On May 16, 2024, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace held a workshop for a small group of experts and practitioners to discuss the United Nations and its role in maintaining international peace and security. The paralysis of the UN Security Council in the face of the war in Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas conflict has deepened skepticism about the body’s capacity and legitimacy to advance collective security and promote the international rule of law, particularly when a permanent Security Council member is a belligerent or supports a party in a conflict. Given procedural obstacles to any formal amendment of the UN Charter to alter the council’s composition and decision rules, member states and legal scholars are exploring alternative avenues to strengthen the UN’s capacity to promote and defend international peace and security, including through reinterpretation of the charter, new Security Council working methods, and an expanded purview for the UN General Assembly.
The workshop’s goals were to assess the Security Council’s current dysfunction and practical limits to charter reform, evaluate recent UN innovations to sidestep this paralysis, propose additional creative institutional and legal avenues that might be available, and reconsider the UN’s centrality in a world of competing institutions.
The workshop focused on four critical aspects of the UN:
- The present state of the Security Council
- The implementation of non-amendment reforms
- The exploration of new approaches to UN reform
- The emergence of regional, multilateral, and minilateral arrangements outside the UN
Following opening remarks, the first discussion broadly addressed the use of the veto by the Security Council’s five permanent members—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States; the so-called P5—and the factors that impact the legitimacy of the council. The conversation then transitioned into a comprehensive examination of the non-amendment reforms that have been enacted and potential future reforms aimed at addressing the council’s deficiencies, particularly the use of the veto by a permanent member that is party to a conflict. The workshop concluded with an assessment of the effects of the emergence of various minilateral and regional fora that provide potential alternatives (as well as complements) to the UN in maintaining international peace and security.
The Health of the Security Council
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, and its continued use of its veto power to block action by the Security Council have amplified long-standing criticisms of the body and reinvigorated discussions about increasing its representativeness and effectiveness.
The context of these discussions shifted in the wake of the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel and subsequent Israeli military response, as the United States has received backlash for shielding Israel by vetoing several Security Council resolutions relating to the ongoing hostilities and consequent humanitarian toll in Gaza. (Russia and China have also vetoed resolutions related to the Israel-Hamas conflict. After the workshop, the Security Council passed a resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire as well as a U.S.-drafted resolution backing a ceasefire plan for the war. Neither resolution included any enforcement provisions, and Israel has continued the war without pause as of this writing.)
The current moment thus illuminates an enduring dynamic: the Security Council fails to defend international peace and security when a permanent member is a belligerent or supporter of a belligerent in a conflict. This ailment of the Security Council is a product of its design, and it will persist so long as the permanent members retain veto power for nonprocedural matters.
For this reason, analyzing the health of the Security Council through the lens of veto use by a P5 member is insufficient. The workshop participants discussed additional ways to measure the health of the Security Council. These include:
- The extent to which discord among the P5 spreads into issues where those powers do not have direct interests, impeding other forms of cooperation. For example, the International Crisis Group observed in September 2023 that Russia has become increasingly obstructionist such that “the room for residual major-power cooperation through the UN has started to narrow, and diplomats have found it harder to make compromises on difficult issues than in 2022.”
- The efficacy of the Security Council’s enforcement measures, such as economic sanctions, peacekeeping missions, and use of force authorizations, when adopted.
- The ability of the ten elected, nonpermanent members to influence the Security Council’s operations, including through penholding.
The discussion focused on three key questions: What ails the Security Council? How has the Security Council performed in promoting international peace and security and defending the rule of law? Is the current situation unusual, from a historical perspective, or inherent to the UN Charter?
What ails the Security Council?
Participants identified several key issues that impair the Security Council’s effectiveness. The central problem is the veto power held by the P5, which is frequently wielded according to narrow state interests. This veto power, and even its mere threatened use, prevents critical issues from being effectively addressed. Even among the elected, nonpermanent members of the Security Council (known collectively as the “E10”), this dynamic leads to self-censorship and permits illegal circumstances to persist without any effective response from the Security Council.
