Newly-minted Nobel Laureate Mohamed ElBaradei has been a resolute non-proliferation proponent.   The Nobel Peace Prize is a vote of confidence in his independent voice and the vital role inspections play in verifying compliance with non-proliferation commitments.  During his tenure the IAEA has toughened its inspection regime and he has advanced thoughtful proposals for reforming the nuclear fuel cycle to prevent nations from creeping up to the edge of nuclear weapon status. 

The award may also reflect the critical efforts he and the IAEA undertook during the build-up to the war in Iraq.  Though belittled at the time by some officials, UN intelligence proved more accurate than U.S. intelligence.  The IAEA was just weeks away from certifying that Iraq had not reconstituted a nuclear weapons program--the chief justification for the invasion.  We present below excerpts from the Carnegie study, WMD in Iraq, detailing the IAEA findings presented to the UN Security Council before the war. 

We are delighted that the Director-General will deliver his first major address after receiving the Nobel Prize to the Carnegie Non-Proliferation Conference on November 7. 

From WMD in Iraq:  Evidence and Implications, pp 23-25:

There were 237 inspections at 148 sites including all those identified in overhead satellite imagery as having suspicious activity. IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei reported to the UN Security Council on March 7, 2003 that:

• There is “no indication of resumed nuclear activities… nor any indication of nuclear-related prohibited activities at any inspected sites.”

• “There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import uranium since 1990.” The documents that indicated Iraq attempted to purchase uranium from Niger were declared “in fact not authentic.”

• “There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import aluminum tubes for use in centrifuge enrichment.” Even if it had, “it was highly unlikely that Iraq could have achieved the considerable redesign needed to use them in a revived centrifuge program.”

• Although the question was still under review, there was “no indication to date that Iraq imported magnets for use in a centrifuge program”

• “[D]uring the past four years, at the majority of Iraqi sites, industrial capacity has deteriorated substantially due to the departure of the foreign support that was often present in the late ‘80s, the departure of large numbers of skilled Iraqi personnel in the past decade, and the lack of consistent maintenance by Iraq of sophisticated equipment. At only a few inspected sites involved in industrial research, development and manufacturing have the facilities been improved and new personnel been taken on.”

Director-General ElBaradei told the Carnegie Conference in June 2004 that inspectors were just weeks away from certifying that Iraq had not reconstituted a nuclear weapons program. “All evidence to date indicates that Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme had been effectively dismantled in the 1990s through IAEA inspection — as we were nearly ready to conclude before the war,” he said.

Lessons Learned
Inspections before the 1991 Gulf War had failed to detect Iraq’s clandestine program.  This lead directly to the adoption by the IAEA Board of Governors of new, more intrusive inspections codified under the Additional Protocol.  The agency also dismantled Iraq’s program in the aftermath of the war, as described in WMD in Iraq:

“IAEA inspections between 1991 and 1998 uncovered and dismantled an extensive nuclear program. They revealed that before 1991 Iraq had secretly constructed industrial-scale facilities for the production of uranium compounds suitable for isotopic enrichment or fuel fabrication, pursued research and development of indigenous uranium enrichment technologies, as well as explored weaponization capabilities for implosion-based nuclear weapons.

“During this time period, the IAEA removed or secured all known imported and indigenously produced uranium compounds and destroyed or removed all known single-use equipment used in enrichment research and development. Inspectors dismantled all known facilities for the enrichment of fuel, destroyed the principal building of the Al Atheer nuclear weapon development and production plant and related equipment. It verified and accounted for the entire inventory of research reactor fuel targeted by the “crash program.” (WMD in Iraq, 22)

Peace Advocate
In an essay he wrote for Le Monde in May 2003, ElBaradei voiced his dismay at the use of pre-emptive force over a “rules-based approach to international security.”

“As the war in Iraq comes to an end, a central question the international community will have to face is whether the pre-emptive use of force should be the model to address threats of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or whether alternatives exist that are less unpredictable in outcome and less costly in terms of human life.”

“[N]uclear weapons have continued to have a position of prominence as the currency of ultimate power… Faced with this reality, must we conclude that it is futile to try to combat the spread of WMD through a collective, rule-based system of international security — and that we have to acquiesce to living in a world plagued with the constant threat of a nuclear holocaust or other disasters? I do not believe so. But reliance on a system of collective security to curb the proliferation of WMD will require bold thinking, a willingness to work together, and sustained effort.”

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Related Links:

WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications, Carnegie Endowment Report, January 2004