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Obama’s Middle East Policy: What the Arab World Expects

Amid the overwhelming popular enthusiasm and unprecedented media coverage in the Arab world that accompanied the 2008 U.S. presidential elections, the Carnegie Middle East Center provided an open forum for distinguished Arab observers to share their thoughts on future American policies in the Middle East.

by Amr Hamzawy and Farah Choucair

Published on December 8, 2008

Obama’s Middle East Policy: What the Arab World Expects, features the different concerns and agendas of writers from a range of countries, disciplines, and backgrounds, including Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.

The writings explore America’s image in the region; the critical security issues facing the Middle East: Iraq, the Israeli—Palestinian conflict and Iran’s nuclear ambitions; the social significance of Obama’s election, political reform, and Islamist movements.

Social Significance of Obama's Election:

Top Priorities for the Middle East:

The Israeli—Palestinian Conflict:

Iraq, Iran, and Gulf Security:

Islamist Movements:

"The Obama Administration and Islamist Parties: Any Hope for Turning a New Page? " - Mustapha al-Khalfi

Introduction:

The 2008 U.S. elections garnered unprecedented attention from the Arab public and media. During our daily monitoring of the most prominent and widely read Arab newspapers, we found that the majority of news articles and op-ed pieces discussed the election not only in the context of its impact on U.S. policies in the Middle East, as U.S. elections are usually discussed in the Arab media, but also in the context of U.S. domestic politics. During the campaign many Arab newspapers recognized the historic significance of Barack Obama’s possible election as the first African-American president. Following his election, many writers praised Obama’s victory as a sign of the vitality of American society, the strength of its democratic system, and the power of voters to change the political course of the country. However, it was not long before media coverage refocused on the implications of an Obama victory for future U.S. policies in the region. Palestine and Iraq continued to top regional concerns, but there was also noticeable interest in U.S.–Iran relations, including Tehran’s nuclear program, its growing influence in Iraq, and the implications of such influence on Arabian Gulf security and the region’s stability. Only a few articles addressed the future of U.S. support for democracy and human rights in the Arab World or the possibility of a change in Washington’s alliance with ruling elites and its attitude toward Islamist opposition movements.

Reading the Election in its Domestic Context

Many Arab commentators praised the election outcome as a victory for the democratic process and interpreted it as a sign of the vitality of U.S. society. Arab writers commented on the ability of the liberal majority of Americans to effectively sway their communities and revolt electorally against the rightwing policies that characterized George W. Bush’s two terms and plunged the country in a series of national and international crises, costing the model of the “American way of life” its balance, humanity, and international appeal.

In these writers’ views, the majority of Americans chose to bring a decisive end to an era of neoconservatism and religious fundamentalism by voting overwhelmingly for the African-American candidate and his campaign for change. Some Arab writers read the momentum of the longest campaign in U.S. history and the election outcome as proof of Americans’ restored belief in the political process as a tool for change, and as a national reconciliation with the country’s history of racism. The high voter turnout of 64 percent—compared to 56.7 percent in 2004—was seen as a clear indication of the revitalization of the democratic system, particularly among apathetic and disillusioned sections of society that do not usually vote. These include groups such as U.S. youth (ages 18–29) who this year formed 18 percent of the voters, with 66 percent of them voting for Obama; and minorities, who made up 26 percent of voters, with 72 percent voting for Obama.

According to the Arab press, this rejuvenation of the democratic process offers a true opportunity for reestablishing U.S. political credibility, transcending partisanship and the Bush administration’s damaging obsession with internal security and with military ventures abroad. Obama and his team are qualified to address pressing U.S. issues, including the economic crisis, the reform of the social security and health care systems, and illegal immigration. The administration is also seen as well placed to revive the liberalism of the political system and to restore the balance of power among the three branches of government that had been undermined by the Bush administration. Nevertheless, Obama remains a candidate of the U.S. establishment, many argued, winning the support of most economic interest groups and the majority of U.S. media outlets, both of which recognized the inevitability of a post-Bush change, with the African-American candidate as its main motivator. This could limit Obama’s ability to translate the promise of change into a political reality; however, with his charisma and energy, his balanced team, and his public mandate, he should be able to push back against the limits of change and challenge the obstacles to reform in the interest of the U.S. public.

Many Arab writers saw Obama’s landslide victory as a rejection of the ideology of fear that the Bush administration created after 9/11 and used effectively to remain in office for eight years. Not only did the majority of American voters rediscover their liberal ideals, but they also broke traditional barriers by electing an African-American candidate whose father was a Muslim. Arabs should take a step back, reflect on the meaning of the elections, and acknowledge the Americans’ daring embrace of change and their ability to exercise their democratic rights even in a global moment full of setbacks. These actions represent a stark contrast with Arab societies, which are still unable to develop a balanced relationship between the majority and minorities and participate in a democratic process. Even stable European democracies do not have the vitality of U.S. democracy: they suffer from public apathy, the waning credibility of politics, and the political marginalization of their racial and religious minorities, for whom the ambition to attain a leading political role in countries like Britain, France, or Germany has not yet become a dream. There is no doubt that eight harsh years of the Bush presidency have not only motivated American voters to change direction and correct political course, but also encouraged them to enter into a new social and more democratic era that will advance the equality between the white majority and minorities in the United States. Arabs who do not have the right to elect their governments nor hold their leaders accountable need to carefully examine the American elections as a model and appreciate the mechanisms of self-correction that allow citizens to awaken even after long slumber.