Additionally, the Security Council’s traditional function as a forum for the “great powers” of the P5 to coordinate, deliberate, and deconflict has weakened in recent years, exemplified by Russia’s increased veto use and confrontational stance in the council following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Meanwhile, the United States’ repeated use of the veto during the war in Gaza has depleted much of the goodwill the United States had built up in recent years and has placed not just one but two of the P5 members in a defensive stance in the council. This shift is concerning, and reform efforts should focus on incentivizing the great powers to use the Security Council forum rather than merely seeking to obstruct it in times of crisis.
The lack of transparency, consistency, and representativeness of the Security Council was identified as another source of its ill health. The absence of true global representation undermines the legitimacy of the institution. Bad-faith actors sometimes point to inconsistent responses and selective action/inaction as justifications for their behavior. A healthy Security Council would deprive bad-faith actors of this opportunity by demonstrating greater consistency and transparency in its decisionmaking. Several participants stressed that legitimacy is tied to the council’s representativeness and requires qualitative opportunities for dialogue and perceptions of structural balance. Yet, they also noted that states have very different views of how to achieve representativeness—and even if the broad goal is a point of consensus, there will be very little agreement about how to get there. Participants cited PEN America Chief Executive Officer Suzanne Nossel’s recommendation to create new council seats based on the “objective criteria” of population and gross domestic product. There were also discussions on either (1) putting more permanent members into the council or (2) creating a permanent membership for specific geographical regions (with the precise occupant of the seat rotating). Both, however, would require charter reform, which is subject to the P5 veto.
Some participants expressed the concern that there is a tension between enhancing the representativeness of the Security Council and maintaining its effectiveness. Greater diversity of opinions and interests may complicate decisionmaking. Instead, some participants argued that the Security Council is not primarily intended to be representative (that being the function of the General Assembly) but rather to harness and restrain the capacity of the great powers. The council’s enduring value is in providing a venue at which these powers can, in principle, (1) ensure international peace and security and (2) deconflict and ideally coordinate their respective policies. It remains essential to have Russia, China, and the United States, in particular, actively engaged in the Security Council, even if there is imperfect representation and deadlock. Others countered that even if greater representativeness slowed the Security Council, reducing its efficiency, the decisions of a more representative council would be more legitimate and thus more effective.
Capacity was identified as another problem that plagues the Security Council. Even in areas where there is agreement, the council’s implementation mechanisms often fall short. Targeted sanctions are one area in which weak follow-through and oversight undermine the council’s legitimacy, credibility, and effectiveness. The council must focus on creating a new infrastructure to monitor and ensure compliance with its decisions. Additionally, a weak Secretariat has hampered the Security Council’s performance. Sixteen years ago, the Secretariat was sometimes referred to as the council’s sixteenth member. That is no longer the case.
The Security Council’s effectiveness inevitably reflects fluctuations in geopolitical conditions; at times when great powers are willing to cooperate, there are flurries of activity. However, when they decline to cooperate, the council becomes a stage for political theater instead. Despite these challenges, some participants cautioned against overly pessimistic views, noting that the Security Council continues to function with numerous meetings and resolutions, even if they are primarily administrative.
How has the Security Council performed in promoting international peace and security and defending the rule of law?
From a historical political science perspective, it is clear that the Security Council has prevented the scourge of war in the past. The quantitative data show that UN peacekeeping “has a large, positive and statistically significant effect on reducing violence of all sorts.” The findings are so strong that there is no question that peacekeeping reduces deaths, sexual violence, refugee flows, and the likelihood of the recurrence of conflict. Where there are peacekeeping missions, lasting peace agreements are more likely. In short, UN peacekeeping is extremely effective at bringing peace. Moreover, interstate wars have declined overall since World War II, in part because states have often chosen to work through the Security Council to resolve interstate conflict.
And yet dysfunction within the Security Council has been something of a constant. Part of this is a matter of design: gridlock is built into the structure of the UN Charter precisely to prevent unilateralism and hot wars between the P5 states. The council has faced periods of paralysis more than once, but the Cold War period may be the closest fit to the current context. The significant difference today, however, is the inability of P5 members to compartmentalize their conflicts to find areas of consensus in the Security Council. This failure has been felt across the organization. As a result, states have been less likely to pursue their objectives through the UN, seeing it as too cumbersome compared to other institutional alternatives.
Is the current situation unusual, from a historical perspective, or inherent to the UN Charter?
