Soft Power: A Strategy for UK Success? Written Evidence for the UK Parliament

The evidence presented in this submission is the authors’ own, and does not reflect an official organisational position of the Oxford China Policy Lab.

Why is soft power important? How might this concept be measured? What tangible benefits does soft power provide to the UK's international relationships? To trade? To support for the rules-based international order?

1. Soft power represents a critical dimension of international influence that complements traditional hard power capabilities; both are essential to national competitiveness. Building on Joseph S. Nye, Jr. ’s canonical work Soft Power, we define soft power as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.”¹ This distinction is critical: developing policies and institutions that other countries want to adopt can spread influence without the diplomatic costs of coercion.
2. The UK has developed substantial soft power in artificial intelligence (AI), especially in areas like AI safety and security technical and policy research. Britain's thriving AI research community, world-leading AI Security Institute (FKA AI Safety Institute, abbreviated UK AISI), and deliberate policy actions collectively shape the strategic landscape to serve UK interests without resorting to coercive measures. They offer clear evidence of the UK’s ability to transform substantial investment and entrepreneurial spirit into world-class institutions that are shaping the norms of AI, creating critical pathways to advance British interests.
3. AI could be the most transformative technology of our generation, with potential to either significantly advance or profoundly damage human progress. Thanks to the resourcefulness of policy entrepreneurs in government, industry, academia, and civil society, the UK now occupies an influential position in the global AI ecosystem—as a norm-shaper, security convener, and innovation hub. Maintaining leadership in AI development and governance is essential for both national security and economic prosperity.
4. This assessment aligns with stated government priorities:
   1. Prime Minister Keir Starmer: “Artificial Intelligence will drive incredible change in our country.”²
   2. Science, Innovation, and Technology Secretary Peter Kyle: “We already have remarkable strengths we can tap into when it comes to AI – building our status as the cradle of computer science and intelligent machines and establishing ourselves as the third largest AI market in the world.”³
   3. Foreign Secretary David Lammy: “We should be leading global diplomatic efforts to stop AI from being exploited by terrorists, criminals and autocrats hoping to use it to suppress freedom, disseminate misinformation and undermine democratic processes. We should work with the widest possible coalition of countries on AI development and governance, including in areas of the impact of technology on nuclear weapons.”⁴
5. Since its establishment in 2023, the UK AISI has pioneered critical norms in international AI governance that have substantially advanced the UK’s national security interests. Since its formation, UK AISI has secured leading commitments from frontier AI companies to develop safety frameworks to protect against the most extreme harms of AI.
6. Critically, the UK brought the US and the PRC – the world’s two leading AI powers – to the table during heightened geopolitical tension in 2023 to the world’s first AI Safety Summit at Bletchley Park. There they signed the UK-led Bletchley Declaration, a world first for AI safety and security.⁵ If, as noted previously, soft power is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion, the fact that PRC leaders frequently praise the Bletchley Declaration for its positive role in international AI governance demonstrates the UK’s ability to establish truly globally accepted norms.⁶
7. Further, the Bletchley Summit set a new annual norm: it has since been followed by the 2024 Seoul Declaration and the 2025 Paris Summit. It has also helped inspire the establishment of several AISIs in other countries, including the United States, South Korea, Canada, and Japan.
8. The tangible benefits of AI-based soft power can be measured through several metrics:
   1. Policy emulation: The establishment of similar institutes and networks⁷ in South Korea, Japan, the PRC, Singapore, India, France, and the EU demonstrates the UK's normative influence.
   2. Corporate alignment: UK AISI’s norm entrepreneurship has extended to industry, including bringing together frontier AI companies from across jurisdictions to agree to produce safety frameworks. UK-led international efforts have inspired similar domestic efforts to facilitate industry commitments in the PRC.⁸
   3. Academic collaboration: Citation metrics and international research partnerships initiated by UK institutions within AI safety and governance.
9. These soft power assets strengthen a rules-based international order, within which evolving AI systems can benefit rather than harm society, by establishing norms for responsible AI development before national approaches become further entrenched and difficult to reconcile.

