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The Revival of Russia's Military Power

Vladimir Putin's open attempts to reassert Russia's position as a world power have been met with trepidation from the international community. Further, Russia faces domestic constraints, both economic and military, that will complicate Putin's efforts.

published by
NPR's Talk of the Nation
 on August 22, 2007

Source: NPR's Talk of the Nation

Michael McFaulIn the wake of recent Russian actions that seem to indicate a revival of Russia's military power and status on the world stage, NPR's Neal Conan spoke with Michael McFaul, senior associate with the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, about the larger context of these events.

CONAN: Joining us is Michael McFaul, a Russia scholar at Stanford University, also a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He joins us from studios on the Stanford campus in California, and nice to talk with you again.

MCFAUL: Thanks for having me.

CONAN: And President Putin seems to be taking every opportunity he can to tell the world Russia is back as a military power. What's going on?

MCFAUL: Well, you're quite right. He wants to assert Russia's position as a military power, as a great power in the international system. And the analysts that are close to the Kremlin talk about a shift back from a unipolar world that they see in the '90s back to a bipolar world, echoing the way that we used to talk about the world during the Cold War. Now, what's going on? I think this is a recovery, a negative one in my opinion, but it's a reaction to the '90s, when Russia was weak, in their eyes, when the collapse of the Soviet Union was considered a great humiliation to the particular group that are now ruling in the Kremlin. And over the last seven years, they've had fantastic economic growth and, you know, we should be happy for Russia because they have that. And they are now translating some of that economic wealth into military power.

CONAN: And in some instances, people would cite instances of bullying. There was—have now been a couple of examples of, evidently, Russian aircraft intruding into Armenian (sic/Georgian) airspace, a bomb dropped on a tiny village about 30 miles outside of Tbilisi, the capital, a few weeks ago, another incursion just yesterday I gather. So (is) Russia using military force to try to intimidate its neighbors?

MCFAUL: Yes. The simple answer is yes. And this is what's disturbing about this trend. I think it's great that Russia's back on its feet. The Russian people deserve the economic growth that they have. I think, for Americans, a strong and democratic Russia that would be allied with us to fight common enemies—and we have common enemies—would be a truly sensational thing that would be in our interest. The problem is is that the current leadership in Moscow doesn't see themselves as joining the West. They don't see Russia as part of the democratic community of states. They've moved increasingly in an autocratic direction at home. And therefore I don't think it's just an accident that they're using their power in a more coercive way vis-a-vis countries particularly like Georgia, as you mentioned, but other places as well: Ukraine, Belarus. And that I think is where the rubber hits the road. I think we in the West should welcome and be encouraged by Russia getting back on its feet, but we want them to be part of the West, not going back to balance-of-power politics against the West and our allies.

CONAN: On the anniversary of the Warsaw Pact invasion that ended the Prague Spring of 1968, a Russian general, senior general visiting Prague, warned that the Czech Republic would be making, quote, "a great mistake" if it allowed the U.S. to build part of a missile defense shield on its territory. That can't be seen as anything other than a threat.

MCFAUL: Yeah, it is a threat, and it's an awful threat. And it's a tragic statement of where we've come in terms of Russia's relations with the West. And let's be clear, these are constructed threats. These are perceived threats that have to do with the elites in Russia's own definition of Russia's place. I know it takes a bit of an imagination, but imagine if you will that Western-oriented democrats, with a small D, were ruling a democratic Russia. Then we would be cooperating about those intercepts in the Czech Republic. Then we would be working together in a much more cooperative way, say, in fighting the Taliban. Russians now talk about we have these American bases in Kyrgyzstan, for instance. Well, the base is there to fight a common enemy. (Chuckles.) And the problem in Moscow today is that, for a variety of reasons that have to do with the particular people in charge of Russia today, they are now returning to this rather old- fashioned, I would say, definition of Russia's interest in the world, and in particular defining Russia's national interest as being antithetical to American national interest—seeing the world in a zero-sum game, if you will, where if it's good for the U.S., it's bad for Russia, rather than looking for instances and places where we could cooperate in ways that are mutually beneficial.

