How Do Terrorists Get a Hold of Nuclear Material?

{
  "authors": [
    "Mark Hibbs"
  ],
  "type": "legacyinthemedia",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
    "Carnegie Europe"
  ],
  "collections": [
    "U.S. Nuclear Policy"
  ],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "ctw",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
  "programAffiliation": "NPP",
  "programs": [
    "Nuclear Policy"
  ],
  "projects": [],
  "regions": [
    "North America",
    "United States"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Nuclear Policy",
    "Nuclear Energy"
  ]
}

In The Media

How Do Terrorists Get a Hold of Nuclear Material?

Nuclear smugglers acquire nuclear material and technology piece by piece through clandestine networks. They are potentially very dangerous people who are aggressive in looking for innovative ways to illegally transfer nuclear material and dual-use items.

By Mark Hibbs

Published on Apr 11, 2010

Source: NPR's All Things Considered

World leaders at the Nuclear Security Summit this week hope to make progress toward preventing nuclear terrorism. But how do the myriad parts that go into making a nuclear weapon get into the hands of terrorists and rogue governments in the first place? Host Linda Wertheimer talks to Mark Hibbs, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who has actually searched out nuclear traffickers and asked just that.

"Many of the [nuclear smugglers] I have met have very deep backgrounds in engineering, physics, and chemistry," says Hibbs. "They also tend to be logistical experts … these people are very aggressive in looking for innovative ways of solving the problem of moving illegal [nuclear] material."

About the Author

Mark Hibbs

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Nuclear Policy Program

Hibbs is a Germany-based nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. His areas of expertise are nuclear verification and safeguards, multilateral nuclear trade policy, international nuclear cooperation, and nonproliferation arrangements.

Recent Work

Article
Dimming Prospects for U.S.-Russia Nonproliferation Cooperation
- +1
  Toby Dalton, Mark Hibbs, Nicole Grajewski, …
Commentary
What Comes After Russia’s Attack on a Ukrainian Nuclear Power Station?
- Mark Hibbs

Nuclear Policy Nuclear Energy North America United States

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Commentary
Emissary
Inside the Global Race to Erode a Battery Manufacturing Monopoly
Over the past decade, China has moved from marginal player to major producer of all things batteries. The United States, Europe, and others are aiming to balance the market.
Milo McBride
Research
Coercive Nuclear Threats Under Domestic Dissonance
A look at how public opinion influences the credibility of coercive nuclear threats,and how it enables and constrains strategies of nuclear coercion.
Lauren Sukin, Samuel Seitz
Paper
A Geothermal and Nuclear Strategy for the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation
The DFC should focus on advanced, low-carbon energy sources, prioritizing areas where the United States has comparative advantages.
Noah Gordon, Liana Schmitter-Emerson
Commentary
Emissary
Why Korea’s President Skipped Washington for Silicon Valley and Brasília
Lee’s tour shows how Seoul is reorganizing its diplomacy away from Pyongyang and toward industrial networks and the geography of the compute economy.
Darcie Draudt-Véjares
Paper
Confronting the Barriers to AI Diffusion in the U.S. Military
The Pentagon is calling for a rapid AI transformation. Autonomous drones offer a case study in the eight bottlenecks the U.S. military must navigate to realize that vision.
Jake Steckler

More Work from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Two people in blue PPE standing over large metal rolls

Commentary

Emissary

Inside the Global Race to Erode a Battery Manufacturing Monopoly

Over the past decade, China has moved from marginal player to major producer of all things batteries. The United States, Europe, and others are aiming to balance the market.

Milo McBride

Research

Coercive Nuclear Threats Under Domestic Dissonance

A look at how public opinion influences the credibility of coercive nuclear threats,and how it enables and constrains strategies of nuclear coercion.

Lauren Sukin, Samuel Seitz

Aerial View of a Geothermal Energy Plant in the Imperial Valley of California near the Salton Sea

Paper

A Geothermal and Nuclear Strategy for the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation

The DFC should focus on advanced, low-carbon energy sources, prioritizing areas where the United States has comparative advantages.

Noah Gordon, Liana Schmitter-Emerson

Commentary

Emissary

Why Korea’s President Skipped Washington for Silicon Valley and Brasília

Lee’s tour shows how Seoul is reorganizing its diplomacy away from Pyongyang and toward industrial networks and the geography of the compute economy.

Darcie Draudt-Véjares

An AS3 interceptor part of the Merops, an AI-powered anti-drone system is pictured during a NATO live-fire demonstration of a counter-UAS system on November 18, 2025 in Nowa Deba, Poland.

Paper

Confronting the Barriers to AI Diffusion in the U.S. Military

The Pentagon is calling for a rapid AI transformation. Autonomous drones offer a case study in the eight bottlenecks the U.S. military must navigate to realize that vision.

Jake Steckler