How China is Adapting to Tajikistan’s Demand for Security Cooperation

Preface

China Local/Global

China has become a global power, but there is too little debate about how this has happened and what it means. Many argue that China exports its developmental model and imposes it on other countries. But Chinese players also extend their influence by working through local actors and institutions while adapting and assimilating local and traditional forms, norms, and practices.

Carnegie has launched an innovative body of research on Chinese engagement strategies in seven regions of the world—Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, the Pacific, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Through a mix of research and strategic convening, this project explores these complex dynamics, including the ways Chinese firms are adapting to local labor laws in Latin America, Chinese banks and funds are exploring traditional Islamic financial and credit products in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and Chinese actors are helping local workers upgrade their skills in Central Asia. These adaptive Chinese strategies that accommodate and work within local realities are largely ignored by Western policymakers.

Ultimately, the project aims to significantly broaden understanding and debate about China’s role in the world and to generate innovative policy ideas. These could enable local players to better channel Chinese energies to support their societies and economies; provide lessons for Western engagement around the world, especially in developing countries; help China’s own policy community learn from the diversity of Chinese experiences; and potentially reduce frictions.

Evan A. Feigenbaum

Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Introduction

Over the past decade, the authoritarian government of Emomali Rahmon has consolidated its power while Russia has reduced its military presence in Tajikistan, calling into question Russia’s reliability as Tajikistan’s primary security partner. This opening has allowed China to play a more prominent role in Tajikistan’s security. Tajikistan’s partnership with China has become a fertile testing ground for Chinese security initiatives. This experimentation is exemplified by investments from Huawei to build a surveillance infrastructure, Chinese military aid, and joint exercises between the Tajik and Chinese militaries. The arrival of Chinese investments were spurred on by tumultuous regional developments. The emergence of Syria as a haven for foreign fighters after 2011 along with the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan in 2021 have heightened threat perceptions for both China and Tajikistan further driving coordination and cooperation.

Seeing these regional threats along with internal instability, Rahmon’s government has sought out Chinese investments to meet its own domestic objectives, instead of China purely imposing upon Tajikistan to accept its growing presence. The country’s security forces have primarily been deployed to suppress internal dissent, most recently in the Pamir region. The pull from Tajikistan instead of the push from China has shaped the scope, intensity, and specifics of cooperation. In November 2021, for example, it was Tajikistan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs that invited the Chinese government to fund a new paramilitary facility in the Wakhan Corridor on the border with Afghanistan, not Beijing that proposed it. Chinese support is being shaped by the regime in ways that help it maintain its grip on power and the country’s resources.

Why Does China Support Tajikistan?

China supports the government of Emomali Rahmon, who has ruled since 1992, because he is a long-time partner and potential bulwark against instability. Tajikistan, Central Asia’s poorest country with a weak military, and long border with Afghanistan, is a potential weak point through which Uyghur terrorists might try to capitalize to launch operations into Xinjiang. In 2014, Xi Jinping stated that “after the United States pulls out of Afghanistan, terrorist organizations positioned on the frontiers of Afghanistan and Pakistan may quickly infiltrate into Central Asia.” This comment proved prescient as Chinese nationals in Central Asia have become targets of terrorist attacks. The Islamic State of Khorasan Province attacked a Kabul hotel that is frequented by Chinese delegations killing five Chinese citizens in December 2022. Dozens of Chinese citizens have been killed in Pakistan by a range of terrorist groups since 2021. In November 2024, an attack on a Chinese mine near the Afghan border left one Chinese citizen dead and four injured. Besides threatening Chinese workers, these attacks also endangered Chinese investments as well, leading China to expand its security assistance program in the region—especially in Tajikistan. Despite Russia still being the main security provider for Tajikistan, China’s presence in the nation is growing.

Agreements, Visits, and Meetings

In July 2024, Xi Jinping arrived for a state visit to Dushanbe and was received with much fanfare. During a speech to the media, he stated it is “important to deepen security cooperation and create a security barrier for the development of the two countries.” President Rahmon vowed, “to ensure through joint efforts the sustainable development of the region and collectively counteract the challenges and threats that are common to all of us.”

Regular high-level visits and meetings and the signing of agreements in the field of security and technology indicate the increasing institutionalization of relations. The basis of bilateral cooperation is based on 300 agreements covering almost all areas of activity, as well as various agreements established by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), of which both are founding members. Key agreements on security issues between the two countries include a law enforcement cooperation agreement and a cooperation agreement to combat terrorism, separatism, and extremism signed in 2002 and 2003 respectively. They also signed a Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership agreement in 2024, elevating ties to the highest level.