CONAN: We're talking with Michael McFaul at Stanford University. If you'd like to join us, 800-989-8255, e-mail talk@npr.org. And Joe's on the line with us, Joe calling from Berkeley, California. Joe? And I guess Joe has left us. And instead, let's go to Allen. Allen's calling from Flagstaff, Arizona. Excuse me, I'm on the wrong line. Allen?

CALLER: Hi.

CONAN: Allen, are you there? I apologize.

CALLER: This is Allen.

CONAN: Yeah, I pushed the wrong button. Again, Mr. Clever strikes. But go ahead.

CALLER: This is Allen.

CONAN: Yeah, you're on the air.

CALLER: Hi. Yeah, the Bush administration, you know, with its kind of scrapping of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the U.S. putting missiles in NATO countries close to the Soviet borders, sent the message that the treaties that we made with you when you used to be strong don't count anymore. Do you think this would have an affect on why they're acting strong now?

CONAN: Provocation from the United States, is that, Michael McFaul?

MCFAUL: That's definitely the way folks in the Kremlin see it. And I would add to what Allen said the unilateralism of the Bush administration, and most certainly the ABM Treaty, and we could talk about many other things if we were having a show about the U.S.—(chuckles)—I think you're now seeing a unilateralist response from Russia, as well. They, too, just pulled out of the treaty, the CFE Treaty, which was a very important treaty signed 20 years ago.

CONAN: Conventional Forces in Europe, yes. Go ahead.

MCFAUL: Thank you. Sorry for the acronym. They're doing lots of unilateral activity and using their power in that way. And they think, well, this is the way that international politics work, and now that we're strong, we have the capacity to do so. And if we do so—and this is where I think they're really flawed in their thinking, and I would say the same about the Bush administration, by the way—they think that if they use this coercive power in a unilateral way, they'll somehow earn respect in the international system. And I think in the short term that may be true, but in the long term it's actually going to undermine the way people perceive Russia and perceive the way that they use their power.

CONAN: Thanks very much, Allen.

CALLER: Thank you.

CONAN: And as we were talking earlier about, some of this is directed seemingly against the United States, the resumption of long-range bomber patrols, which are—but by describing them as strategic, the assumption is they're carrying nuclear weapons. This definitely hearkens back to the Cold War. There's even discussion of sending the Russian fleet out from the Black Sea and back into the Mediterranean.

MCFAUL: There is, and I would say two things about it. First, let's not compare it to the Cold War because the Cold War was actually not very cold in many places around the world, and Americans and Russians died fighting the so-called Cold War. And it had a different dimension to it because there was an ideological dimension to the Cold War, communism versus capitalism, that is not part of this current revanchism, or whatever you want to call it, inside Russia. They're for markets, they're for making money, and it's not an ideological struggle. But it is, I would say, fundamentally a struggle that they perceive to be their power against our power. In other words, they're not looking to cooperate with us in terms of security; they're seeking to balance against us. And they think, by the way, they have lots of allies, potential allies around the world to do this. It turns out the United States is not only unpopular in Moscow, the United States is unpopular in a lot of countries in the world. And so Russia, and Mr. Putin in particular, is trying to appeal to that—particularly with the Chinese, for instance, where they just ran a very big military operation, a training exercise. It was called Peaceful Mission 2007. And they think that, given American weakness in combination with America's negative image around the world, they can help to construct a new balance of power in the world that offsets American hegemony.

CONAN: We're talking with Michael McFaul at Stanford University. And is there an extent to which several of these muscle-flexing exercises have been made into major media events in Moscow—the planting of the Russian flag beneath the North Pole, the pictures of the bombers taking off back on television in Moscow? To some degree, is this domestic?