What should the objective of soft power be, for example, to achieve economic growth for the UK overseas, bolster its influence or other?

The UK's AI soft power strategy should pursue multiple complementary objectives:

10. Cultivate and demonstrate democratic flourishing with AI: The UK should evidence how advanced technologies can strengthen rather than undermine democratic values and institutions, serving as a powerful counterpoint to technological authoritarianism.
11. Drive economic growth through quality innovation: A reputation for quality and beneficial AI systems will vastly enhance UK competitiveness in global AI markets. In simple terms: ensuring the safety of these systems is not incompatible with innovation and economic growth; adequate safeguards built into advanced AI systems increase the quality and reliability of resulting products, as well as their utility in cultivating meaningful economic growth. Over time, quality AI systems designed with the public interest in mind are more likely to organically outcompete systems developed haphazardly and for the pure purpose of corporate profit, both domestically and globally.
    1. Expertise as Export: Further, the UK has already committed considerable resources into thinking out approaches to AI governance, security, and safety. This in turn can create opportunities for its firms specialising in AI auditing, quality & safety evaluation, and responsible deployment. The UK can export lessons it has learned to other nations and companies in this space.
12. Reinforce the UK as an essential mediator: As tensions between the US and PRC grow in the technology sphere, and as countries increasingly pursue diverging approaches to AI development and governance, the UK can serve as a credible bridge-builder that maintains productive relationships with both powers while advancing its own national and international interests. This already has recent and clear precedent
    1. Shape international norms and standards: The UK should continue to leverage its position to influence how AI is developed, deployed, and governed globally.
    2. Build trust and foster collaboration: By positioning itself as a responsible steward of AI advancement, the UK can strategically build partnerships with both leading AI nations (US, PRC) and ambitious emerging powers (India, African Union members, South Korea, Japan).
13. Leverage AI to expand diplomatic engagement beyond developed economies: The UK must position its AI governance leadership as serving the distinctive needs of developing economies.⁹ By developing and sharing lightweight evaluation and safety tools accessible to countries with more modest technical infrastructure, the UK can demonstrate that responsible AI governance is not exclusively for advanced economies. This approach directly counters narratives from China and Russia that only state-centric or resource-intensive models can manage AI effectively.
14. Attract global talent and investment: A reputation for balanced, innovation-friendly, and quality-conscious AI governance can make (and keep) the UK the preferred destination for top researchers and companies seeking a supportive but responsible regulatory environment.

How might the FCDO engage with the media and private sector to strengthen its soft power offering?

15. To maximize soft power benefits from this approach, the FCDO should:
    1. Demonstrate civic engagement in AI policy: Showcase how the UK involves civil society, academic institutions, and diverse stakeholders in AI policymaking, highlighting the stark contrast with authoritarian approaches to technology governance.
    2. Develop AI ambassadors: Train select diplomatic staff as specialists in AI development, ethics, and governance, enabling them to effectively represent UK positions in international forums and bilateral engagements.
    3. Proactively communicate AI implementation successes: Regularly brief Parliament, international partners, and industry stakeholders on how AI is enhancing diplomatic operations—highlighting efficiency gains, cost savings, and novel capabilities. Quantifying benefits (e.g., "AI translation tools have enabled 40% more engagement with non-English speaking communities") provides concrete metrics of success.
    4. Establish public-private AI diplomacy forums: Create structured opportunities for UK AI firms to engage with diplomatic counterparts, facilitating commercial diplomacy while ensuring alignment with UK foreign policy objectives.
    5. Commission and publicise case studies: Document specific instances where UK AI governance approaches have been adopted internationally, demonstrating the real-world impact of British leadership.
16. OCPL research indicates that successful soft power in the AI domain requires coherent messaging, backed by meaningful action, across government, academia, and industry that emphasises the UK's balanced approach to innovation and responsibility.

How does soft power interact with and complement the UK's foreign policy? In what ways does soft power support the UK's foreign policy? Are there challenges in this relationship?