Many of the dynamics in the Security Council today are consistent with the past, but there have been important shifts, as well. In particular, Russia’s stance in the Security Council has changed; it has been unable or unwilling to bracket off its disagreement over the situation in Ukraine to make headway on areas of common ground where they may exist. Notably, China has not followed Russia’s lead in that respect. This creates a possibility that China and the United States may find common ground that could be the basis of a new governing coalition in the Security Council. At the moment, however, P5 members seem less worried about the potential permanent loss of relevance of the Security Council due to its inaction or perception of illegitimacy than they do about the possible negative ramifications of action.
Despite the paralysis of the Cold War-era Security Council, the bipolar world order provided a degree of security and stability. The situation today is more complex. During the Cold War, there were fewer institutional alternatives to the UN. Contrast that with today, where there are many options outside the UN infrastructure, including regional and minilateral bodies. The Security Council does not have the same degree of power or centrality. Even though the council muddled through the Cold War, it may not do so again. If the Security Council continues on its current trajectory, it risks becoming less effective and even falling into irrelevance in a manner analogous to the League of Nations.
This decline will likely be gradual rather than sudden. P5 members should be particularly concerned about losing their influence if international peace and security begin to be managed outside of the UN framework. This is particularly true for Russia, which has fewer sources of global influence than China and the United States. Indeed, the range of alternatives is a distinctive feature of the current moment. A reminder that there are alternatives might help motivate obstructionist states to do more to find common ground at the council, lest its influence wither.
Current Non-Amendment Efforts to Reform or Sidestep the Security Council
The most challenging obstacle to the ability of the UN to fulfill its raison d’etre of maintaining international peace and security is the misuse of the Security Council P5 veto. Despite calls for reform throughout the UN’s history, the UN Charter has been amended just three times, but never in a manner that dilutes, constrains, or otherwise threatens the P5 veto. The reason for this is obvious: the charter’s amendment process has “locked in” P5 control by requiring a favorable vote of all of the P5 members. Efforts to reform the UN through formal amendment have been unsuccessful, which hazards mounting pessimism that the world body is trapped in amber.
However, history demonstrates that the UN has instituted change many times through what might be called “non-amendment reforms”—reform through changes in interpretation and practice rather than through formal amendment. Such reforms have included voluntary abstention in Security Council voting; the Uniting for Peace Resolution; Chapter VI and Chapter VI “plus” peacekeeping; creation of criminal law tribunals, including the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda; and the creation of the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for international crimes committed in Syria.
Workshop participants discussed efforts by member states and other UN stakeholders to reform the Security Council. As is well understood, reforming the Security Council by amending the UN Charter is a challenging feat because it requires the consent of all five permanent members. For this reason, non-amendment reforms—including reinterpreting the charter to enhance the General Assembly’s response to breaches of peace—have been and continue to be the more promising path for reforming the Security Council. Workshop participants highlighted the various non-amendment reforms successfully adopted by the UN, as well as those currently being developed for future consideration. The proposals discussed included the “veto initiative,” reform to Chapter VI, voluntary restraints on the veto, and reforms of other working methods.
The “Veto Initiative” and Efforts to Build on It
A recent, celebrated example of non-amendment reform is the 2022 “veto initiative”: a General Assembly resolution that creates a standing procedure that provides that whenever a veto is cast in the Security Council, the General Assembly will meet within ten working days and “hold a debate on the situation as to which the veto was cast.” This procedure has already been triggered several times.
The veto initiative, introduced by Liechtenstein and adopted unanimously by the General Assembly, has created a measure of accountability for the P5’s use of the veto. It has not only led to timely debates being held within the General Assembly on the vetoes cast by the P5 but also successfully deterred one of the P5 members (China, in the case of Security Council Resolution 2634 on the Gulf of Guinea) from using their veto power. Workshop participants discussed the possibility of the General Assembly adding a mechanism to the veto initiative to hold any veto-wielder accountable for their actions. One proposed option was to put in place a mechanism that would increase the likelihood that the General Assembly would be in a position to adopt a resolution after the referral—for example, by designating a standing working group for this purpose.
