• Research
  • Emissary
  • About
  • Experts
Carnegie Global logoCarnegie lettermark logo
DemocracyIran
  • Donate
{
  "authors": [
    "Zhang Chuanjie"
  ],
  "type": "legacyinthemedia",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
    "Carnegie China"
  ],
  "collections": [
    "U.S.-China Relations",
    "China’s Foreign Relations"
  ],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie China",
  "programAffiliation": "",
  "programs": [],
  "projects": [],
  "regions": [
    "North America",
    "United States",
    "East Asia",
    "China"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Foreign Policy"
  ]
}

Source: Getty

In The Media
Carnegie China

Leadership Will Define China-U.S. Relations

The future of the U.S.-China relationship depends largely on the relationship between presidents Xi Jinping and Donald Trump and attitudes in their respective countries.

Link Copied
By Zhang Chuanjie
Published on Nov 5, 2017

Source: Global Times

It is no coincidence that Donald Trump’s visit to Beijing comes two weeks after the conclusion of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC). The party has decided that socialism with Chinese characteristics has rolled into a new era. Not only was Xi Jinping unanimously re-elected the general secretary of the party’s central committee, but also his thought was officially enshrined in the newly amended CPC constitution. When Xi led other newly-elected members of the Standing Committee of the 19th CPC Central Committee Political Bureau before global media, it was a clear sign of his strengthened leadership of China.

Now, Beijing is making preparations for Trump’s meeting with his Chinese counterpart. Will the new era of China’s development open a new era of China-U.S. relations? The answer will be largely decided by the leadership of Xi and Trump. What Xi and Trump’s predecessors have historically contributed to this increasingly consequential bilateral relationship can serve as good examples.

Political leadership mean many things, but what constitutes the most important dimensions of effective political leadership for U.S.-China relations? It involves at least two things, both related to the opinions at home in each country.

First, leaders spend time and patience to build consensus and use that consensus as political capital to take the bilateral relationship forward. While Richard Nixon managed to persuade both congress and the public that the United States and China could work together, Mao Zedong also took efforts to convince his colleagues and the public that the Mei Di Guo Zhu Yi (“American imperialism,” aka the United States) may sometimes be regarded as a partner in international politics in order to deal with other greater evils.

During times of difficulties when consensus is impossible and public mood can seriously constrain leaders’ policy choices, leadership entails political courage and craft to prevent the yielding to short-term impulses from derailing strategic interests in the long haul. Thus in the aftermath of June 4th incident of 1989, then-U.S. President George H. W. Bush told Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping through General Brent Scowcroft that his administration still valued the strategic and economic interests of the bilateral relationship but only needed some time to cope with negative opinion about China in the United States. Meanwhile in China, Deng warned leftist factions that reversing the process of economic liberalization may lead the country nowhere. Both leaders were making efforts to keep the relationship from going into choppy waters because of strong opposition at home.

Now is the turn of Xi and Trump. Xi is building consensus at home, and given his more consolidated position, is capable of firewalling the bilateral relationship from the vicissitudes of domestic moods when necessary. The question remains open for Trump.

Reports from the Pew Research Center in recent years point to an increasingly polarized America. Political scientists have identified polarization in congressional ideology, partisan sorting, and negative inter-group affect that the left and the right attribute to each other. Trump certainly is not the cause of political polarization, but what he is doing can hardly reverse that trend either. Against this background of increasing polarization, he is unlikely to have consensus on any salient political issue, including the China-U.S. relationship. Now the question seems to focus on the second aspect of leadership. Is Trump willing to stabilize and carefully manage the overall relationship at a time when playing the blame game on issues such as North Korea or trade is more convenient to please supporters at home?

This does not mean that the two countries should dodge difficult issues for the sake of a pretentiously healthy relationship. North Korea and trade will surely be high on the agenda of Xi and Trump. But Trump’s troubled domestic political situation and his unclear willingness to lead may be a source of major uncertainty in the future of the bilateral relationship. Such moments were seen early during the terms of Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush, but all three of them soon changed course, showing similar learning curves in their China policy.

As many in the United States are concerned, if not worried, as to the direction in which Trump is leading the country, many in China are also curious to know how Trump’s leadership or the absence of it will impact the China-U.S. relationship. Perhaps this month’s meeting will provide some clues.

A version of this article was originally published in Global Times.

About the Author

Zhang Chuanjie

Former Resident Scholar, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy

Zhang Chuanjie was a resident scholar at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center until June 2020.

Zhang Chuanjie
Former Resident Scholar, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy
Zhang Chuanjie
Foreign PolicyNorth AmericaUnited StatesEast AsiaChina

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

  • Japanese troops take part in a counter-landing live fire exercise as part of the annual Balikatan joint military drills on May 04, 2026 in Laoag, Ilocos Norte province, Philippines.
    Article
    The Two Logics Driving Japan’s Security Policy

    Japan’s revision of its three strategic documents reflects an intention to keep the United States engaged in the region while Japan fills any vacuums of U.S. power to preserve the Indo-Pacific order.

      • Ryo Sahashi

      Ryo Sahashi

  • Robot arm with disposable test tube virus sampling in laboratory
    Commentary
    Caught in the Middle: Chinese Biotech Firms’ Divergent Responses to U.S. Sanctions

    Chinese biotech companies have been on the receiving end of U.S. economic coercion. Yet their responses have differed significantly because firm and state interests are not uniformly aligned. For Washington, treating all Chinese tech firms the same, irrespective of their actual interests, risks pushing them farther into Beijing’s corner.

      Xue Gong

  • Two people in blue PPE standing over large metal rolls
    Commentary
    Emissary
    Inside the Global Race to Erode a Battery Manufacturing Monopoly

    Over the past decade, China has moved from marginal player to major producer of all things batteries. The United States, Europe, and others are aiming to balance the market.

      Milo McBride

  • Aerial View of a Geothermal Energy Plant in the Imperial Valley of California near the Salton Sea
    Paper
    A Geothermal and Nuclear Strategy for the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation

    The DFC should focus on advanced, low-carbon energy sources, prioritizing areas where the United States has comparative advantages.

      • Noah J. Gordon

      Noah Gordon, Liana Schmitter-Emerson

  • Lee and Lula walking
    Commentary
    Emissary
    Why Korea’s President Skipped Washington for Silicon Valley and Brasília

    Lee’s tour shows how Seoul is reorganizing its diplomacy away from Pyongyang and toward industrial networks and the geography of the compute economy.

      Darcie Draudt-Véjares

Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Carnegie global logo, stacked
1779 Massachusetts Avenue NWWashington, DC, 20036-2103Phone: 202 483 7600
  • Research
  • Emissary
  • About
  • Experts
  • Donate
  • Programs
  • Events
  • Blogs
  • Podcasts
  • Contact
  • Annual Reports
  • Careers
  • Privacy
  • For Media
  • Government Resources
Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.