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{
  "authors": [
    "Alexey Malashenko"
  ],
  "type": "commentary",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
    "Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center"
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  "englishNewsletterAll": "",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center",
  "programAffiliation": "",
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  "regions": [
    "Russia",
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  "topics": [
    "Security",
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}

Source: Getty

Commentary
Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center

Crimea’s Tatar Factor

The “Islamic factor” in the Crimean crisis has received relatively little attention so far. However, the complexities of Crimean ethnoreligious realities should not be ignored.

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By Alexey Malashenko
Published on Mar 7, 2014

The “Islamic factor” in the Crimean crisis has received relatively little attention so far. It is inconspicuous, especially in light of the fact that the peninsula looks free of interethnic strife and religious conflicts during these troubled times.

However, the complexities of Crimean ethnoreligious realities should not be ignored. While the statistics are quite muddled, 300,000 Muslims, 12-13 percent of the total population, do live in Crimea. We should not forget that political uncertainty may translate into ethnic and religious tensions in no time. The Tatar views on the future of Crimea should also be taken into account. Incidentally, the Tatars are not planning to secede from Crimea and join Russia as of yet.

In fact, the Crimean Muslim community is rather diverse in its views. Most Tatars are moderate, preserving the memory of Ismail Gaspirali, a renowned 20th-century reformer. At the same time, a significant segment of Muslim youth is quite radical. These people share Salafi attitudes; they sympathize and communicate with their ideological companions in the North Caucasus. These connections date back to the time of the Chechen wars. We know that dozens (quite possibly even hundreds) of wounded militants received medical treatment in Crimea under the watchful eye of their Tatar allies.

Radical ideas continue to spread around Crimea. Several Islamic cells have recently sprung up. Evidently, these are the local branches of Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tahrir. The latter has already gained a foothold in Russia and is now trying to do the same in Crimea. Hizb-ut Tahrir, which is outlawed in Russia and Central Asian countries, has already tried to organize its conference in Simferopol, receiving some support from the local Tatars.

There were also reports of a few hundred Crimean Muslims fighting alongside the Syrian opposition. Thus, local Islamic radicals have become part of the international extremist community and can count on its support if they feel threatened.

The situation in Crimea is far from stable. In this context, the Muslim community is being wooed by a slew of different political forces, both on the local level, in Kyiv and in Moscow. This is certain to continue well into the future. Naturally, Muslims will exercise their freedom of choice in deciding which side to support.

The Islamic radicals stand to benefit from the instability. First, they will now have an easier time influencing the youth and increasing their ranks. Second, the current power vacuum allows them to strengthen their organizational structure. And, believe me, they will. And who will deal with them later? Who will bear responsibility for the Islamist activities in Crimea? Will it be Moscow? Hasn’t it had enough dealing with the North Caucasus?

And don’t forget Turkey. Ankara will definitely remember Crimea. Actually, it has already remembered it—cautiously, for now.

About the Author

Alexey Malashenko

Former Scholar in Residence, Religion, Society, and Security Program

Malashenko is a former chair of the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Religion, Society, and Security Program.

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Alexey Malashenko
Former Scholar in Residence, Religion, Society, and Security Program
Alexey Malashenko
SecurityForeign PolicyReligionRussiaEastern EuropeUkraine

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

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