Source: Getty
In recent years, Buenos Aires has sought stronger ties with China and membership in the BRICS. But with the recent election of far-right president Javier Milei, Argentina’s approach to the world may change.
This article, which examines Argentina’s approach to Ukraine and China, is part of an ongoing series on U.S. statecraft and the Global South developed by the Carnegie Endowment’s American Statecraft Program. For other articles in the series, click here.
Argentina strives for a foreign policy of equidistance and generally resents perceived attempts by the United States to “choose sides” between Washington and Beijing. It will continue to deepen relations with both powers—including with other partners, such as the European Union, India, and Japan, as part of its strategy of largely preserving ties to everyone—while remaining wary of the risks associated with strategic competition. On Ukraine, it has leaned more toward the United States than some other emerging powers yet eschewed calls for sanctions on Russia or military aid to Ukraine. Compared to its regional peers, Argentina has not been as pro-Ukraine as Chile, but its stance strongly diverged from that of other left-leaning governments such as Bolivia and Cuba, which side with Russia.1
Economic turmoil has made it hard for Argentina to adopt an ambitious foreign policy, but Buenos Aires has long considered the G20 a valuable platform to voice its foreign policy views. Argentina’s economic troubles have also driven it toward newer, Beijing-led platforms, including the BRICS grouping, which offered it formal membership in August 2023. Argentina’s BRICS membership, however, is still up in the air. With the election of far-right presidential candidate Javier Milei, Argentina is likely to alter the course of its policies. Milei, who has been compared to former U.S. president Donald Trump and Brazil’s former president Jair Bolsonaro, vowed to dollarize the Argentine economy, withdraw Argentina’s BRICS application, and downgrade diplomatic ties with China.2 Yet in an effort to attract centrist voters, Milei moderated his rhetoric somewhat during the runoff and since he lacks a majority in Congress, he can be expected to struggle to implement many of his most radical ideas.
As President Vladimir Putin massed Russian troops at Ukraine's border in February 2022, Argentina’s President Alberto Fernández visited Moscow, and called for Argentina to reduce its dependence on the United States and the International Monetary Fund. Russia, he said, could be an important alternative partner for Buenos Aires.3 Standing alongside Putin, Fernández argued that “Argentina has to be Russia’s gateway into Latin America” and the two leaders then signed trade agreements and promised to deepen bilateral cooperation.4 After the war broke out, however, Argentina temporarily stepped back from its pursuit of stronger ties with Russia and condemned the invasion as a violation of the rules-based order. When Putin called Fernández to congratulate him on Argentina’s World Cup Victory in December 2022, Fernández told him that he had not resumed dialogue because of “an inconvenience, which was the problem of the war.”5
Unlike many other emerging powers such as India and Brazil, Argentina has voted in favor of all Ukraine-related resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly. It has also provided humanitarian aid to Ukraine.6 But it has stopped short of where the United States would have liked it to go.7 Buenos Aires made it clear that it would not send weapons to assist Kyiv, even though Argentina has two Soviet-made Mi-17 transport helicopters that Ukraine requested.8 Granted, these helicopters are now in poor condition and unusable even by Argentina itself.9 Buenos Aires also decided against imposing sanctions on Moscow, with its leaders arguing sanctions are not a mechanism to generate peace, and that they instead have negative impacts for Argentina and for the world.10
Argentina’s economic ties to Russia are marginal, and so do not explain Argentina’s reluctance to impose sanctions.11 The position instead springs from Buenos Aires’s long-standing opposition to sanctions unapproved by the UN Security Council, a common position among Latin American governments. Argentina has also called for an end to the sanctions on Cuba and Venezuela, for example.12
Economic factors have influenced Argentina’s position on the war in Ukraine, albeit indirectly. Unlike Brazil, for example, whose trade with Russia would be negatively affected by sanctions, it is the weakness of Argentina’s economy that encourages it to seek peace. At a time of economic crisis, fuel shortages, and risk of social instability, Argentine leaders fear global economic fallout from the war, especially if it drags on or escalates. Fernández has thus consistently advocated for the international community to push for dialogue between Russia and Ukraine, arguing that “the world needs more food, not more missiles.”13 Argentina has also offered to help the EU and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in any negotiations that may occur.14
Argentina’s president-elect Javier Milei has criticized both leftist and authoritarian leaders such as Putin on the campaign trail and can be expected to more explicitly side with Ukraine, but not significantly alter Argentina’s approach. Milei sees himself as a defender of liberty and uses a picture of the fall of the Berlin Wall on his X (formerly Twitter) account. He is thus likely to embrace a more pro-Western and pro-Ukraine rhetoric—even though frictions between Argentina and the West are also likely, given Milei’s admiration for Trump and the fact that he is a climate skeptic.15
Argentina has been one of Washington’s most trusted South American partners in the post–Cold War era. Argentina was the only South American country to join the United States’ military coalition in the 1991 Gulf War, a decision that later helped earn it the designation “major non-NATO ally” from Bill Clinton’s administration.16 Since then relations with the United States remained positive, even as the political leanings of Argentine administrations have swung further to the left.
