Year End Nuclear Progress Report

As 2005 comes to a close, there is good news to report on several government efforts aimed at stemming the spread of nuclear weapons.  We are moving in the right direction, though not as fast nor as far as we could. 

The Nunn-Lugar Program is a multi-pronged effort focused on deactivating or destroying nuclear warheads, chemical and biological munitions, and delivery vehicles as well as increasing security for weapon stockpiles and creating jobs for former weapons scientists in the former Soviet States.  Begun in 1991 by Senator Richard Lugar (R-IL) and Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), as of August 2005 the Nunn-Lugar program had deactivated or destroyed:

6,760 nuclear warheads

587 ICBMs

483 ICBM silos

32 ICBM mobile missile launchers

150 bombers

789 nuclear air-to-surface missiles

436 submarine missile launchers

549 submarine launched missiles

28 nuclear submarines

194 nuclear test tunnels

“The experience of Nunn-Lugar shows that, with determination and hard work, we can deny terrorists access to these devastating weapons,” says Senator Lugar. 

However, much work remains to be done.  The authors of the 2005 Carnegie report Universal Compliance say that “whether one judges by the percentage of Russian nuclear warheads and weapon-usable materials secured, the amount of fissile material destroyed, the number of facilities converted to commercial production, or the number of new permanent jobs created for weapon scientists, it is evident that less than half of the overall threat reduction mission in Russia has been completed.”  Since the “biggest impediments to progress are political, not technical or financial,” their report recommends that the US “establish a senior coordinator, or focused coordination team, within the White House with a mandate to oversee, prioritize, and expedite threat reduction programs” and “launch a fast-paced initiative, in partnership with Russia, to fully protect Russian nuclear weapon-usable material by 2008.”  The National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) estimates that the Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program will not be completed until 2020, under current schedules. 

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative is another important program taking steps in the right direction.  Part of the NNSA, the mission of the GTRI is to “identify, secure, recover and/or facilitate the disposition of high-risk, vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials around the world that pose a threat to the United States and the international community.”  This program got a lot of press this year for some of its exciting nighttime operations, in one case airlifting 14kg of HEU to Russia from the Czech Technical University in Prague.  The GTRI is responsible for a broad set of tasks, from repatriating fissile material to converting reactors to run on LEU, and like the Nunn-Lugar program, is not moving forward as fast as hoped.  To date, the program has secured 122kg of highly-enriched uranium at research reactors in 7 nations.  Currently the GTRI plans to meet its goals within ten years.  This program could be accelerated and “with the necessary resources and emphasis, the ten-year goal can – and should – be met in four years,” according to Universal Compliance.  (For a more detailed discussion of the GTRI, see the Carnegie analysis “Cleaning House.”)

The Megatons to Megawatts program is a creative, commercially-sustainable solution to a rather large problem.   After dismantling some of their nuclear warheads, Russia was left with 500 metric tons of HEU.  The Megatons to Megawatts program allows for the HEU to be diluted in Russia, then sold to the United States Enrichment Corporation, distributed to US power utility companies, and ultimately used to generate electricity.  In fact, one-tenth of America’s electricity comes from this Russian-origin fuel or as a spokesperson for the program might put it – one in ten holiday lights this season is powered by energy from former Soviet warheads.  Through October, the program converted 255 metric tons of HEU – a little over half its goal.  The program is scheduled for completion by 2015. 

Despite the steady progress, the HEU still waiting to be diluted “remain[s] in weapon-usable form, to say nothing of the remaining Russian stockpile – which may amount to an additional 500 metric tons under uncertain security,” says the Carnegie report Universal Compliance.  The report urges that downblending “be accelerated to ensure the fastest possible elimination of this material.  Russia and the United States should agree to double the pace from 30 to 60 metric tons of HEU per year.”

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an innovative approach to stopping weapon shipments, “their delivery systems, and related materials from reaching states and non-state actors of proliferation concern,” according to the US State Department PSI Fact Sheet.  The PSI is an activity, not an organization, in which partner countries choose to participate, “employing their national capabilities to develop a broad range of legal, diplomatic, economic, military, and other tools to interdict” suspect shipments. 

Created in May 2003, over 70 countries have now expressed support for the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles.  Universal Compliance notes, however,  that “while the initiative is a valuable extension of export control implementation, it is not and cannot be a silver bullet to prevent proliferation to terrorists or states.”  There are gaps in the program that can limit its effectiveness.  Therefore, the Carnegie authors recommend that the international community “expand the scope of the PSI to cover shipments through international waters and airspace” and “ground the PSI in international law by means of a UN Security Council Resolution.”  (For more, see the Carnegie analysis “Putting PSI into Perspective.”)

The Container Security Initiative (CSI) focuses on suspect US-bound cargo in foreign ports.  Container security is critical to protecting the US homeland given that 90 percent of all world cargo is shipped in containers and that 9 million cargo containers come into the country every year.  As part of the initiative, teams of officers from the US Customs and Borders Protection (CBP) are dispatched to the participating ports to work with the host nations in identifying and inspecting suspect cargos before they arrive in US territory.

Just recently, the Argentine port in Buenos Aires joined the initiative, bringing the total number of participating ports to 41.  Together, these ports handle about 75 percent of US-bound cargo and are located throughout the Americas, Europe, Asia, and Africa.  By the end of 2006, the CSI hopes to increase the number of participating ports to 50.  This initiative looks promising, but some important concerns need to be addressed.  Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) raised some of these concerns before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in May.  Senator Levin highlighted issues such as the failure to persuade foreign governments to inspect all suspect containers, the high costs of keeping CBP officers overseas, and the lack of standards for inspection equipment. 

These are just a few of the many programs in place working to reduce the threat from nuclear weapons and materials.  Their successes are commendable.  However, we must not be lulled into complacency.  All these programs are doing good work, but with additional international political and financial support, work would be done faster and more comprehensively.  As former Senator Nunn said in a speech this year, “The gravest danger in the world today is the threat of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction,” and that “[w]e will prevent this danger only if every country accepts that it is the number one threat, and every country makes it a priority to cooperate for our common security.”  There is much more to do in 2006. 

Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security, George Perkovich, Jessica T. Mathews, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller, Jon B. Wolfsthal, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2005

Nunn-Lugar Report, August 2005  

"Cleaning House," Ben Bain, Carnegie Analysis, 13 October 2005

International Security News, Sandia National Laboratories, July 2003. 

“Acceleration of Removal or Security of Fissile Materials, Radiological Materials, and Related Equipment at Vulnerable Sites Worldwide,” NNSA Global Threat Reduction Initiative, Interim Report, Unclassified Summary, 2005

“Megatons to Megawatts,” Ben Bain, Carnegie Analysis, 20 October 2005  

Proliferation Security Initiative Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), Department of State

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Department of State

Container Security Initiative Fact Sheet,  Department of State

“Argentina Joins U.S. Container Security Initiative,” Global Security Newswire, 21 November 2005  

Statement by Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), 26 May 2005 

Senator Sam Nunn’s speech, “The Race Between Cooperation and Catastrophe,”  7 June 2005