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Take Two: Iran's Plan for Nuclear Compliance

The February IAEA safeguards report on Iran indicates that the answers provided by Iran on all but two issues are "consistent" or "not inconsistent" with its information and on schedule with the agreed-upon work plan. However, the final outstanding issues are those most closely associated with weaponization.

by Sharon Squassoni and Nima Gerami
Published on March 5, 2008

TimelineIn August 2007 Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreed to a work plan (INFCIRC/711) for resolving all outstanding questions concerning Iran’s past nuclear activities. We illustrated in a past Proliferation Analysis entitled "Iran's Plan for Nuclear Compliance" that the timeline proposed by the Iran-IAEA deal would allow Iran about eight months of continued centrifuge installation and operations, but that it failed to appropriately address certain issues, in particular the 1987 uranium metal document received from Pakistan. We did not include any dates for resolution of Iran's "alleged studies"—the Green Salt Project, high explosive testing, and the design of a missile re-entry vehicle—because Iran categorically rejected considering them.

The February IAEA safeguards report on Iran (GOV/2008/4) indicates that the answers provided by Iran on all but two issues are "consistent" or "not inconsistent" with its information and on schedule (if not earlier) with the agreed-upon work plan. However, the final outstanding issues are those most closely associated with weaponization. An illustration of Iran’s progress shows that questions regarding its alleged weaponization studies and uranium metal will likely remain contested issues into April 2008 and beyond. (See below for a side-by-side comparison of INFCIRC/711 and GOV/2008/4.)


 

Comparing Iran’s Nuclear Compliance: INFCIRC/711 and GOV/2008/4
How close is Iran in complying with the Iran-IAEA work plan?

IAEA PROVIDES QUESTIONS

MEETING IN IRAN TO DISCUSS

CLOSURE

INFCIRC/711//GOV/2008/4

INFCIRC/711

GOV/2008/4

INFCIRC/711

GOV/2008/4

Plutonium

July 23

July

July

August 20

August 20

P1/P2

August 31

September
24-25
mid-October

September 24

November

November

HEU Contamination

September 15

2 weeks after P1/P2 closure (mid-November)

December 10-12
December 15-16        

January

January 8

Uranium Metal

INFCIRC/711: Iran agrees to facilitate comparison of sections of uranium metal document after which IAEA will close issue.
GOV/2008/4: Iran provides copy of document to IAEA; IAEA awaiting information from Pakistan.

Po-210

September 15 after all other questions closed.

2 weeks after HEU Contamination/
U Metal talks
(end of January)

January
20-21

March*

February 22

Ghachine Mine

September 15

2 weeks after Po-210 closure (February 22)

January
22-23

April*

February 22

Alleged Studies

INFCIRC/711: Iran finds allegations as “baseless” and “political motivated” but will review IAEA-provided documents.
GOV/2008/4: Iran finds allegations as “baseless” and “fabricated”. Minimal responses on two issues following meetings on January 27-28 and February 3-5; IAEA awaiting further Iranian responses.
































*These dates were Carnegie estimates for possible issue closure, based on the text of INFCIRC/711. The IAEA indicated in GOV/2008/4 that it no longer considered the Po-210 and Ghachine mine issues to be outstanding.

Click here to download the PDF version of the above table.

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