The veto initiative has helped crystallize the General Assembly’s role in maintaining international peace and security, particularly when the Security Council fails to act. This point of reflection led to a more extensive discussion on other potential ways to strengthen the role of the General Assembly. Participants acknowledged that the General Assembly has limited powers. For example, it cannot authorize measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The group endorsed further explorations on how to augment the authority of the General Assembly while remaining cautious of future reforms that might infringe upon the powers entrusted to the Security Council. Some raised the concern that non-amendment reform like the veto initiative is essentially a Band-Aid since the real problem is the P5 veto itself. In response, others observed that whether this is true or not, finding ways to work around the veto is essential, given that those who hold it can prevent any formal charter amendment.
Chapter V Article 27(3)
Another non-amendment reform proposal that the group discussed was the interpretation (or revitalization) of Chapter V Article 27(3), which provides: “a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting” in Chapter VI resolutions. As many observers have noted, more could be done to require states to abstain when they are a party to the dispute, consistent with this charter obligation. Doing so could allow the Security Council to proceed with Chapter VI resolutions even if a P5 member is opposed (unlike the case in Chapter VII resolutions, in which a party to a dispute retains the right to vote and veto). In the discussion, questions surfaced about the meaning of a “party,” considering that in many current conflicts, outside powers not directly involved on the front line nevertheless operate through proxies or provide material support to belligerents. It was proposed that the General Assembly consider a resolution reaffirming or reinterpreting Article 27(3) to revitalize Chapter VI. An alternative discussed was to seek an advisory opinion from the ICJ regarding the legal obligations under Article 27(3).
Initiatives to Voluntarily Restrain Veto Use in the Face of Atrocity Crimes
Participants also discussed an existing effort to encourage states to voluntarily refrain from using the veto in the face of atrocity crimes. Some participants advocated reviewing the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group Code of Conduct—which calls upon all members of the Security Council not to vote against any credible draft resolution intended to prevent or halt mass atrocities—to determine whether any member states that endorse the code have violated it. If a member state has done so, are there any steps that could be taken to hold them accountable? Are there ways to build on this voluntary effort? For example, might states declare that they will not support a state for an elected seat on the Security Council unless it has signed the code? Could (and should) the General Assembly seek an advisory opinion from the ICJ on whether a veto of a resolution in the face of atrocity crimes violates the UN Charter? Others suggested proposals to permit the broader UN membership to override a veto in the face of atrocity crimes—perhaps with a three-fourth or seven-eighth vote in the General Assembly—but there was general agreement that this is unlikely to succeed, given that this would require charter amendment and the P5 exercise a veto over such reforms.
While the general view was that each of these proposals has virtues, there are also drawbacks. New ideas are needed to make real progress on UN reform.
Brainstorming New Ways to Strengthen the UN’s Defense of International Peace and the Rule of Law
The workshop took advantage of the group’s expertise to consider new ideas for strengthening the UN’s capacity to defend international peace and the rule of law. Many of these proposals stretch existing authorities and may face legal and policy challenges, yet such challenges have been overcome in the past.
Participants noted that international peace and security conceptions have broadened in recent years. While Security Council action remains irreplaceable in the management of violent conflict, the General Assembly could play a greater role in addressing contemporary global threats that fall outside of this traditional ambit, including planetary crises, such as climate change, pandemic disease, global development, and famine, to name a few. The General Assembly is well-positioned to take the lead in addressing these challenges because every state has equal representation and because the countries bearing the brunt of these challenges are better represented in the General Assembly than in the Security Council. Moreover, the absence of coercive powers may be an asset in these contexts. States may feel free to discuss these broader threats to peace in the General Assembly rather than the Security Council precisely because the General Assembly cannot authorize coercive action.
When it came to situations more likely to fall under the purview of the Security Council, the discussion focused on three additional proposals for non-charter amendment reform of its functioning: (1) creating automatic consequences for grave violations of the UN Charter; (2) declaring vetoes cast in relation to a Security Council resolution concerning an atrocity crime ultra vires; and (3) expanding reform of the council’s working methods.
Automatic Consequences for Grave Violations of the UN Charter
The veto initiative has been effective precisely because it automatically refers any matter vetoed at the Security Council to the General Assembly. This creates diplomatic consequences for exercising a veto. It also ensures that a veto does not end discussion of the matter but merely shifts it to a new venue, by empowering the General Assembly to take up the issue. Could there be other similar opportunities for creating automatic repercussions for specific breaches of the UN Charter?