17. Foreign Secretary David Lammy has indicated the FCDO's intention to leverage AI in its strategic approach, stating: "I believe that AI can be transformative for the practice of diplomacy. And I am determined for the Foreign Office to be a pioneer in harnessing its power. An upgraded data science team will sit at the core of this office, bringing more empirical rigour to everything that we do."
18. AI-focused soft power complements UK foreign policy by allowing Britain to influence global technological behaviors and outcomes without resorting to costly coercion. The UK can influence global technology norms and development pathways, while maintaining productive relationships that advance broader foreign policy goals.
19. UK soft power in the realm of AI development and governance would provide incalculable foreign and industrial policy advantages, including:
    1. Longevity as a leading technological power: As AI becomes increasingly central to global power, establishing early leadership in both AI’s development and governance would ensure the UK's continued influence regardless of shifts in conventional hard versus soft power metrics. Leadership in a combination of AI development, governance, and healthy societal integration is crucial to remain a legitimate “leader” internationally.
    2. Access and insight: Leadership in AI governance forums provides early awareness of emerging technologies and their implications, informing more effective foreign policy responses.
    3. Agenda-setting power: The ability to determine which issues receive priority attention in international AI discussions aligns global governance efforts with UK interests and values.
    4. Value promotion: The UK's human-centered approach to AI reinforces its broader commitment to democratic values, human rights, and the rule of law.
    5. Coalition building: Technical leadership provides the credibility needed to form effective coalitions on emerging governance challenges, from social media regulation to autonomous weapons.
20. However, several challenges exist in this relationship:
    1. Maintaining democratic integrity: By successfully maintaining healthy democratic processes and governance structures that are responsive to the needs of the public, the UK could demonstrate that technological advancement need not come at the expense of civil liberties or democratic governance—a powerful rebuke to authoritarian techno-narratives. This is foundational to the UK’s soft power at home and abroad, and requires consistent proactive maintenance.
       1. Balancing openness and security: The UK must navigate tensions between promoting open research that enhances its soft power and protecting sensitive technologies with national security implications.
       2. Addressing domestic tensions: As noted in Blomquist's (2023) House of Lords session, there are inherent tensions between values like freedom of speech and the need for content moderation in AI systems.¹⁰ Successfully navigating these tensions domestically would strengthen the UK's status as a leading democratic nation internationally, but is an inherently contentious process riddled with tradeoffs.
       3. Avoiding irreversible concentration of power: The UK must actively prevent excessive concentration of AI capabilities among a few tech giants or state actors, as ensuring diverse ownership and access patterns will be crucial to prevent anti-democratic consolidation of influence that undermines democratic principles and creates potentially insurmountable power imbalances and the erosion of institutional accountability mechanisms.
    2. Resource constraints: Effective AI diplomacy requires sustained investment in technical expertise within the diplomatic corps—a resource-intensive commitment that competes with other priorities.
    3. Maintaining distinct identity: As the EU implements its comprehensive AI Act and the US pursues its own approach to rapid AI development, the UK must develop and communicate a distinctive governance model that reflects its particular strengths and values as a responsible home for high quality innovation.
    4. Managing technological nationalism: Rising technological nationalism globally challenges the UK's ability to promote international cooperation in AI governance.

How does the UK counter the soft power influence and narrative of other major powers including China, India, Russia and Turkey?

