Are Germany’s economic, industrial, and political struggles becoming a liability for the EU’s ability to rise to the geopolitical moment?
Rym Momtaz, ed.
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"Manisha Reuter"
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It will likely take more than a strong push from France, Germany, and the Netherlands to ensure that the EU implements a long-term strategy in the Indo-Pacific.
Former Nonresident Senior Fellow, South Asia Program
Frédéric Grare was a nonresident senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where his research focuses on Indo-Pacific dynamics, the search for a security architecture, and South Asia Security issues.
Manisha Reuter
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
Are Germany’s economic, industrial, and political struggles becoming a liability for the EU’s ability to rise to the geopolitical moment?
Rym Momtaz, ed.
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