Five problems—and solutions—to make it actually work as a tool of great power competition.
Afreen Akhter
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The long negotiations and ongoing ratification process for the New START agreement suggests that it is not certain how long it will take the Obama administration to advance its nuclear agenda or whether it will even succeed.
When President Obama announced his nuclear arms control agenda in an April 2009 speech in Prague, he declared his intention to quickly secure three international agreements: a sequel to the U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. However, as the long negotiations and ongoing ratification process for the New START agreement suggest, it is not certain how long it will take the administration to advance its nuclear agenda or whether it will even succeed.
Given the current political will to reduce global nuclear dangers, can the United States also pursue a set of arms control measures that could quickly find bipartisan support and be implemented without necessarily securing the legal consent of other states?
This briefing was hosted by Congressman Jeff Fortenberry (R-NE), co-founder of the Congressional Nuclear Security Caucus, and Congressman Edward Markey (D-MA), founder of the House Bipartisan Task Force on Nonproliferation.
Japan Chair for a World Without Nuclear Weapons, Senior Fellow
George Perkovich is the Japan Chair for a World Without Nuclear Weapons and a senior fellow in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Nuclear Policy Program. He works primarily on nuclear deterrence, nonproliferation, and disarmament issues, and is leading a study on nuclear signaling in the 21st century.
Henry Sokolski
Rep. Jeff Fortenberry
U.S. House of Representatives
Rep. Ed Markey
U.S. House of Representatives
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
Five problems—and solutions—to make it actually work as a tool of great power competition.
Afreen Akhter
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