MCFAUL: Yes, it is. That's right. I think as Russia has become increasingly autocratic—Russia is no longer a democracy, I think, by most definitions. Freedom House, the nongovernmental organization which rates countries around the world in terms of their freedom, two years ago relisted Russia as a "not free" country—by the way, the biggest reversal in terms of democracy in the last eight years. And Russia is now coming up on an election. Putin wants to hand over power. And having this outside enemy, the United States—I mean, seriously, if you look at the Russian press today, that is one thing that does remind me of the Cold War in terms of its orchestration on the one hand of showing the great leader doing all these things, and secondly the anti-American rhetoric. I mean, the United States—there's a lot of good reasons to be critical of American foreign policy, but this is just pure propaganda going way beyond anything that anybody is doing in terms of foreign policy. And that's to help manage this transition. You have this enemy, you have a kind of siege mentality, you talk about the world surrounding Russia, and therefore that will help Putin handpick his successor and have continuity with the Putin administration.

CONAN: You're listening to "Talk of the Nation" from NPR News. And to follow up on that, here's an e-mail from Jeremy in Russellville, Arkansas: "Could the Russian government and Putin flexing their military muscle at all be a measure to hide the authoritarian measures Putin has been taking? Russia is the second- worst country in the world to live in if you're a journalist"—these are Jeremy's words—"and I think that's an example of one thing they would want to pour smoke over."

MCFAUL: I think Jeremy's right. I think he's right in that—and this is a long, old tradition in Russian and Soviet history, right? As a way to deflect attention from internal problems, you talk about these enemies out there. And issues like corruption, which all indicators show has been skyrocketing in Russia, you put this in TV instead. And importantly—and I think this is something, you know, that other democracies should learn from—when you stifle debate about foreign policy internally, that allows those in the Kremlin to do what they want without a real debate. So take these bombers flying around, right? If this was—if this was Russia 10 years ago, you would have had on television, say, the independent television station NTV. They would have broadcasts saying, hey, wait a minute, why do we need this? (Chuckles.) Is this really in our national interest? Or the sanctions against Georgia which are currently in place, no debate. Is this in Russia's national interest or not? And that, I think, is a disturbing trend. That allows for increasingly irresponsible behavior in terms of foreign policy. So there is a relationship between democracy domestically on the one hand and how a country behaves internationally.

CONAN: An e-mail from Kurt in Renton, Washington: "Leaving out natural resources"—for which read oil or natural gas—"how strong an economy does Russia really have? Is it just a banana republic on steroids?"

MCFAUL: Well, that's a very good question, hard to answer systematically. I would say a couple of things.
Russia has been growing about six-and-a-half, 7 percent since 1999. It's real growth, and budget surpluses—all the kind of macroeconomic indicators are positive. Now the question is why, as Russell asks. And I would say 80 percent of that, to give kind of a gross estimation, is driven by oil and gas. The other part of it is driven by sound economic policy and a devaluation that Russia went through back in 1998, which helped to make their exports more competitive and helped to make imports, particularly food imports, more expensive. And that allowed domestic producers in Russia to get back on their feet. Having said all that, Russia needs to diversify its economy, and that you don't see happening. You see the end of economic reforms. Structural reforms really kind of ended two or three years ago. And therefore, if Russia—if oil and gas prices do fall, I think you're going to see some real strains on the Russian economy.

CONAN: And finally, much of the Russian air force and navy, and much of its army's equipment, has spent the past 15 years rusting. Is it premature to be talking now about a bipolar world?

MCFAUL: Yeah, it's real premature for several reasons, but two big ones. One is the United States still outspends the top 20 countries, including Russia, altogether. We spend roughly 600 billion (dollars). You add them all up, they don't come to that. So the notion that just getting your strategic bombers up in the air—and by the way, I think we do now know that these are "training exercises," quote/unquote, so they do not have nuclear weapons on them, and that's good news. But they're nowhere near American military might. And the second thing, which is a big untold story inside Russia, is, despite whatever equipment they are rebuilding, the Russian military in terms of the soldiers and the training is a total disaster right now, just massive numbers of desertions. That reform needs to take place before Russia will ever be able to exercise its military might again.

CONAN: Michael McFaul, thanks very much for your time.

MCFAUL: Thanks for having me.

CONAN: Michael McFaul, a Russia scholar at Stanford. He joined us from the studios on the university's campus in Stanford, California. This is "Talk of the Nation" from NPR News. I'm Neal Conan in Washington. 
 

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.