An exploration into how India and Pakistan have perceived each other’s manipulations, or lack thereof, of their nuclear arsenals.
Rakesh Sood
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States and experts preoccupied with winning (or at least not losing) wars that could go nuclear have largely ignored questions of post facto accountability.
Source: Journal of Peace and Nuclear Disarmament
If nuclear war occurs, non-belligerents want the conductors to take responsibility for providing assistance to deal with harm imposed on them. This harm could take the form of radioactive fallout, climatic change that causes global food shortages and refugee crises. But states and experts preoccupied with winning (or at least not losing) wars that could go nuclear have largely ignored questions of post facto accountability. Nuclear-armed states claim to be responsible, defensive actors; therefore, they should not object if others demand processes to adjudicate the conduct of nuclear war after the fact and provide reparations and remedies to victims in non-belligerent nations. Indeed, international efforts to establish such accountability could strengthen deterrence against aggression and use of nuclear weapons.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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