Meetings take place on a regular basis. Between 1992 and 2023, there were at least 117 meetings between senior officials from both countries where security was on the agenda. Regular meetings occur between Tajikistan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and State Committee on National Security and China’s Ministry of Public Security, and between both countries’ Ministries of Defense, Ministries of Foreign Affairs, and Prosecutors General Offices, all of which have a focus on security.

Training and Joint Exercises

The Chinese government increasingly provides training to Tajik security officials. The PRC’s Ministry of Public Security has led cooperation in this regard. Niva Yau, nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub, compiled a list of training activities involving Tajik and Chinese government actors until 2021, finding that China’s Ministry of Public Security accounted for fifteen of the twenty-one activities she identified. Other actors are also involved. For example, in October 2024, a delegation from China’s Criminal Police University trained twenty-seven representatives from the Ministry of Internal Affairs in crime scene investigation, terrorism in China, combating money laundering, counter-narcotics, and online crimes. Courses have also been offered for Tajikistan’s Drug Control Agency.

Tajikistan participated in nineteen of the thirty-six joint military exercises China was involved in with militaries from Central Asia between 2002 and 2023. Of these, the vast majority were conducted through the SCO, with six being organized bilaterally (see table 1). 

Exercises have involved both military units and internal security forces, with all focusing on border security and joint counterterrorism operations in line with their collective concerns over spillovers across the Tajik–Afghan border and the Tajik government’s concerns around internal rebellions or coups. In 2023, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Public Security pledged to organize joint anti-terrorist exercises at least once every two years in a further sign of the growing institutionalization of ties. The training and exercises bolster the security forces’ ability to suppress insurgencies. Exercises are designed to mirror the kind of small-scale violence that has erupted periodically since 1991. Despite claiming to be fighting terrorism, most of the political violence in the country since independence has been driven by domestic struggles for political control. China’s assistance, which has focused on counterterrorism and border security, is particularly helpful to the regime as it seeks to stamp out opposition.

Paramilitary Facility, Joint Patrols, and Operations

In 2016, China’s Ministry of Public Security established a military facility in Tajikistan’s Pamir region. Located ten miles from the Afghan border, the facility includes space for 500 personnel and a helipad. It is China’s first security facility in the region and first outside its territory. It foreshadowed the expansion of other Chinese military facilities in Djibouti, Cuba, and Argentina.

In 2023, China’s Lanzhou University established a weather station in southern Tajikistan near the Afghan and Uzbek borders. Ostensibly used for climate and environmental monitoring, the station could also be used to monitor militant movements in nearby Afghanistan.  Lanzhou University has proven links to China’s defense industry. Rather than China forcing Tajikistan’s government to accept its presence, it is often the Tajik side asking for more Chinese support. The SCO, which is dominated by China, has discussed establishing a second regional counterterrorism center (the other having been launched in 2004 in Tashkent). Speaking to the Chinese media in 2024, President Rahmon commented that “considering that our country is on the front line of the fight against the drug threat, we consider the placement of this SCO [counterterrorist] center in Tajikistan to be completely fair.”

Beyond China’s growing network of facilities, it has deepened cooperation with Tajik counterparts along the border. Tajikistan and China share a 296-mile border, which was fully delimited in 2011. Since then, cooperation has increased between the People’s Armed Police and People’s Liberation Army and Tajikistan’s State Committee on National Security, which are collectively responsible for border security. A joint operation involving over 5,000 officers in November 2014 resulted in the arrest of thirty-eight drug smugglers. Chinese and Tajik forces have also conducted joint patrols along the border in 2017 and 2019. Such exercises benefit both sides, but particularly build the capacity of the Tajik side to maintain security and keep the regime in power.

Security Assistance and Arms Supplies

Russia remains the dominant provider of security assistance, including arms, non-lethal equipment and aid for infrastructure, accounting for over 90 percent of arms transferred to the country since independence in 1991. But in recent years, China has made inroads into this sector.

According to local media, at least $10 million in aid was transferred from the Chinese government to the Tajik Ministry of Defense from 1991 to 2006. Since then, increasing numbers of Chinese-made arms have been on display in military parades in Tajikistan. Equipment that has been gifted to Tajikistan from China since 2018 includes Norinco VP-11 mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles, Shaanxi Baoji Tiger vehicles, Norinco CS/VN3 light tactical armored vehicle, Type 56-3 7.62 mm assault rifles, LR2 12.7 mm rifles, and CS/SS4 82 mm self-propelled mortars. The Chinese side has also given non-lethal equipment. The PRC Ministry of Public Security gave the Tajik Ministry of Internal Affairs $500,000 in non-lethal equipment in 2011 and $150,000 in clothing in 2015.

