1. Better strategies to reduce demand

118. Lacklustre disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States weakens the diplomatic force of the non -proliferation regime and thus its ability to constrain proliferation. Despite Security Council commitment to the contrary (resolution 984 (1995)), these nuclear-weapon States are increasingly unwilling to pledge assurances of non –use (negative security assurances) and they maintain the right to retaliate with nuclear weapons against chemical or biological attack.

119. Despite the end of the cold war, nuclear -weapon States earn only a mixed grade in fulfilling their disarmament commitments. While the United States and the Russian Federation have dismantled roughly half of their nuclear weapons, committed to large reductions in deployed strategic warheads and eliminated most of their non -strategic nuclear weapons, such progress has been overshadowed by recent reversals. In 2000, the nuclear-weapon States committed to 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament, which were all but renounced by them at the 2004 meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non -Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

120. The nuclear-weapon States must take several steps to restart disarmament:

(a) They must honour their commitments under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to move towards disarmament and be ready to undertake specific measures in fulfilment of those commitments;

(b) They should reaffirm their previous commitments not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States , to further diminish the perceived value of nuclear weapons, and secure robust international cooperation to staunch proliferation, formalizing such commitments in pending and future nuclear-weaponfree zones agreements.

121. The United States and the Russian Federation, other nuclear –weapon States and States not party to the Treaty on the Non -Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should commit to practical measures to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war, including, where appropriate, a progressive schedule for de - alerting their strategic nuclear weapons.

122. In addition, we believe it would be valuable if the Security Council explicitly pledged to take collecti ve action in response to a nuclear attack or the threat of such attack on a non-nuclear-weapon State.

123. Given the challenge to the nuclear non -proliferation regime posed by States not party to the Treaty on the Non -Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and recognizing the impact of that challenge on regional insecurity, we recommend that negotiations to resolve regional conflicts include confidence -building measures and steps towards disarmament.

124. States not party to the Treaty on the Non -Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should pledge a commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament, demonstrating their commitment by ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty and supporting negotiations for a fissile material cut -off treaty, both of which are open to nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. We recommend that peace efforts in the Middle East and South Asia launch nuclear disarmament talks that could lead to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in those regions similar to thos e established for Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, the South Pacific and South –East Asia.

125. For biological and chemical weapons, there is both an obligation and a historic opportunity to fully eliminate all declared chemical weapons stockpiles: all chemical -weapon States should expedite the scheduled destruction of all existing chemical weapons stockpiles by the agreed target date of 2012.

126. Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention should also be further strengthened, and the long -standing impasse over a verification mechanism for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which has undermined confidence in the overall regime, should be overcome. States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should without delay return to negotiations for a credible verification protocol, inviting the active participation of the biotechnology industry. States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention must increase bilateral diplomatic pressure to universalize membership.

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