Building on the veto initiative, the participants discussed a proposal for the General Assembly to pass a framework resolution that would create automatic consequences following a determination that there had been a grave violation of the UN Charter. The General Assembly could make that determination based on its mandate to address international peace and security issues. Alternatively, the General Assembly could refer the matter to the ICJ. The framework legislation would set out the consequences for a violation and rely on the General Assembly’s powers. Repercussions might include, for example, financial penalties; suspension of UN membership; suspension from a UN organ (such as the Economic and Social Council) or a subsidiary organ (like the Board of Auditors); suspension from a UN committee (for example, the Fifth Committee, which addresses administrative and budgetary issues); suspension from speaking during the next General Debate of the General Assembly during the high-level week in September; suspension of the privilege to hold meetings, including informal bilaterals, on UN grounds; or reduction in the number of UN Secretariat positions allocated to a P5 member state’s nationals under the formula for equitable geographic distribution under Article 101 of the charter. Participants discussed the possibility of a simple on/off triggering of this mechanism; another possibility would be establishing a procedure with escalating consequences over time or with set benchmarks that the state in question must meet to avoid the automatic implementation of future sanctions after the initial trigger.
Some participants noted challenges to this proposal beyond the obvious difficulty of building political support for it. In particular, if automatic consequences follow from a determination by the General Assembly that there has been a violation of the charter, that might deter the General Assembly from passing resolutions condemning violations. Relatedly, some expressed concern that triggering automatic consequences could chill rather than encourage debate. Finally, while an automatic approach to consequences makes it more likely they will be put in place, it would also make it difficult to tailor these consequences to the situation at hand.
Declaring Vetoes in Atrocity Crimes Ultra Vires
Under this proposal, vetoes would be considered ultra vires—that is, exceeding the scope of P5 powers—when they are used to prevent the passage of a Security Council resolution to address or prevent an atrocity crime. The argument relies on several legal principles: (1) The UN Charter cannot authorize violations of jus cogens, peremptory norms of customary international law, hence there is no source of power in the charter for exercising a veto that would enable such violations; (2) the International Law Commission’s 2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts establish that states cannot aid jus cogens violations; and (3) states are obliged to exercise due diligence to prevent violations of the Geneva Conventions under Common Article 1 of that instrument.
In the same vein as the first proposal, this idea would rely upon the passage of a framework resolution in the General Assembly that articulates the position that vetoes wielded to block resolutions pertaining to atrocity crimes are ultra vires. Alternatively, the General Assembly could request an ICJ advisory opinion on the legality of a veto in such contexts.
Participants discussed what the legal procedure would be for such a process. One possibility would be to refer individual cases to the ICJ for adjudication according to the principle established by the prior framework resolution or ICJ advisory opinion. There might be an emergency procedure—something close to ICJ rulings on provisional measures—to allow for quick action. Nevertheless, the idea of putting the Security Council on hold while the ICJ deliberates on the legitimacy of a veto was troubling to some discussants. Others noted that the ICJ is not a constitutional court with the power of judicial review. Yet others noted that an advisory opinion is merely advisory—the council is free to accept, reject, or ignore it. And it would be likely to reject an opinion that declares a veto ineffective. Moreover, advisory opinions are not binding on UN organs, and bringing this question in a contentious case would be difficult. Some expressed concerns that the Security Council’s efficiency could be compromised by a procedure that sends vetoes to the ICJ for review. Some believed this proposal would be difficult, if not impossible, to implement in practice.
Working Methods Reforms
Participants proposed that the Security Council’s working methods could be revised to include a greater focus on global threats, such as climate change, that are not directly related to violent conflict but have destabilizing impacts that threaten collective peace and security. This change would have the additional benefit of opening new avenues for nonpermanent Security Council members to spearhead issues of great global importance. This idea was met with reservation by some participants, as it would only expand the scope of issues under the council’s purview—a disconcerting thought for many states, given its recent track record. Broadening the definition of global threats could also influence powerful states to justify more interventionist attitudes. Others suggested more could be done to provide diplomats with information on the workings of the General Assembly and how to trigger action to address such questions.
