- +10
James M. Acton, Dan Baer, Mark Baldassare, …
{
"authors": [
"James M. Acton"
],
"type": "other",
"centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"
],
"collections": [
"U.S. Nuclear Policy"
],
"englishNewsletterAll": "ctw",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"programAffiliation": "NPP",
"programs": [
"Nuclear Policy"
],
"projects": [],
"regions": [
"North America",
"United States"
],
"topics": [
"Nuclear Policy",
"Arms Control"
]
}Source: Getty
International Verification and Intelligence
While intelligence sharing creates risks for both national intelligence agencies and international verification organizations, it is ultimately critical to the effective verification of arms control agreements.
Source: Intelligence and National Security
Both national intelligence agencies (NIAs) and international verification organizations (IVOs) attempt to assess compliance with arms control treaties. Their strengths and weaknesses are complementary. Because IVOs are seen as legitimate, they are able to conduct on-site inspections to verify declared activities and to confirm or disprove allegations of clandestine cheating.
NIAs are more flexible and have a greater ability to uncover preliminary evidence of clandestine activities on which further investigations can be based. Such investigations require NIAs to share intelligence with IVOs. While this kind of intelligence sharing is generally permitted by arms control agreements, it is controversial.Nonetheless, it appears to have become more common in recent years, particularly during the International Atomic Energy Agency’s investigation of Iran’s nuclear program. While intelligence sharing creates risks for both IVOs and NIAs, it is ultimately critical to the effective verification of arms control agreements and steps can and should be taken to ensure it becomes more common and less controversial....
The chapter "International Verification and Intelligence" was originally published in the special issue "Intelligence and Nuclear Proliferation" of Intelligence and National Security.
About the Author
Jessica T. Mathews Chair, Co-director, Nuclear Policy Program
Acton holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- What the New Democratic Congress Can (and Can’t) Do on Foreign PolicyCommentary
- Nuclear Weapons and the Future of American PowerPaper
James M. Acton, Ankit Panda
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- To Keep Its Second Place in the Global Battery Race, Seoul Needs More TeammatesCommentary
In an increasingly competitive landscape, Seoul should expand its current partnership with Washington and deepen ties with Brussels and New Delhi.
Darcie Draudt-Véjares, Milo McBride
- Starlink Should Make Europe Act StrategicallyCommentary
Too many national interests, too many EU institutions, and too little political will are preventing Europe from acting in its own best interests.
Judy Dempsey
- California’s Direct Democracy and State Policymaking in the MidtermsCommentary
Voters sent mixed messages about funding priorities.
Mark Baldassare, Ian Klaus
- A New Age of Nuclear Policy: Perspectives from Gen ZCommentary
As the nuclear order rapidly evolves, what can Europeans and other key players do to strengthen deterrence and reduce risks?
Jamie Kwong, ed.
- Will a UN Treaty on Autonomous Weapons Arrive Too Late?Article
The final report by the Group of Governmental Experts is a key milestone toward a potential instrument regulating Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems and has garnered both accolades and criticism.
Charukeshi Bhatt