Source: Paper presented at GDF Suez University
In this paper presented to GDF Suez University's "Nuclear Prospective Seminar" in Paris, Pierre Goldschmidt highlights the high volume of recent nuclear agreements forming between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states. In particular, Russia, France, China, and the United States appear to be taking advantage of growing interest in nuclear energy – spurred by a combination of geopolitical and economic factors – by offering to supply nuclear material, equipment, and knowledge to so-called "newborn nuclear nations," which presently lack adequate infrastructure and operation experience. Current national export rules and laws are simply not enough to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation. To minimize the incentive for domestically constructing sensitive fuel-cycle facilities, Dr. Goldschmidt argues for the strongest possible nuclear fuel supply guarantees, including generic export licenses subject to well-defined safety, security, and nonproliferation criteria. He also underlines the need for the nuclear industry to include specific (and transparent) nonproliferation conditions in future supply contracts.