China has also focused particularly on building facilities for Tajikistan’s security apparatus. The following table (table 2) lists some of the main projects:

Opening ceremonies for new buildings have been attended by senior officials, including President Rahmon, ministers from both sides and China’s ambassador, highlighting the importance placed on this area of cooperation. The construction of paramilitary bases, border complexes, and training centers simultaneously contributes to Tajikistan’s dependence on Chinese technology and infrastructure, which in the long term may limit its independence in making decisions in the security sphere. But at the same time, more advanced facilities and equipment bolster the ability of the regime to maintain control.

Smart Cities and Surveillance

China has become known as a leading innovator in the realm of digital authoritarianism. In 2015, China launched the Digital Silk Road to develop new infrastructure. This investment in digital infrastructure includes 5G, smart cities, cloud computing, and fiber optic cables. Tajikistan has joined this effort. Dushanbe launched its Safe City project in 2013, with support from Huawei and a $21 million loan from the Export-Import Bank of China, installing 870 cameras in the capital city. Huawei trained over fifty employees from Tajikistan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs to install and use the new surveillance system.

Huawei communications equipment serves nearly nine million local wireless users, or over 70 percent of the market. In 2023, Huawei signed an agreement to install 7,600 cellular communication stations across the country to allow access to mobile internet. Chinese company Hytera provided radio equipment for the 2019 Commonwealth of Independent States summit and SCO summit in 2021, both held in Dushanbe.

Chinese technology has also enabled the monitoring of internet traffic. In collaboration with the security services, Tajikistan’s State Communications Service established the “Unified Electronic Communications Switching Center” (EKTs) in 2016 at a cost of $50 million. The equipment was purchased from the Chinese company ZTE. The government claimed the system was aimed at “ensuring national and information security,” as well as the ability to keep “gray traffic” and telephone conversations under control. But in reality, it gives the government the ability to surveil citizens’ online activities and even suspend mobile and wireless connectivity entirely during crises for the regime, a step taken by the government in the Pamir region on numerous occasions since 2018.

However, this technological dependence raises concerns from a national security perspective. The integration of Chinese technologies into key areas such as e-government, intelligent transportation systems, and city management systems provides Huawei with direct access to Tajikistan’s information and communication networks. If the government is concerned, it’s not evident, as it is the Tajik side that often calls for new investments. President Rahmon meets with Chinese technology companies on a regular basis. In 2015, he expressed interest in ZTE expanding its footprint in the country. He repeated the call for greater Chinese investment in the country’s tech sector on a visit to China in 2022.  In 2022, Chinese company Hytera Public Safety Solutions held a conference for thirty government officials in which they showcased their surveillance technology and established relationships with government contracts. The Head of the Communications Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Tajikistan said they had achieved “amazing results.”

China’s primary vector of influence on Tajikistan’s legal system has been the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The SCO has served as a platform for seeking regional consensus over concepts like information security, cyber sovereignty, and internet sovereignty. These are based on respect for national sovereignty and non-interference in efforts to curtail online activities that undermine public safety.

China has worked with officials in Central Asia to harmonize understanding over key concepts and norms. For example, the International Congress of Deputies of the Parliaments of the Central Asian States, which was held in October 2024 in China, aimed to share model bills and form common approaches to managing a range of issues. The Tajik delegation expressed a particular interest in developing common approaches to countering extremism. Such exchanges of ideas and practices help the Tajik side strengthen their control by emulating policies adopted by their eastern neighbor to suppress and control populations in regions like Xinjiang.

The “Safe City” system, related to transport management and public order, is only part of a larger strategy of introducing surveillance technologies. These projects are becoming an important tool for monitoring and controlling civil society. This cooperation is not imposed on Tajikistan from the outside, but is conditioned by the interests of the Tajik authorities themselves, who seek to strengthen their control and suppress possible sources of discontent in society.

Conclusion

Tajikistan has become a vivid example of how local governments are leaning on China to strengthen their regimes. Over the past two decades, China has significantly strengthened its presence in the country using financial, technological, and military instruments. While dependence on China may be growing, the Tajik side still shapes the relationship and forms of support that China provides.

Tajikistan is in many ways a pilot project for China, testing various mechanisms of influence that can later be transferred to other countries in the region. Cooperation with Tajikistan demonstrates the successful integration of Chinese technologies, such as Huawei's developments in 5G and smart cities, as well as an example of how China supports authoritarian regimes through financial, economic, and military assistance. China actively supplies weapons and participates in joint military exercises, which leads to the strengthening of its military presence in Tajikistan. These technologies and military aid strengthen the authoritarian regime, allowing it to consolidate its power by suppressing the opposition and neutralizing any attempts at resistance.