In his last state visit to the United States as president, Hu Jintao will try to stabilize U.S.-China relations to shore up his political legacy. Minxin Pei explains that the visit provides an opportunity to change the contentious tone of the past year and perhaps even “reset” the bilateral relationship.
China and the United States are both partners and rivals but the potential for more effective U.S.-China cooperation in managing regional and global challenges is huge, argues Pei. “At this moment, the relationship clearly has enough common interests but insufficient mutual trust.”
- What is the importance of President Hu’s visit to Washington?
- Is the balance of power between the United States and China changing?
- Will the Obama administration press China on human rights? What is the current state of human and political rights in China?
- Will other sensitive issues—Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang—be discussed?
- How strong are U.S.-China relations? How effectively are Washington and Beijing working together on critical regional and global challenges?
What is the importance of President Hu’s visit to Washington?
In terms of specifics, the Hu-Obama summit is not expected to yield any major agreements. However, this visit is quite important both for the United States and for China.
U.S.-China relations had a rough year in 2010 and the level of mistrust is high. The two countries engaged in a series of disputes that covered many regional and global issues. While China was perceived by the United States as assertive, the United States was seen in China as trying to build an anti-China regional framework of containment. So Hu’s visit provides an opportunity for the two presidents to change the contentious tone of the bilateral relationship and perhaps even “reset” it.
For President Hu, this is his last state visit to the United States as president. He has an incentive to leave behind a healthy and stable Sino-American relationship as his political legacy.
In terms of the substance of the summit, North Korea will probably be the most important issue because both the United States and China have an incentive to see the Korean peninsula remain stable. The trick is how to re-start a process that will lead to the de-nuclearization of North Korea, which is China’s official goal. Washington would like to see Beijing play a more active role in restraining North Korea. China wants the United States to provide more concessions to North Korea.
The most likely concrete outcome from the summit on this issue may be an announcement of the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, which is a multilateral forum established to conduct negotiations with Pyongyang regarding the dismantling of its nuclear facilities. The talks were suspended after North Korea’s second nuclear test in May 2009. China has been trying to revive the talks, but the United States has been cool to the idea because it feels that would reward North Korea for violating prior agreements and for its aggressive acts against South Korea in 2010.
Another issue that will attract much attention is the value of the Chinese currency. China’s fixed-exchange rate policy has been a sore spot in bilateral relations for some time; however, it is not expected to mar the summit in substantive terms this time because China began allowing the value of its currency to appreciate against the U.S. dollar about six months ago—albeit at a very gradual pace (roughly 5-6 percent a year). It may not appease China’s harshest critics, but this does make things a bit easier for the Obama administration in counseling for more patience.
Is the balance of power between the United States and China changing?
The balance of power between the countries has been changing for at least two decades. While the United States maintains a formidable advantage vis-à-vis China in all areas, the gap has been narrowing rapidly.
In terms of the size of the economy measured by exchange rates, China was about 7 percent of the United States when Bill Clinton was elected to the White House in 1992. In 2001, when George W. Bush became president, the Chinese economy was 13 percent of the American economy. When Barack Obama won the White House in 2008, the Chinese economy was about 30 percent of the U.S. economy. Today it is about 40 percent. So the relative balance of power has been changing at a pace that is bound to produce real geopolitical consequences.
What makes such change potentially destabilizing is its effect on the perception of the elites on both sides. In China, the political elites may interpret such a rapid shift as evidence of American decline and China’s unstoppable rise. The mindset engendered by this perception will lead to more assertive behavior. In the United States, China’s rapid gains may give rise to anxiety and fear.
However, in managing the changing balance of power between the United States and China, Washington has advantages that Beijing does not have. The United States plays an important role as a strategic balancer in Asia. China’s rise has struck fear among its neighbors, and Beijing’s assertive behavior in 2010 only reconfirmed their worst worries about a powerful China. As a result, these countries—particularly Japan, India, South Korea, Indonesia, and Vietnam—are motivated to strengthen their ties with the United States.
So when we talk about the U.S.-China balance of power, we must also factor in the power of America’s allies and friends in Asia that can be called upon to counter China.
Will the Obama administration press China on human rights? What is the current state of human and political rights in China?
President Obama will likely talk tough on human rights, but this will not be the most important issue for the summit. The United States does not have a lot of direct leverage on China in pressing for substantive and broad-based improvement in human rights.
China’s human rights record is very mixed. In terms of economic rights and personal freedom, the country has seen significant progress in the last thirty years. Lifting several hundred million people out of poverty is one example. Physical mobility, lifestyle choices, access to information, and the freedom to travel overseas have expanded for nearly all Chinese.
But at the same time, civil liberties (the freedoms of association, speech, and religion) remain tightly controlled. Basic political rights, such as the right to vote and organize opposition parties, simply do not exist. The ruling Communist Party continues to try to keep a tight censorship on the media (even though the information revolution is making the task harder and most costly). The party also uses its control of the repressive apparatus of the state to silence and persecute pro-democracy and human rights activists (jailed Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo is the most well-known example).
Another area where China’s human rights performance is severely criticized is its policy toward ethnic minorities, especially those in Tibet and Xinjiang. In the eyes of the international community and these minority groups, Beijing has not lived up to its pledge to protect the rights to local autonomy, religious freedom, and cultural heritage of these ethnic minorities. Instead of seeking endurable political solutions that address the underlying grievances of the Tibetans and the Uighurs, China favors a dual-pronged approach that combines economic development and political repression in these areas.
Will other sensitive issues—Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang—be discussed?
President Hu will perhaps repeat China’s long-standing position on Taiwan in his talks with President Obama, but he will not dwell on Taiwan since, aside from recent dispute over American arms sales to Taiwan, the Taiwan Strait is quiet today.
China’s relationship with Taiwan has improved significantly since May 2008, when President Ma Ying-jeou came to power in Taiwan. The mainland and Taiwan signed a free-trade agreement and resumed direct commercial flights. So things look pretty good for China at the moment.
On Tibet and Xinjiang, Obama will urge Hu to resume meaningful dialogue with the Dalai Lama and urge China to respect the cultural rights and religious freedoms of ethnic minorities. Hu is not likely to make any concessions on Tibet or Xinjiang, which China regards as its “internal affairs.”
How strong are U.S.-China relations? How effectively are Washington and Beijing working together on critical regional and global challenges?
The relationship is neither strong nor weak. It is complex, dynamic, and multi-faceted. The United States and China are rivals and partners at the same time. In geopolitical terms, they are more rivals than partners; in economic terms, they are more partners than rivals.
When translated into their management of regional and global challenges, this complexity means that Washington and Beijing cooperate on some issues but clash over others. One example is North Korea. The United States and China are both rivals and partners on the Korean peninsula. They work together to prevent conflict and war there. But they also work against each other at the same time—the Chinese provide aid to the North Koreans to maintain a strategic buffer against American influence, while the Americans maintain a powerful military presence and alliance structure in the region to balance against growing Chinese power.
On global climate change, the United States and China are also rivals and partners at the same time. They compete against each other for the moral high ground in global climate change negotiations and try to gain support for their respective positions. But at the same time, U.S. and Chinese companies work with each other in developing and commercializing green technologies.
The potential for more effective U.S.-China cooperation in managing regional and global challenges is huge. That would require common interests and mutual trust. At this moment, the relationship clearly has enough common interests but insufficient mutual trust.