Participants also discussed revising the way in which members of the Security Council, particularly E10 members, are briefed. E10 members tend to be at an informational disadvantage in the Security Council since they do not possess the institutional memory available to P5 members, sometimes lack capacity to fully participate in briefings, and rarely possess independent “horizon-scanning” capabilities to stay informed on issues likely to appear on the council’s agenda. In order to close this deficit, two proposals were discussed: (1) to institute informal “horizon-scanning” briefings to the Security Council, based either on a fixed schedule or triggered by context-neutral criterion (for example, armed conflicts involving at least one hundred deaths) or (2) to appoint an E10 representative who can obtain briefings and deliver the information received to all of the E10 nations. There was a related proposal for an automatic trigger to be adopted for the secretary-general’s use of Article 99 authority, which permits the secretary-general to raise to the Security Council “any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.”
Widening the Aperture: The Place of the UN in the Evolving World Order
There is a plethora of (sub)regional, multilateral, and minilateral arrangements that national governments have established outside of the UN to advance cooperation, including on matters of international peace and security. Such arrangements are anticipated in the UN Charter, which acknowledges the right of member states to pursue individual and collective self-defense (Art. 51); recognizes a role for regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security (Ch. VIII), the pacific settlement of disputes (Ch. VI, Art. 33), and the enforcement of Security Council resolutions (Ch. VII, Art. 53); and otherwise places few limits on coalitions both standing and ad hoc.
Regional (and Subregional) Organizations
Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has expanded collaborations with regional bodies in conflict prevention, mediation, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. The most prominent, with the African Union (AU), seems poised to intensify as the Security Council works out the details of UN financing for AU-led peacekeeping operations. More generally, UN Secretary-General António Guterres’s “A New Agenda for Peace” envisions these partnerships as a core component of “networked multilateralism.”
Collective Defense Arrangements
Doubts about the UN’s capacity to defend international rule of law incentivize countries to invest in collective and individual self-defense. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, for example, has breathed new life into NATO as a self-perceived bulwark of the “rules-based international order.” In the Asia-Pacific, the United States and its allies have sought to deter Chinese assertiveness by redoubling the U.S. alliance system and launching new initiatives such as AUKUS (a trilateral security partnership that includes Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and the Quad (a strategic security dialogue that includes Australia, India, Japan, and the United States). The deterioration of major-power relations poses multiple risks, including lowering barriers to the use of force without Security Council authorization.
Minilateral Forums
Finally, standing minilateral groupings, notably the G7, G20, and BRICS+, compete with the UN in setting the global agenda. Although these forums lack mandates for managing security crisis responses, they possess geopolitical heft by virtue of their compositions. Their agendas continue evolving as they identify priorities their members pledge to pursue. Symbolically, the G20 and BRICS+ represent a move toward a more inclusive international order that Security Council reform efforts have failed to deliver. Even if they cannot fill the gap created by Security Council paralysis, these forums’ existence could be seen as a challenge to its legitimacy and the UN’s centrality in international diplomacy.
These regional, multilateral, and minilateral arrangements are growing as member states and other stakeholders find new ways of cooperating on matters of international peace and security. Regional, multilateral, and minilateral arrangements are generally more specialized than the UN. The division of tasks among these various arrangements is often more flexible than at the UN, with regional organizations and non-state actors playing a pivotal role in their adaptability. These arrangements do not necessarily compete with the UN; indeed, they can engage in burden-sharing with the UN.
The current global order is a network of various organizations including state and non-state actors. Governance within this web has evolved past the G7 paradigm; regional arrangements and similar entities, like regional agencies, increasingly assist the public sector in tackling significant problems, such as climate change, food security, and migration. Workshop participants emphasized the need to balance the use of these arrangements to avoid carving out the world into competitive groupings of like-minded states.
The UN’s previous collaborations with the AU on hybrid peacekeeping operations were cited as an example of a successful partnership between a regional organization and the UN. During this discussion, two clarifying questions were posed: (1) Would these arrangements be more successful if they were divided (or structured) according to their work, such as development versus security activities, and (2) What is the correct division of labor between these arrangements and the UN? Given that the General Assembly, unlike the Security Council, is not coercive, it may be the more appropriate body as the first option for seeking cooperation for these arrangements. There may be situations, particularly peacekeeping situations, where these specialized arrangements, rather than the UN, ought to be the first responders in times of conflict or crisis.