The Obama Administration and U.S. Policies in the Middle East

After Obama’s victory, Arab media and commentators were quick to focus on the consequences of the change in Washington for the region. The reactions were divided: some were pessimistic about the capacity of the Obama administration to bring about real change in U.S. policies in the Middle East; others expressed cautious optimism in his ability to devise a more balanced role in the region.

The skeptics relied on several familiar and credible, though extremely narrow, claims:

Israel’s security and access to oil in the Gulf region are permanent U.S. strategic interests that do not change when a new administration takes power. These interests require the continuation of the U.S. military presence in the Middle East and the marginalization of all regional opponents.
These interests also prevent an impartial U.S. role in promoting an Arab–Israeli peace settlement that recognizes Palestinian and Arab rights. The United States will also not seriously open up to countries such as Iran and Syria and to resistance groups in Palestine and Lebanon unless they change their policies.
Obama remains the son of the U.S. establishment and its special interests groups. Those hoping that he will turn away from these interests are just dreamers who are unaware of the intricate nature of U.S. politics and its long-term strategic plans.
A change in U.S. policies is impossible as long as pro-Israel politicians such as Rahm Emanuel and Joseph Biden hold decision-making posts—these are the least ethical and most politically erroneous of the claims to appear in the Arab press.

Less pessimistically, some Arab writers sought to refute these common claims. They challenged the idea that the permanence of U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East prevents the United States from changing its policies. The history of U.S. policies in the Middle East clearly shows that this is not the case. Washington’s abiding and unlimited support for Israel did not keep it from supporting at times diplomatic proposals that guaranteed some of Arab and Palestinian demands. Furthermore, securing access to oil can be achieved in different ways: by forming strategic alliances with Arab rulers in the Gulf in order to contain real or perceived dangers emanating from other regional actors such as Iraq and Iran; and not only by directly deploying military force. Finally, in the last few years, Arabs experienced and suffered from a new U.S. policy in the Middle East that favored military might over diplomacy—leading Arabs to better appreciate the previous administrations that had been more balanced and diplomatic and less militaristic.

Other writers questioned the claim that Obama is the product of the dominant establishment, thus unable to challenge it; some also rejected the branding of all Jewish members of the administration as pro-Israel. These opinions, they argued, reveal the writers’ inability to recognize the wide range of positions on domestic and international issues held by different government officials, and to recognize the difference among administrations, particularly those that won an indisputable mandate. Finally, some optimistic writers wondered why Arab pessimists refuse to see that the mechanism of self-correction that sent Obama to the White House could also lead to the reevaluation of detrimental U.S. foreign policies.

In general, the cautiously optimistic writers saw the arguments of the pessimists as based on an argument that is phony and defensive, but resonates well with Arab public opinion: any partial benefit the Arabs may receive from relatively better balanced and less severe policies still carries with it the threat of spreading U.S. and Israeli influence in the region.

While their criticism of the skeptics’ knee-jerk reaction was well-founded, the cautious optimists failed to formulate a clear view of the changes in Middle East policy that could expected from an Obama administration. Some simply argued that the new administration could not possibly be worse than the previous one. Others essentially drafted petitions to the new administration expounding the importance of withdrawing from Iraq, ending Bush’s war on terror, ending the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, and supporting democracy and human rights in the Arab world. They neglected to consider that Obama has prioritized withdrawal from Iraq and fighting terrorism, but so far has not outlined a policy on Palestine and democracy promotion.

Many optimists, furthermore, ignored the question of whether a president confronting a daunting change agenda can be expected to move speedily to craft new policies and establish new priorities in the Middle East. Facing a long list of domestic and international crises, Obama is bound to focus in the first years of his term on the most pressing issues, such as Iraq, Iran, and terrorism before he finds time and momentum to address other foreign policy issues. Finally, with only a few exceptions, the cautiously optimistic writers did not discuss major obstacles to democracy and human rights in the region such as U.S. alliances with autocratic regimes and Washington’s negative view of all Islamist movements, whether peaceful or violent, as a threat to U.S. interests. These obstacles derailed the democratization and human rights campaigns the Bush administration had spearheaded under the “Freedom Agenda.” These dilemmas will not mysteriously disappear once Obama is sworn in, and neither Obama nor his team possesses magic tools to correct these contradictions.

Whether optimistic or pessimistic, the writings in the Arab press lacked a realistic understanding of the possible changes in Obama’s Middle East policies. It is in this context that the Carnegie Middle East Center decided to give a distinguished group of writers and researchers an opportunity to formulate their views on Obama’s election and their expectations of U.S. policies in their region. We selected our contributors to represent a wide spectrum of Arab countries, including Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen, and to cover a range of issues and concerns. They reflect the opinions of different intellectual circles—academics, writers, journalists, and civil society activists. The contributions dealt with five major themes: the social significance of Obama’s election; the top priorities to be addressed by the United States in the Middle East; the Israeli–Palestinian conflict; security concerns in Iraq, Iran and the Gulf; and Islamist movements.

As we publish these contributions in Arabic and English, we hope that they will motivate U.S. decision-makers and experts to give serious thought to these Arab readings of Obama’s election and its implications. We ultimately hope that this project will stimulate a positive and productive dialogue between Arabs and the incoming administration that transcends the skepticism voiced by many.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

Obama’s Middle East Policy: What the Arab World Expects

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