An exploration into how India and Pakistan have perceived each other’s manipulations, or lack thereof, of their nuclear arsenals.
Rakesh Sood
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In the Gulf Yearbook 2007-2008, George Perkovich discusses what is publicly known about GCC intentions and capabilities to acquire nuclear technology and explores how the development a GCC nuclear program would balance Iran's growing power.
Source: Gulf Research Center

Developing a GCC nuclear program is one way to "do something" to balance Iran's growing power. The phrase "nuclear program" is usefully ambiguous. In material terms, it is extremely difficult to imagine the GCC collectively seeking to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities to deter Iran. The effects of a GCC "nuclear program" will be ambiguous and muddled, at least for the 10-15 years it would take to develop basic capabilities. Competition for Arab leadership could give nuclear programs in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other GCC states, and perhaps Algeria, momentum independent of developments in Iran.
If faced with a nuclear-armed Iran, GCC states also would be tempted to rely even more intensively on US protection, which is a double-edged sword. Wanting to multiply their options, Saudi Arabia and the UAE recently have embraced closer defense ties with resurgent Russia. Ultimately, the GCC will mix tactics of balancing and potentially confronting Iran with diplomatic entreaties to encourage Iranian goodwill.
This article was originally published by the Gulf Research Center.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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