Commentary
Ultimately, Zelensky sided neither with the reform camp nor with the military establishment as such, but with political control.
Balázs Jarábik
Source: Getty
Paper
Warlords As Bureaucrats: The Afghan Experience
Afghanistan's hybrid form of governance, which draws on a mix of formal institutions and warlord-administered informal power, may be the only viable model for Afghanistan at present.
By Dipali Mukhopadhyay
Published on Sep 22, 2009
Afghanistan’s weak central government and limited resources make the informal networks employed by local warlords a viable option for governance. The country’s former warlords, made powerful governors by President Hamid Karzai, use both formal and informal powers to achieve security objectives and deliver development in their provinces.
Based on substantial in-country research and interviews, Dipali Mukhopadhyay examines the performance of two such governors, Atta Mohammed Noor and Gul Agha Sherzai, who govern the northern province of Balkh, and the eastern province of Nangarhar, respectively.
Key points:
- Karzai’s reliance on warlord-governors can be attributed in part to the country’s security vacuum and the competing priorities of counterterrorism and state building, but is also part of a longer tradition of accommodation between the center and periphery in Afghanistan.
- The international community should acknowledge that the informal networks employed by warlord-governors have a productive, if less than desirable, role to play in Afghanistan. But, where practicable, they should check the warlords’ power and encourage formal institution building.
- Over time, informal actors like warlord-governors will be influenced by the slow but palpable emergence of effective formal institutions.
Mukhopadhyay concludes:
“A ‘good enough’ governor, who can demonstrate success in counternarcotics, security, and economic and infrastructural development, becomes a valuable asset in the absence of unlimited resources, troops, and political will,” writes Mukhopadhyay. “Acknowledgment of hybrid governance need not mean the abandonment of formal institutional capacity building on the part of international, intervening organizations. Rather, they must adopt more realistic expectations of formal institutions.”
For a longer version of the arguments put forward in this paper, see Warlords, Strongman Governors, and the State in Afghanistan by Dipali Mukhopadhyay, available at http://www.amazon.com/Warlords-Strongman-Governors-State-Afghanistan/dp/1107023920.
About the Author
Dipali Mukhopadhyay
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Control Above Reform: What’s Behind Ukraine’s Government and Security Reshuffle?
- What We Know About the U.S.-Saudi Nuclear DealCommentary
Despite the agreement’s uncertainty, it’s still a significant development in regional and nuclear policy.
Andrew Leber, Jane Darby Menton
- A Path Forward on AI Safety for the United States and ChinaCommentary
“AI safety in parallel” is modest and pragmatic but vital.
Matt Sheehan
- Why Europe Must Take Charge of its Russia Diplomacy NowCommentary
Trump is distracted and Ukraine wants Europe to step up. The continent’s leaders must find their voice and assert it in talks with Russia.
Alissa de Carbonnel
- The Alternative für Deutschland and Germany’s Unsettled Place in the WorldPaper
Unresolved tensions within the AfD may ultimately constrain the its potential as a leader among European and global populist forces.
Jeremy Cliffe