The rise of several (sub)regional, multilateral, and minilateral arrangements does pose some dangers. Some workshop participants expressed concerns that the abundance of alternative fora has led to more forum shopping. (Others countered that forum shopping is not a real threat to the UN, given that the limits of these organizations are apparent.) Some expressed concern that these arrangements might lead to fragmentation. Regional, multilateral, and minilateral arrangements often also suffer from underinvestment.
The group agreed that despite the rise of large numbers of international arrangements of various kinds, there are at least three key qualities of the UN that no other international organization possesses: (1) it has a distinctive role in maintaining international peace and security, given that only the Security Council may authorize lawful uses of force beyond self-defense; (2) the UN is also distinctively global in its universal membership—with 193 state parties, it is more representative than any other global organization; and (3) it is a genuinely multipurpose organization, with jurisdiction over the entire global agenda. At present, these features make the UN irreplaceable. The key to global rule of law is not to replace the UN but to ensure that the many new organizations collaborate, rather than compete, with it to achieve their shared aims more effectively.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Maggie Mills, Cindy Garay, and Emma Klein for their extraordinary support for the workshop. The authors are also grateful to workshop participants for their invaluable contributions to our deliberations.
Appendix: Recommended Readings
Acharya, Amitav, and Dan Plesch, “The United Nations: Managing and Reshaping a Changing World Order,” Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 26, no. 2 (June 11, 2020): 221–235, https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02602001.
Acharya, Amitav, Antoni Estevadeordal, and Louis W. Goodman, “Multipolar or multiplex? Interaction capacity, global cooperation, and world order,” International Affairs 99, no. 6 (November 2023): 2339–2365, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiad242.
Adebajo, Adekeye et al., UN Security Council Reform: What the World Thinks, ed. Stewart Patrick, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 28, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/06/28/un-security-council-reform-what-world-thinks-pub-90032.
Hathaway, Oona A., Maggie Mills, and Heather Zimmerman, “Crisis and Change at the United Nations: Non-Amendment Reform and Institutional Evolution,” Michigan Journal of International Law, forthcoming, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4817650.
Howard, Lise, “Does UN Peacekeeping Work? Here’s the data,” UN Story, December 10, 2022, YouTube video, https://www.un.org/en/video/does-un-peacekeeping-work-here%E2%80%99s-data.
International Peace Institute, “25 Years of POC and the UN Security Council: Challenges and Opportunities,” May 20, 2024, YouTube video, https://www.ipinst.org/2024/05/25-years-of-poc-and-the-un-security-council-challenges-and-opportunities#2.
International Peace Institute and Institute for Economics and Peace, Multilateralism Index: Pilot Report, September 2022, https://www.ipinst.org/2022/09/multilateralism-index-pilot-report.
Kellogg, Marion K., “The Laos Question: Double What Veto?” Virginia Law Review 45, no. 8 (December 1959): 1352–1360, https://doi.org/10.2307/1070683.
Marschik, Axel, “Improving the UN Response to Aggression and Mass Atrocities,” in Mona Ali Khalil and Floriane Lavaud, eds., Empowering the Security Council: Reforms to Address Modern Threats (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
Nossel, Suzanne, “How America Can Win Over the Global South: It’s Time to Expand the UN Security Council,” Foreign Affairs, July 7, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-america-can-win-over-global-south.
Trahan, Jennifer, Existing Legal Limits to Security Council Veto Power in the Face of Atrocity Crimes (Cambridge University Press, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108765251.
Trahan, Jennifer, “The Role of the UN Security Council and General Assembly in Responding to the Invasion of Ukraine,” Polish Review of International and European Law 12, no. 2 (February 13, 2024): 23–64, https://doi.org/10.21697/2023.12.2.02.
Walter, Barbara F., Lise Morje Howard, and V. Page Fortna, “The Extraordinary Relationship between Peacekeeping and Peace,” British Journal of Political Science 51, no. 4 (October 2021): 1705–1722, doi:10.1017/S000712342000023X.
