the judicial branch of government. Putin would have enormous clout as both the defender of the basic law and its sole interpreter. Thus, he will be above the czar and closer to God.
Russia has been recently shaken by a series of high profile murders _ a couple of bankers, a prominent journalist and a news agency executive have been killed in an apparent gangland manner. Why is the road of reforms so bloody?
Violence has made a comeback after a period of relative civility. The individual cases are very different. Yet, Politkovskaya’s murder looks very ominous. I very much hope that Mr. Gun does not make his appearance in the run-up to the elections.
Did Russians’ living standards improve under Putin, how and why? To what extent that could be due to the international prices of commodities like oil and gas and to what to market reforms? Does Russia have a genuine free market?
Russian living standards have definitely improved due to the rebounding of the economy. Oil and gas are the central part of the story, but not the whole story. The reforms of the 1990s are paying off. Russia does have a market, which is a great achievement.
The United States rates as enemy number one in the new Russian military doctrine. The U.S. qualifies even as a threat larger than terrorism. How would you interpret this rating of threats?
Terrorism is serious, but this is less of a challenge to the Armed Forces. The Russian military doctrine assumes that, since the U.S. is pursuing a super-activist foreign policy, is not an ally of Russia, and Russian-American interests are at odds on a number of issues important to Russia (starting from the former Soviet states), it is prudent to regard U.S. military capabilities with apprehension. There is a lot of Cold War inertia here, but with the admixture of the more recent experience of the 1990s: NATO enlargement, Balkan crises, and especially Kosovo. The U.S.-Russian political relationship remains highly ambivalent.
To Bulgaria - Commercially
What are the principal Russian interests and allies on the Balkans nowadays? Where does Bulgaria stand in that respect? Does anybody in Moscow care about Bulgaria as they did during the Cold War?
Today, Russia has mainly commercial interests in the area, linked to oil and gas shipments to the countries in the region or through their territory on to Western Europe.Like all countries, Bulgaria is viewed in terms of commercial opportunities it offers. For some, it could be a pipeline. For others, an electricity grid. For yet others, this will be property on the Black Sea.
Would you agree that Russia is blackmailing Europe with its energy supplies _ namely the natural gas? Was the temporary cut of gas supplies to Ukraine a smart move or a mistake?
I think Russia is being extremely awkward and heavy-handed in its moves as an “energy power”. The Ukrainian gas supply shut-off at the beginning of 2006 was particularly counter-productive and politically costly. There is too little concern about the public sensitivities and just too much bluster.