21. The UK faces increasing competition in the AI soft power arena from several major powers pursuing distinctive strategies. It is worth briefly outlining how these powers are pursuing their strategies:
    1. The PRC has rapidly expanded its AI capabilities and governance approach, embodying a model that emphasises social stability, economic growth, and state oversight.
       1. The PRC's approach combines domestic innovation policies with international standard-setting through organisations like the UN.¹¹
       2. The PRC actively promotes its model of AI governance to countries throughout the world as more forward-leaning and effective than Western approaches. This model integrates advanced surveillance technologies and centralised data collection with the promise of enhanced public safety and economic efficiency.
    2. Russia has pursued a more aggressive offensive strategy, leveraging AI capabilities in information operations while promoting digital sovereignty concepts internationally.¹²
       1. Russian influence operations have evolved to employ AI-generated content, including fake domains and media outlets, to manipulate global public discourse. Their tactics have become increasingly sophisticated, leveraging cyberattacks and covert media funding.¹³
22. The UK should counter these influences by:
    1. Emphasising the advantages of its balanced regulatory approach that protects rights and the needs of citizens while fostering innovation;
    2. Highlighting concrete examples of how UK AI governance produces better societal outcomes;
    3. Building stronger partnerships with democracies in Asia to offer an alternative to Chinese models;
    4. Leveraging the AISI’s international credibility to promote UK approaches to AI risk management;
    5. Leading international efforts to establish norms against AI-enabled information manipulation;
    6. Providing technical assistance to nations vulnerable to malign influence campaigns;
    7. Documenting and publicising instances of harmful applications of AI that violate international norms.
23. India presents a complex challenge and opportunity, with its large talent pool, growing technology sector, and ambition to become a "rule-maker" rather than "rule-taker" in AI governance. It is also seeking to be on the AI leaderboard and is set to host the next international AI Summit. With an eye to the next summit, the UK should:
    1. Work to support India’s upcoming AI Summit, seeking to insert AI safety and security expertise where appropriate, and continue to strengthen ongoing AI and technology collaboration already outlined in the UK-India Technology Security Initiative.¹⁴ This effort would ensure that the legacy of the Summit series, which began with the UK AI Safety Summit at Bletchley Park, lasts and continues in a constructive manner.

3 March 2025

About the Authors

Kayla Blomquist is a co-founder and director of OCPL and a DPhil researcher at the Oxford Internet Institute, with an affiliation to the Oxford Martin School AI Governance Initiative. Her research focuses on US-PRC relations and international AI governance, examining how soft power motives shape PRC AI, governance, development, and international coordination. Prior to Oxford, she served as a diplomat in the U.S. Mission to China for four years, specializing in governance of emerging and dual-use technologies.

Scott Singer is co-founder and director of OCPL, Visiting Scholar in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Technology and International Affairs Program, and an affiliate of the Oxford Martin School AI Governance Initiative. His research focuses on US-China coordination in AI and China’s domestic AI development and governance.

Sam Hogg is Head of Policy Engagement of OCPL. His work focuses on geopolitics, AI and strategy. Previously, he founded Beijing to Britain, a company that produced and delivered research notes on the UK-China bilateral weekly to thousands of government readers, politicians, embassies and corporate clients. Read a million times across 140 countries, various governments, the FTSE100, and embassies around the world, his writing on strategic thinking in Government and the need to build China capabilities has been published on three occasions by the British Parliament. His insights have been quoted in major media publications.

Notes

¹ https://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/publications/soft-power-means-success-world-politics

² https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-sets-out-blueprint-to-turbocharge-ai

³ https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-sets-out-blueprint-to-turbocharge-ai

⁴ https://www.biicl.org/documents/11859_david_lammy_speech_10_july_2023_bingham_centre.pdf

⁵ https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-safety-summit-2023-the-bletchley-declaration/the-bletchley-declaration-by-countries-attending-the-ai-safety-summit-1-2-november-2023

⁶ https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2024/10/lammy-china-ai-safety-cooperation?lang=en

⁷ https://www.iaps.ai/research/understanding-aisis

⁸ https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/01/deepseek-and-other-chinese-firms-converge-with-western-companies-on-ai-promises?lang=en

⁹ https://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/publications/voice-and-access-in-ai-global-ai-majority-participation-in-artificial-intelligence-development-and-governance#:~:text=However%2C%20access%20to%20AI%20and,parts%20of%20Eastern%20Europe%20%E2%80%93%20is

¹⁰ https://www.oxfordchinapolicylab.com/events-and-dialogues/westminster-panel-on-ukchina-relations

¹¹ https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:a0387253-cee7-43a4-b3fc-fa5ceb7fa42e

¹² https://www.wired.com/story/project-good-old-usa-russia-2024-election/

¹³ https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/russias-quest-digital-sovereignty

¹⁴ https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-india-technology-security-initiative-factsheet/uk-india-technology-security-initiative-factsheet