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Q&A

Pakistan After the Floods

As the floodwaters recede, Pakistan is assessing the impact of its worst-ever flooding and beginning the long rebuilding process. In spite of this tragedy, the terrible losses should not prevent Pakistan’s economy from growing nor severely restrict its military’s counterterrorism efforts.

Published on September 29, 2010

As the floodwaters recede, Pakistan is assessing the impact of its worst-ever flooding and beginning the long rebuilding process. Over 20 million were affected—more than the Asian tsunami in 2004 and Kashmir earthquake in 2005 combined—and at its height, water covered a fifth of the country. The disaster is exacerbating Pakistan’s existing problems and raising fears in the United States that it will delay efforts by the Pakistani military to move against militants taking refuge in tribal areas.

In a Q&A, S. Akbar Zaidi assesses Pakistan’s response, the country’s aggravated economic problems, the security and political implications, and the slow reaction by foreign donors. Zaidi argues that this is a horrible tragedy, but the economy is still going to grow by at least 2 percent this year—and the floods and rebuilding process should not severely restrict the Pakistani military’s counterterrorism efforts.


How devastating were the floods in Pakistan this summer? What areas were most significantly impacted?

Without a doubt, these are the most severe floods to hit Pakistan since its independence in 1947. Water in the Indus River and its tributaries began to overflow in late July and flooding continued through August. As the levels rose, people were displaced within provinces and sought refuge in the nearest large town.

The floods wiped out villages—nearly two million houses were damaged or destroyed—infrastructure, and agricultural land. By washing away roads, bridges, communication networks, powerhouses, and livestock, this destruction devastates the livelihoods of many Pakistanis. It’s the relatively poor and the farmers who have suffered the most.

The area hit worst by the floods was Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, formerly known as the North-West Frontier Province, and the impact stretched north into Gilgit-Baltistan and south into southern Punjab and Sindh. Balochistan and northern and central Punjab did not suffer to the same extent, and the port city of Karachi, Pakistan’s economic powerhouse, was not directly struck.


How successfully has Pakistan responded?

The Pakistani government has been criticized by the population and foreign and local media for not doing enough to help the people directly impacted by the floods—and for not delivering assistance quickly enough. Indeed, the civilian government’s response has been inadequate in every sense of the term and it is rightly disparaged for the slow, limited, and incomplete humanitarian services provided.

The one person who was singled out for criticism is President Asif Ali Zardari. At a critical moment when it was clear the floods were catastrophic, he was in Europe on what was billed as a semi-official visit. Most news coverage argued that he should have been in Pakistan during the crisis.

The one institution that emerged as a savior and lifeline for a great deal of the population is Pakistan’s army—just as it has many times during past disasters. The military played a critical role in the relief effort from rescues to providing food to resettlement services. So while the elected government was roundly criticized, the military was seen as providing a sufficient response.   


How has the international community supported Pakistan’s relief and redevelopment efforts?

There are few parallels between this year’s floods and the 2005 earthquake, but the comparison is often used when assessing the international response. Global support for the earthquake was massive. But unlike the earthquake, the humanitarian assistance and donor aid this time has been slow.

The earthquake was instant, lasted only a few seconds, and highly localized around the Kashmir area. The tragic photos quickly spread around the world, creating a great deal of global sympathy, and aid immediately poured into Pakistan. The floods, on the other hand, were spread over weeks and even though they impacted a much larger number of people, the damage was stretched across the country.

The previous Pakistani government managed international funds and the response during the earthquake. Allegations of misappropriation in 2005 emerged—key public individuals were reportedly siphoning off humanitarian funds—and this is a key reason for today’s diminished giving. To make matters worse, Transparency International recently announced that Pakistan’s perception of corruption indicator had worsened.

These changes are true within Pakistan as well. There was a major outpouring of grief and rapid mobilization of money by Pakistanis in 2005. This time, the prime minister’s relief fund has seen only trickles of support from citizens who give to non-governmental organizations. They feel that the government was unable to provide quality assistance in the past.

And Pakistanis don’t trust the government as much as they used to. The government is seen as more corrupt and inefficient and there is a growing hesitancy to provide financial support to government efforts. This also points to a broader problem of accountability and transparency. With concern—both locally and internationally—that Pakistan is not transparent or efficient, people and countries have been cautious in offering support.

