Edition

Benchmarking the Second Trump-Kim Summit

IN THIS ISSUE: Benchmarking the Second Trump-Kim Summit, U.S. Intelligence: Russia Tried to Con the World with Bogus Missile, U.S. Weighs Opening Liaison Office in North Korea, Merkel Nudges China to Help Save the INF Treaty, India Weighs Military Options Against Pakistan as Kashmir Tensions Rise, The Finger on the Button: The Authority to Use Nuclear Weapons in Nuclear-Armed States

Published on February 19, 2019

Benchmarking the Second Trump-Kim Summit

Toby Dalton and Ariel Levite | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

President Donald Trump deserves credit for pursuing diplomacy with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un. Coercive sanctions and military saber rattling have proven necessary and effective at times, but they are clearly insufficient to force unilateral nuclear disarmament by the North Koreans. Trump has taken plenty of criticism for securing only vague commitments from Kim at their Singapore summit last year. But he should be lauded for taking risks to test Pyongyang’s willingness to accept nuclear constraints and, ultimately, give up its nuclear weapons. Testing North Korea’s sincerity to take concrete steps toward denuclearization requires flexibility and innovation in the U.S. approach. Neither immediate handover of North Korea’s nuclear weapons nor a fully transparent declaration of the North Korean nuclear assets was ever an obtainable objective at the outset of the negotiation. In his second summit with Kim, Trump should aim to meet the following six realistic benchmarks to make clear progress.

U.S. Intelligence: Russia Tried to Con the World with Bogus Missile

Ankit Panda | Daily Beast

On Jan. 23, Russian military officials held a press conference showing off what they said was a cruise missile at the center of a years-long arms control controversy between Washington and Moscow. Except the presentation was essentially a hoax, according to a classified briefing prepared by U.S. intelligence. Neither the missile, nor its launch vehicle, nor the accompanying schematics were what Russia claimed them to be. The alleged Russian misdirection came just days before the United States announced that it would withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty—the treaty that Russia violated, in the U.S. view.

U.S. Weighs Opening Liaison Office in North Korea

Michael Gordon and Andrew Jeong | Wall Street Journal

The U.S. is considering opening a liaison office in North Korea, in what would be another potential step toward normalizing relations while the two sides negotiate to curtail Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile forces, according to a Trump administration official. The proposal comes as President Trump prepares to meet later this month in Hanoi, Vietnam, with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. The plan would allow North Korea to also open an office in the U.S., the official said, but it wasn’t immediately clear how strongly North Korea supported the idea. President Trump has repeatedly boasted of the warm relationship he has established with Mr. Kim. But there has been little progress since the two leaders met in Singapore in June and pledged to improve ties and “work toward” denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. While North Korea has suspended nuclear tests and missiles launches since 2017, the two sides still appear to be far apart on the pace of denuclearization and what concessions the Trump administration might give in return.

Merkel Nudges China to Help Save the INF Treaty

Sebastian Sprenger and Joe Gould | Defense News

German Chancellor Angela Merkel wants China to join negotiations about saving the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. She made the appeal at the Munich Security Conference on Feb. 16, directing her words at the highest-ranking Chinese government official in the audience, Yang Jiechi, member of the Politburo and director of the Office of Foreign Affairs. “I know there are many reservations, but we would be delighted” about Chinese participation,” she said. Merkel warned that Russia and the United States walking away from the 1987 pact could result in a new arms race in Europe. While the agreement was between Washington and Moscow, it has been key for Germany’s and Europe’s security for decades, she said. The United States announced weeks ago that it was retreating from the pact, reacting to what U.S. and European leaders believe is a years-long history of Russian violations. Moscow in turn also announced it would no longer be bound by it.

India Weighs Military Options Against Pakistan as Kashmir Tensions Rise

Amy Kazmin | Financial Times

Tensions between nuclear-armed neighbours Indian and Pakistan mounted over the weekend as New Delhi’s security forces weighed options for a military response to a suicide car bombing that killed 44 paramilitary police officers in its restive Kashmir region.  In a series of public speeches while inaugurating a new public works project before upcoming parliamentary elections, Narendra Modi, India’s prime minister, continued to express fury at last week’s attack. He vowed to “avenge every tear” and said that India’s military had been given a free hand to decide on an appropriate response. 

The Finger on the Button: The Authority to Use Nuclear Weapons in Nuclear-Armed States

Jeffrey Lewis and Bruno Tertrais | James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

The debate about the personality of Donald J. Trump has shed new light on an old question: how much of the terrible responsibility to inflict large-scale nuclear destruction should nuclear-armed countries invest in a single person? The terms of this debate are well known and relate to the specific requirements of nuclear deterrence. On the one hand, there is a broad desire to retain political control and put in place measures to ensure there is never accidental or unauthorized nuclear use. On the other hand, the credibility of deterrence is thought to rest on the ability to always launch if and when decided, even in demanding cases such as a surprise attack. These twin goals are in tension, a situation that Peter Feaver terms the “always/never” dilemma.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.