That wording implied that the G8 membership was granted (after years of partial membership) as a reward for Russia’s progress and encouraged its president to stay the course. This emphasized Russia’s difference from its fellow G8ers who had joined the club in mid-1970s: The first six nations got together in 1975 in what was conceived as a forum for the world’s major industrialized democracies; the following year they were joined by Canada—unlike Russia, with no trial period.

Russia has not lived up to the expectations that were laid on her back in 2002. Russia’s dissimilarities from its G8 fellow members are fairly strong and include, to mention just a few, its increasingly authoritarian political regime, its geopolitical vision, as well as its status as an emerging market (it is a member of BRICS, while the other seven belong to the OECD). With increasing assertiveness Russian officialdom claims that Russia does not share Western values.

This rift within the G8 seriously reduces the Group’s relevance in tackling global issues. But in fact, the G8 relevance has been on decline even regardless of Russia’s dissent. The judgment and recommendations of the seven “major industrial democracies” may have mattered back in the 1970s, but over the past years their authority or their capacity to offer solutions to world problems has been repeatedly called in doubt. The rise of emerging markets, China first and foremost, but also India and Brazil, has led to the foundation of the G20—an obvious challenge to the G8 stature.

In fact, the problem with supranational authority is broader than the declining influence of the G8. After the end of the cold war, as the major confrontation of the two poles receded into history, the concept of the “international community” has become problematic. In a world that gets increasingly fragmented—call it multipolar—the ability of international actors to make a difference is strongly limited, especially when it comes to dealing with armed conflicts or inhuman regimes.