Another key difference between 2005 and now is the absence of local government, which played an important role following the earthquake. Had a system of local government been in place—and the incumbent government is responsible for not holding elections—one could speculate that perhaps the response could have been better and swifter.


How have the floods impacted Pakistan’s economy? What will the flooding mean for the country’s long-term economic prospects?

The floods will impact Pakistan’s economy in several ways, but some of the gloomy outlooks are exaggerated. Pakistan’s prime minister stated that $43 billion were wiped out of the economy—that’s about 25 percent of GDP—and the finance minister recently said that the economy was on the verge of collapse. But these are overstatements, as the immediate damage and long-term effects will be much less. The government is emphasizing the massive destruction so the country can get more resources and aid from the international community.

The areas that are the economic powerhouses of Pakistan—where the bulk of production and consumption take place—have not been significantly hurt. Industries and the service sector in central Punjab and Karachi were largely spared, so the government’s assessments are clearly too high.

Rural agriculture and the rural economy have been hit the hardest. The agrarian sector provides approximately 23 percent of GDP and even though this is significant, it doesn’t doom the entire economy. While it’s still early to concretely judge the levels of damage, the government is overstating its case to chase international funds.

The long-term economic prospects are also hard to assess. With the impact being highly localized in the areas where the flooding was at its worst and large sections of the economy largely spared, the impact will not compare with the Asian financial crisis in 1997 or recent economic crises in the United States and Europe. It’s a major hit, but the economy will recover. This is a severe short-term problem, but I don’t see a complete meltdown or long-term economic crisis.

Despite militancy, terrorism, war, high inflation, and a global meltdown, the economy has still managed to grow in the past—Pakistan’s economy is stronger than many people think. Pakistan grew by 4 percent last year and it was predicted to be 4.5 percent this year before the floods. Growth will undoubtedly slow, but I predict growth will be at least 2 percent this year—not too good, but not too bad. And it will be higher than the 1.2 percent growth during the first year of the current People’s Party government (2008-2009).


What are the political ramifications? And will floods lead to civil unrest and greater insecurity or delay counterterrorism efforts?

The government is increasingly unpopular, as its reaction has been deemed inadequate. There is high public resentment fueled by a vibrant media that has documented widespread government inefficiencies. President Zardari is under attack the most and his popularity has slipped even further—it was already at a pretty low level. But the opposition parties have not emerged unscathed and their response has also been seen negatively.

There are no signs that the government will fall although rumors abound. With few exceptions, governments in Pakistan don’t collapse through popular agitation and the military is not likely to step in at this point. While the government will continue to be unpopular for some time and may be unstable, it will probably not be removed. Opposition parties and even the military will not want to take on the problems that Pakistan now faces. 

There is an exaggerated scare in the West that militant groups will now gain a new foothold after providing relief to local populations. The recent military operations against the Pakistani Taliban have helped push militants out of certain areas, including Swat and Malakand. Charity and social welfare organizations are providing support on the ground and will gain local support, but this does not translate into new backing for their militant wings.

So while there are Islamist organizations that are mobilizing humanitarian operations, this does not necessarily mean that people will support wide-scale suicide attacks or terrorism. And even though there are U.S. fears that this will slow Pakistan’s efforts to combat terrorism and mount operations against militant groups, this is unlikely. The flood has not curtailed the military’s internal reach. 

The United States has vowed strong support for Pakistan, but it’s unclear how much of the aid has reached Pakistan. Washington’s on-the-ground response to the flooding has improved public perceptions of the United States, but that was immediately lost with repeated drone attacks. Good works are quickly wiped out and anti-American sentiment will resurface.


What is needed for the country to recover?

While this is an opportunity for the government and opposition groups to come together and devise long-term solutions to Pakistan’s real and protracted problems, it will likely be wasted. Pakistani elites should look beyond immediate concerns and look for ways to limit corruption, improve accountability and transparency, and increase the government’s financial resources by raising taxes and cutting exemptions.

Instead of relying on foreign aid to bail the country out, this is a real chance to expand the country’s own resource base. And foreign governments should put pressure on Islamabad to put its own house in order. Sadly, with the understanding that the West will not allow the government to completely fail there is a moral hazard in place. Pakistan remains hesitant to undertake the far-reaching, unpopular, but critical measures that the country needs. Yet another opportunity will surely be missed.
 

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.