Source: Nezavisimaya Gazeta
In an interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Center for International Security and member of the Carnegie Moscow Center Scientific Council Alexei Arbatov appraises the reasons for the current opposition of Russia and Georgia, and the consequences which it might have for our country.
(Correspondent) Alexei Georgievich, if Russia recognizes the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and responds by agreeing to the request to our leadership on joining the Russian Federation, what would be the consequences of this step for our country?
(Arbatov) If Russia recognizes the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia will say that this is an act of annexation. And Georgia's path to NATO would be open. They would make an exception for it, and say that Georgia had been subjected to aggression, that its territorial integrity has been violated. Georgia would become a member of NATO, and foreign troops would be stationed on its territory. Aside from all else, Georgia would provide comprehensive support to terrorists,separatists, and extremists in the North Caucasus. To take South Ossetia and Abkhazia into our complement would be tantamount to lighting a bonfire in our own backyard.
Furthermore, it is entirely probable that the CIS states would not support Russia. Therefore, before taking such a step, Russia must hold consultations with the CIS leaders. And if we are to act in such a capacity, then we must act collectively - at least within the scope of the CIS. If Russia finds itself in solitude on such an important territorial question, this means that the CIS would also be split. And there would also be a schism in the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization), because China does not really share such a position. Therefore, in politics, it is very important to know one's measure.Humanitarian aid, stopping a humanitarian catastrophe, squeezing Georgian troops out of South Ossetia - all this was done within the scope of international law and Russian obligations, and it is unlikely that anyone can reproach Russia for this today. But if Russia continues to inflict strikes on Georgian territory, on Georgian facilities, on population centers, and opts for recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, then here we may lose the moral supremacy that we have today. At least we may lose it within the scope of the post-Soviet area.
(Correspondent) What steps must we take in the direction of normalizing relations?
(Arbatov) It is very important to actively create collective positions within the scope of international cooperation. Because to find ourselves in solitude today - even in proud solitude - would be very undesirable for Russia. As for the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, it is difficult to imagine how and when their return to the complement of Georgia would take place after all that has happened. But in any case, we cannot allow any hasty, emotional, decisions. It is hard for us to influence NATO, it is hard for us to influence the European Union, but we do have a number of forums - the CIS, SCO, BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) - where the ministers of foreign affairs meet. So that here too, it would not be a bad idea to discuss such problems. Because, despite all of
our present economic growth and increasingly strong international positions, there is not one country - not even the US - that can throw down a challenge to the whole world. Russia should not follow the bad example of America.
(Correspondent) Could Russia have prevented the conflict? Why did its peacekeeping mission end in war?
(Arbatov) It seems to me that Russia interpreted its role as mediator incorrectly. Simply to carry papers and to hand packets from one side to another - that is a rather passive role. I think that, in these 16 years, Russia could have played a more active role. It had huge influence on Georgia, and even more on South Ossetia. If Russia had itself worked out a packet of agreements aimed at regulating the conflict, and had forced the parties to sign this packet, then, perhaps, the tragedy would not have happened. For example, in the late 70's, the Americans were also mediators in the Near East between Egypt and Israel. And they forced both parties in the conflict to sign the Camp David agreements. And since that time, there has been peace in the Sinai Peninsula. It is this sort of a mission that Russia did not fulfill.
(Correspondent) Instead, they gave out passports and made ambiguous statements in parliament. That is, in fulfilling the peacekeeping function, Russia openly supported one of the parties in the conflict.
(Arbatov) That is correct. After all, Russia, in fulfilling its middleman function in the political plane and its peacekeeping function in the military plane, of course, was not an equidistant party. But this was also associated with the general policy of Georgia. Georgia took a rather hostile position in regard to Russia, and in 1999 it withdrew from the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) and later filed application to NATO. Yes, Russia was formally a mediator, but of course, in fact it could not treat both sides the same. The matter lies elsewhere. Russia must, after all, have foreseen that the situation would ultimately explode and that the consequences of that explosion would be very serious- in any case. Russia had to be the leading party. Not in the sense of a host on KVN
("Club of the Happy and Witty," a televised game show - translator's note ), who jokes and lets the parties have their say, but in the sense of a squadron commander, when one airplane leads others behind it. It is such a role that Russia should have played. But, evidently, there were reasons why it did not assume such a position.
(Correspondent) What reasons?
(Arbatov) We can only surmise. For example, lack of coordinated actions of the authorities. The only legitimate platform, after all, should have relied on the principle of territorial integrity of Georgia, as well as of all the CIS countries. And Russia must be the guarantor of territorial integrity of Georgia. Russia acknowledged this in principle, but acknowledged it only from time to time, and often as a mere formality. Yet any agreement can - and must! - rely specifically on this principle. Having proclaimed this, we could have defended the special status of South Ossetia de-facto and dejure. Evidently, within the power structures, they were not able to coordinate such a platform and packet.
(Correspondent) What may be the consequences of the war for Russia?
(Arbatov) The moral ones, of course, are very difficult. For the first time in hundreds of years, Russia and Georgia are at war with each other. The political consequences will depend on Russia. If it clearly maintains the line of an operation on compulsion to peace and announces that it strives to restore the status-quo, which would push out the Georgian troops, but does not go any farther, and then sits all the parties down at the negotiating table -- then, I think, in the long term plane this would be to Russia's benefit. Russia's prestige would greatly increase in the surrounding world. But if it sets the goal of changing the regime, then the consequences would be bad for Russia. A change of regime is a matter for the Georgian people. Already now, we see that Russia has been left in the
minority in the Security Council. Even China has taken a neutral position. So that Russia must keep this in mind. It will be left in the minority in the surrounding world. And no one will support us, because many of the CIS countries have similar problems. Russia may lose its moral high ground if there are casualties among the civilian population of Georgia. For now, society supports the position of Russia. Despite all the tragedy of losses among the peacekeepers, they only draw us closer together and do not evoke dissatisfaction. But if this entire incident turns into a new and difficult war, the situation will change.
(Correspondent) Would a mixed complement of peacekeeping forces help to avoid war?
(Arbatov) Yes, the Georgians would probably not dare to attack a West European or American peacekeeping contingent. But Russia considers this region to be a zone of its own vital interests, and since the Dagomysskiy agreements provided for the presence of only Russia as the third party, Russia believes that it does not have any grounds to hand the region over to international oversight.
(Correspondent) As a result, Russia was not able to keep the region from war.
(Arbatov) No, it was not.
(Correspondent) And that means its calculation was bad. Or it was absent altogether.
(Arbatov) Yes, it turns out that the peacekeeping operation failed. But first and foremost -because of the criminal folly of Saakashvili and those around him. Now, Russia is restoring the status-quo.
(Correspondent) What may be the consequences of the conflict for Georgia?
(Arbatov) I am not ruling out the possibility that Georgia will have to say good-bye to its aspirations to Ossetia after these barbaric actions. They should have thought of that beforehand. Perhaps Georgia thought that they would very quickly resolve everything with their war. Such a variant always looks good on paper, but in fact turns out to be exactly the opposite. I am not ruling out the possibility that a peaceful mutually acceptable regulation will ultimately be adopted, but, after all that has happened, it is hard for me to imagine that South Ossetia would agree to remain in Georgia.