“Eurasianism” is not a new idea in Russia. We even have the International Eurasian Movement headed by the philosopher Alexander Dugin. The “Eurasians” have long been searching for a form of international integration—one based around Russia, of course. This idea finally reached the Kremlin’s ears, and in the autumn of 2011, Vladimir Putin published an article setting out his integration plan for the post-Soviet area. The plan called for, first, establishing the Customs Union, and then moving on to the Common Economic Area, which would in turn form the foundation for the Eurasian Economic Union. From there, Putin proposes proceeding to an even higher form of integration—the Eurasian Union. Three countries are taking part in the process so far—Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. There are hopes to expand participation by taking in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and Moscow is putting strong pressure on Ukraine to join the union, too. If we were talking only about a customs union facilitating free movement of people and goods the project could indeed be seen as realistic and useful, even if only temporarily, while the participants have not found alternative opportunities for establishing closer ties with Europe. But if we are talking about a full-fledged union on the lines of the European Union, and this is what Putin has in mind, the conclusions would be very different, all the more so as Putin’s proposals only raise new questions.
He speaks of the new integration resting on a base of underlying shared values. But what are they? The new union’s founders are authoritarian countries after all. Are we then talking about a new “Authoritarian International”? The Eurasian Union, as Putin conceives it, would be “one of the modern world’s poles while at the same time acting as a bridge between Europe and Asia.” This is an ambitious goal. But it is realistic only if the Eurasian Union becomes just as dynamic a community as Europe and some of the Asian countries. As things stand though, we are looking at countries with archaic economies and obsolete power systems that are leaning more and more toward dictatorship. What kind of a “pole” and “bridge” can they be?
Putin’s idea that the Eurasian Union would become “part of a Greater Europe united around the values of freedom, democracy, and market laws” raises even more questions. How can countries drifting toward repressive government become part of Europe? And if the Kremlin really wants the union to become a part of Europe why is it doing its utmost to prevent Ukraine from signing an association agreement with the European Union?
Putin was naturally enough looking for a new idea to mark his return to the Kremlin and settled on “integration” as the new big theme. Expanding Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet area and essentially returning to an ersatz version of the Soviet Union serves to bolster Russia’s great power status, and this status in turn is a central pillar of the personalized power system.
But how realistic are the plans to build the Eurasian Union? The Customs Union is a functional project, but the future will bring problems. Countries unite in order to pursue common aims, and Moscow will come to the point when it has to use the stick and carrot approach to persuade its partners to stay under the common roof.
That the Union’s participants do not all share the same aims comes through in an article by Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev published straight after Putin’s Eurasian manifesto came out. In the article Nazarbayev defends his own claim to the integration idea and also states that it does not involve handing over sovereignty. This is a warning to Putin. Nazarbayev goes on to say that he supports the creation of a Central Asian Union. But how would this body fit with the Eurasian Union? Moreover, Nazarbayev proposes that the future union’s executive bodies be located in Kazhastan’s capital Astana—far from Moscow. This answers the question of how realistic the Eurasian Union project is.