The U.S. policy toward moderate Islamist movements is a clear example of the inconsistency of U.S. policies. The hope for a tangible change often clashes with a complex legacy. This in turn gives the impression that all options have been exhausted, and thus strengthens the choice of avoiding dealing with the Islamist movements. However, U.S. progress in the Middle East hinges on abandoning this uncertainty.

 

George W. Bush’s policy failures stem from three factors. The first is the lack of credibility evident in his administration’s double standards when dealing with developments in the region and the contradiction between the administration’s stated policies and actions. This contradiction was clear in the way the Bush administration dealt with the Arab–Israeli conflict and with Hamas, as well as with the situation involving Lebanon, Syria, and Hizbollah. In both situations, U.S. policy can be best described as a coup against its own program of democratizing the Middle East, advocated in the previous two years. In addition, the U.S. administration’s unilateral and illegitimate decision to go to war with Iraq is a proof of a U.S. foreign policy that leads to destructive chaos, alienates allies, and seeks followers. The resignation of several heads of the Office of Public Diplomacy clearly shows this crisis of credibility.

 

The second factor is a blunt unilateralist ideology shaped by neoconservatives, an ideology that lacks local and international support. This vision is the polar opposite of the equally blunt pragmatism of the Clinton era, which produced policies that exhaustively used slogans of democracy and reform in order to push other priorities in the region. It reduced them to mere rhetoric without any effort to translate them into action. What the Bush administration adopted was a counter rhetoric under the banners of creative chaos and spreading freedom, ideas that were a pretext for regime change. Democracy promotion was a war of thoughts to win hearts and minds rather than a direct connection to a true understanding of democratic values that tolerate differences of opinions and reject close-mindedness. The result was a resistance in the Middle East to what many perceived as an arrogant U.S. project to dominate the region.

 

In addition to a unilateral ideology and lack of credibility, the failure of the Bush administrations was due to a policy ambiguity resulting from conflicting priorities in the Middle East: supporting Israel’s security while pressing for the democratization of the region; ensuring the flow of oil,   protecting allied regimes while fighting terrorism, opening markets, and pursuing public diplomacy. Because of these conflicting policy goals, the United States found itself without true allies and with limited and ineffective achievements. Its projects, such as the Future Forum, were doomed to failure and several key goals, for example the creation of a U.S.–Middle East free trade zone, were shelved. This conflict of interests shaped U.S. public positions and made them hostage to developments elsewhere.    

 

It is clear that the future of U.S. policies under the Obama administration depends on avoiding these three policy flaws. With the landslide mandate the new president won on November 4, he should be able to significantly restore credibility and build a clearer and more harmonious policy that goes beyond the unilateralist ideology of his predecessor. Obama has already made some progress in this regard by announcing his intention to open a dialogue with the Muslim world, stressing his intention to devise a well-defined exit strategy in Iraq, and expressing his willingness to hold direct talks with Iran. What remains ambiguous is his policy toward the Arab–Israeli conflict, in which he will be required to adopt a more balanced and even-handed mediating role. As a result of the all-over policy shift the Obama administration is promising, we can expect the United States to turn a new page in its relations with Islamist parties, particularly in light of the setbacks in democratization efforts over the past two years.

 

Islamists’ victories in the 2005 Egyptian and Palestinian elections have radically changed U.S. policy toward these groups and led to stricter congressional restrictions on communications with these parties. Has this shift in policy been productive? Absolutely not. U.S. disengagement from a diplomatic process that includes talking with Islamist groups has proven to be a failure. Imposing a siege on the Palestinian people has not weakened Hamas, and ultimately Egypt was sought as a sponsor of channels of negotiation to end the standoff. The stability in Lebanon was made possible only by an understanding between the government and Hizbollah that the United States opposed. In order to integrate Sunna in the political process in Iraq and contain resistance, the United States had to open talks with some of its opponents. The government in Afghanistan, the scene of another U.S. war, knows that it eventually has to start negotiations with the Taliban and integrate them in the political process. The balances of power in the Middle East have shifted, made the approaches of Bush and Clinton unworkable. What the new administration needs to realize is that political reforms are interconnected with engaging in a dialogue with Islamic parties. 

 

The past two years have proven that the claim that democracy in the region has to wait until the development of education, civil society, and party pluralism are strengthened is a myth. That claim is only based on fears that anti-American politicians might rise to power through elections. Unfortunately some of the president-elect’s advisers are echoing this position, dampening expectations of a new direction in U.S. foreign policy in the region. The path the Obama administration should take is to engage in a serious discussion in Congress about a gradual but a profound reassessment of U.S. policies in the Middle East. People in that region, like Americans, are yearning for change.