Diplomatic balancing acts have a strange way of life. The agreement between Denmark, Greenland, and the United States announced on September 18 is one such act: Immediately acknowledged by its signatories as a major success before its text had even been published, it carries as many promises of appeasement as uncertainties about real expectations. But after all, what the countries agreed on is probably the best they could achieve at this point. Let’s try to break down its real meaning.

Two observations to start with. First, the text has been loudly praised by U.S. President Donald Trump and pro-Trump media, often with a victorious tone, by Copenhagen, and by Nuuk—with a relieved and reassuring tone. Second, painfully negotiated compromises can be judged only over a period of time, especially when one side insists on terms such as “permanent control,” “forever,” and “developing a large military presence.”

Within these limits, a short analysis rests on three key ingredients.

Military Reassurance for the West

The obvious benefit of the announced agreement is that it seems to meet the security requirements of all sides. The United States earns the right to expand its military presence in Greenland to protect itself from its enemies, supposedly China and Russia. Skeptics will say this is akin to storming an open door, since the 1951 Denmark-U.S. agreement and its 2004 amendment, which already allow Washington to expand its military presence on the island at will, are still in force.

By contrast, the prime ministers of Denmark and Greenland—Mette Frederiksen and Jens-Frederik Nielsen, respectively—were quick to underline that the new agreement would serve the security interests of the signatories and of NATO more generally.

Soon after the deal was signed on the margins of the UN General Assembly, Denmark’s Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen reaffirmed in a post on X his country’s confidence in the agreement, despite the “bumpy ride” that had led to it.

Interested entities, such as Canada, France, and NATO, also issued supportive statements, carefully stressing the commonality of interests between the direct parties to the agreement and their close allies in NATO. In the same vein, the deal was discussed on September 20 by the British and Danish prime ministers.

In his September 22 address to the UN General Assembly, Trump predictably announced that the United States would build two new bases in Greenland; the sites could be Narsarsuaq in the south and Mestersvig on the east coast. Trump stressed that these new military installations would serve the security of the United States, Europe, and NATO, though the military involvement of other NATO members has not been discussed.

Domestically, the announcement will supposedly help prove to U.S. citizens that their president is implementing his America First mantra. Internationally, hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars in military expenditure in Greenland, linked to the agreement’s less visible economic goals, will help Washington exert political, economic, and financial dominance under the guise of security.

Unknown Economic Implications

An obvious ingredient of the crisis that erupted after Trump’s statements on the need for the United States to “own” Greenland is the ice-capped island’s presumed wealth in strategic minerals.

As I wrote recently for Carnegie, a key feature of Greenland—by far the largest overseas territory linked to a European state—is that according to the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland, the island contains twenty-five of the thirty-four minerals classified by the European Commission as “critical,” including vast deposits of rare-earth elements, graphite, and lithium.

Clearly, the Trump administration has in mind to take control of many of Greenland’s mining permits and to exert influence well beyond the security sphere. The language used by Trump on Truth Social on September 18 could not be clearer: “[This agreement] gives the United States permanent control over security, and all other needs, in Greenland, completely addressing ALL of our many U.S. concerns. . . . Additionally, from now on, no U.S. adversary can EVER have a base in Greenland, have a military presence in Greenland, or make sensitive investments in Greenland, without our express written approval.”

Already, several U.S. companies are exploiting Greenland’s mineral and oil resources, indicating a strategic economic interest in the territory—hence Trump’s words about security control and sensitive investments. Future access to Greenland’s natural resources will probably be the toughest challenge in the deal’s implementation.

Immutable Rules

Seen from a European perspective, the Denmark-Greenland-U.S. deal comes after twenty months of disrupted transatlantic relations, marked by U.S. Vice President JD Vance’s contentious speech at the 2025 Munich Security Conference, the publication of the U.S. National Security Strategy, vast divergences on Ukraine and Iran, stark U.S. criticism of Spain, election interference in Germany and Hungary, and other episodes.

The Greenland deal comes at a time when overseas countries and territories are receiving increased international attention. It was announced twelve days after European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen unveiled a new partnership agreement between the EU and Greenland and two days ahead of a meeting between French President Emmanuel Macron and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney in Saint Pierre and Miquelon, a French overseas territory off the coast of Newfoundland.

After a year of turbulence, the tripartite agreement on Greenland’s security may, when fully ratified, bring appeasement. The 2025–2026 Trump crisis over Greenland may or may not be over. The deal’s genuine value will be if its balanced nature stands the test of time in today’s tumultuous world.

However, two fundamentals will have changed along the way. First, bullying by an ally leaves deep scars. Healing transatlantic relations will take time and depend on developments in Ukraine, the Middle East, and, indeed, Greenland. Second, citizens of Greenland and Denmark, irrespective of their long-term goals for the island’s sovereignty, are likely to emerge from the crisis with reinforced national feelings and, unsurprisingly, stronger backup from their European allies.