Xi Jinping As An Ordoliberal: China's Margins For Growth In 2022

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In The Media

Xi Jinping As An Ordoliberal: China's Margins For Growth In 2022

Since the coronavirus outbreak of early 2020, and even more since early 2021, China has maintained restrictive policies for the public budget, credit and interest rates. There may therefore be more margins for government action and support to the economy than generally recognized.

By François Godement

Published on Feb 11, 2022

Institut Montaigne

About the Author

François Godement

Former Nonresident Senior Fellow, Asia Program

Godement, an expert on Chinese and East Asian strategic and international affairs, was a nonresident senior fellow in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Recent Work

Other
Reorienting China Policy By Working With Europe
- François Godement, Ashley J. Tellis
In The Media
China at the Gates: A New Power Audit of EU-China Relations
- François Godement, Abigaël Vasselier

Economy East Asia China

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

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