We know the victors write history, but can they re-write it as well? In a U.S. pamphlet handed out at the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) conference in New York this month, officials have erased key international agreements from the historic account. Gone are any references to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and to commitments made at the 2000 NPT conference. Official disdain for these agreements seems to have turned into denial that they existed. The U.S. refusal to comply with it own obligations is a key reason why the conference may break up in disarray, setting back global efforts to stem the spread of nuclear weapons.
The U.S. pamphlet, "The Commitment of the United States of America to Article VI of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons," details the U.S. record in meeting its treaty obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons. The opening timeline of "Progress in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation" list 40 major achievements since 1987, including the Moscow Treaty of 2002 and the Proliferation Security Initiative of 2003. The 1996 signing of the South Pacific and African nuclear weapon-free zone treaties is noted, but there is no mention of the historic signing that year of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The pact is widely cited by delegations to the NPT conference as a central pillar of the non-proliferation regime—including key U.S. allies, Australia, Great Britain and France.
The year 2000 is missing altogether. This was the year of the last NPT Review Conference. The meeting was salvaged because of a hard-fought political compromise. Dropping righteous but unrealistic calls for immediate nuclear disarmament, nuclear "have-nots" such as Brazil, Egypt, South Africa and Sweden found middle ground with the five nuclear powers. Together, they agreed to 13 pragmatic steps for reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons. They include an end to all nuclear test explosions, a diminished role for nuclear weapons in security policy, ending production of nuclear weapons material and reaffirmation of the goal of nuclear disarmament. The pact proved that each side was willing to make concessions and acknowledge the importance of the other's priorities. These steps still make sense. Only one - the pledge to abide by the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty - is now obsolete because the United States abrogated the pact in 2002.
It is no secret that current administration officials disagree with these agreements negotiated by their predecessors. The answer, as noted in previous Carnegie analyses and in the Carnegie study, Universal Compliance, is to negotiate new understandings. But the administration has not presented new alternatives. Rather, they propose to start anew, at year zero. Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf said in May 2004, "The world moves on and the discussion ought not to be locked in 2000…We could return to 2000 and pretend that the next five years did not exist, but we would rather start in 2005."
This policy treads on dangerous ground. It raises profound doubts about the value of any U.S. commitment. It opens the way for other governments to disavow past promises. It undermines the basis of all international agreements, which, after all, are based each party keeping its word.
This approach has already paralyzed the NPT conference. The United States will not reaffirm its past commitments; other states will not agree to a bland conference document that cedes ground from the commitments won in 2000 and 1995. Other nations understandably feel betrayed. They agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely in 1995 in exchange for specific promises by the nuclear-weapon states to dismantle the Cold War arsenals. Now these states, lead by the United States, are walking away from their commitments. It raises serious doubts about the validity of the entire regime. If the current conference ends in the disaster many predict, this crisis of confidence will undermine efforts to hold Iran and North Korea to their commitments and to dissuade other states—including U.S. allies—from exploring their own nuclear options.
If the conference fails, there will be several states that must bear the blame. One of these, sadly, is our own nation.
Related Publication:
"Commitment of the United States of America to Article VI of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons," submitted by the U.S. Delegation to the 2005 NPT Review Conference, May 2005
Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security, Carnegie Report, March 2005
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