Commentary
Regardless of the outcome, there’s another path to ensuring that progress doesn’t stall.
Zaur Shiriyev
REQUIRED IMAGE
Article
UN High-Level Panel Report: Reducing Demand for Nuclear Weapons
The new UN report, "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility," addresses emerging threats of the 21st century. It identifies erosion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the stagnation of disarmament efforts, illicit nuclear trafficking, and the potential threat of nuclear terrorism major crises of the nonproliferation regime as. The report proposes a multi-layered response to these threats.
By Caterina Dutto
Published on Dec 23, 2004
The new United Nations report, "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility," addresses emerging threats of the 21st century. The members of the High-Level Panel convened by UN Secretary General Kofi Anan reinforce the need for collective security to prevent the potential proliferation of nuclear or radiological weapons by state or non-state actors. They identify the major crises of the nonproliferation regime as the erosion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the stagnation of disarmament efforts, the problem of illicit nuclear trafficking, and the potential threat of nuclear terrorism. The report proposes a multi-layered approach to respond to these threats. We reproduced below the panel’s recommendation for how to reduce demand for nuclear weapons. Further analysis of the report will follow in the coming weeks.
Excerpts from "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility"
1. Better strategies to reduce demand
118. Lacklustre disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States weakens the diplomatic force of the non -proliferation regime and thus its ability to constrain proliferation. Despite Security Council commitment to the contrary (resolution 984 (1995)), these nuclear-weapon States are increasingly unwilling to pledge assurances of non –use (negative security assurances) and they maintain the right to retaliate with nuclear weapons against chemical or biological attack.
119. Despite the end of the cold war, nuclear -weapon States earn only a mixed grade in fulfilling their disarmament commitments. While the United States and the Russian Federation have dismantled roughly half of their nuclear weapons, committed to large reductions in deployed strategic warheads and eliminated most of their non -strategic nuclear weapons, such progress has been overshadowed by recent reversals. In 2000, the nuclear-weapon States committed to 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament, which were all but renounced by them at the 2004 meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non -Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
120. The nuclear-weapon States must take several steps to restart disarmament:
(a) They must honour their commitments under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to move towards disarmament and be ready to undertake specific measures in fulfilment of those commitments;
(b) They should reaffirm their previous commitments not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States , to further diminish the perceived value of nuclear weapons, and secure robust international cooperation to staunch proliferation, formalizing such commitments in pending and future nuclear-weaponfree zones agreements.
121. The United States and the Russian Federation, other nuclear –weapon States and States not party to the Treaty on the Non -Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should commit to practical measures to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war, including, where appropriate, a progressive schedule for de - alerting their strategic nuclear weapons.
122. In addition, we believe it would be valuable if the Security Council explicitly pledged to take collecti ve action in response to a nuclear attack or the threat of such attack on a non-nuclear-weapon State.
123. Given the challenge to the nuclear non -proliferation regime posed by States not party to the Treaty on the Non -Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and recognizing the impact of that challenge on regional insecurity, we recommend that negotiations to resolve regional conflicts include confidence -building measures and steps towards disarmament.
124. States not party to the Treaty on the Non -Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should pledge a commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament, demonstrating their commitment by ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty and supporting negotiations for a fissile material cut -off treaty, both of which are open to nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. We recommend that peace efforts in the Middle East and South Asia launch nuclear disarmament talks that could lead to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in those regions similar to thos e established for Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, the South Pacific and South –East Asia.
125. For biological and chemical weapons, there is both an obligation and a historic opportunity to fully eliminate all declared chemical weapons stockpiles: all chemical -weapon States should expedite the scheduled destruction of all existing chemical weapons stockpiles by the agreed target date of 2012.
126. Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention should also be further strengthened, and the long -standing impasse over a verification mechanism for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which has undermined confidence in the overall regime, should be overcome. States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should without delay return to negotiations for a credible verification protocol, inviting the active participation of the biotechnology industry. States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention must increase bilateral diplomatic pressure to universalize membership.
(bold text in original)
Panel Members include: Anand Panyarachun, Chair (Thailand), Robert Badinter (France), Joao Clemente Baena Soares (Brazil), Gareth Evans (Australia), Amre Moussa (Egypt), Sadako Ogata (Japan), Yevgeny Primakov (Russian Federation) and Brent Scowcroft (United States)
About the Author
Caterina Dutto
Former Research Assistant
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- At Stake in Armenia’s Election: Peace and Russian Influence
- Bangladesh’s Unfinished RevolutionArticle
Bangladesh’s February 2026 elections were the most credible in nearly two decades. But within weeks of the BNP’s return to power, the fundamental characteristics of the country’s political economy threaten to pull it back toward continuity rather than change.
Avinash Paliwal
- Trump and Xi Are Angling for Three Years of StabilityCommentary
But their "principal to principal" model will only be as effective as the political strength of each leader back home.
Damien Ma
- China’s Police and Security Cooperation AgreementsPaper
China’s Ministry of Public Security is often portrayed as a domestic law enforcement agency, but it is also a global security actor. This paper explores how MPS has used international law enforcement and security cooperation agreements—over 200 since 2006—to advance China’s vision of security in a changing global environment.
Sophie Zhuang, Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Cameron Waltz
- Europe Should Not Let Nuclear Nonproliferation DieCommentary
Amid uncertainty caused by the Iran war, the global drive for nonproliferation has stalled. With Europe diplomatically marginalized and countries reassessing their nuclear options, efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons risk becoming irrelevant.
Jane Darby Menton