Today, that picture is evolving, thanks largely to China’s growing economic importance for Argentina. In August 2023, members of the BRICS formally asked Argentina, along with five other countries, to join the organization. BRICS has caused concern in the West because it is often viewed there as a platform for China’s foreign policy interests and a challenger to Western-led international institutions. Nevertheless, Argentina seeks new sources of foreign capital to alleviate its economic strain, and outgoing Fernández said that the invitation presents a “great opportunity” to strengthen the Argentine economy.17 Months earlier, Argentina renewed and expanded its currency swap line with China and agreed to use the yuan in its foreign transactions with Beijing.18
Argentine leaders have looked to China as an alternative source of financing for its crushing debt at a time when Western lenders have already been tapped and recourse to them has been more difficult due to concerns about their impositions on Argentine sovereignty.19 Argentina performs so poorly in the Emerging Markets Bonds Index that the U.S. Treasury and other Western lenders are reluctant to lend. When Buenos Aires does get loans, they usually come with forced austerity policies, which risk generating domestic social unrest. The BRICS New Development Bank (NDB), on the other hand, is seen as a source of easier long-term financing without conditionalities, even though it remains far smaller than Western-led multilateral banks.20
After Brazil, China is Argentina’s second-largest trading partner, and also the second-largest destination for Argentine exports, such as soybeans and beef.21 Trade has steadily increased over the past decade. In 2010, only 5 percent of Argentina’s imports were Chinese products. Now, Chinese products make up 20 percent of Argentine imports.22 In all of Latin America, Argentina has received the most loans from China’s “big five” commercial banks, signaling Beijing's stake in the country.23 Argentina officially joined the Belt and Road Initiative in 2022 and signed trade and infrastructure agreements worth more than $23 billion.24 The most strategically significant of these are two hydroelectric dams in Santa Cruz and the Atucha III, an $8 billion nuclear power plant that will aid Argentina’s advanced nuclear industry. China is also seen as a partner in Argentina’s plans to become an important provider of lithium in the global energy transition (for electric vehicles, for example). After Chile, Bolivia, and Australia, Argentina holds the fourth-largest lithium reserves in what many see as a bright spot in Argentina’s overall economic outlook.25
Many, but not all, of China’s inroads are economic. China’s presence is evident, for instance, in Patagonia, where the People’s Liberation Army has operated a space research station since 2018, or in Ushuaia, the southernmost tip of Argentina, where China was eyeing the construction of a naval base as recently in 2021.26 That plan seems to have been paused, but it still shows the potential growth of China’s power there.
Javier Milei promises to align Argentina more closely with the United States but may struggle to do so. He has pledged to withdraw Argentina’s BRICS application and downgrade Argentina’s diplomatic ties with China and Russia.27 But there is no guarantee that his anti-China rhetoric, which is largely meant to mobilize part of the electorate, will result in dramatic policy changes.
As president, Milei can be expected to adopt a pragmatic stance. He has already signaled that economic ties with China would not be affected.28 Much will depend on the influence wielded by more moderate voices, with ties to Argentina’s more traditional center-right alliance. But given that Milei has no majority in Congress, limited governing experience, and faces a stark economic outlook, he may struggle to implement radical foreign policy changes.
Ultimately, Argentina’s positions toward Ukraine and China are motivated by concerns about economic growth and stability. These economic interests combine with concerns about the international order. Speaking to the G7 leaders, outgoing president Fernández said that “in Latin America and the Caribbean we dream of a new international order where efforts are balanced and advantages are distributed with criteria of equity.” He called for the “construction of a new international financial architecture that includes the peripheries of the world.”29
1 Eduardo Porter, “Latin America’s Stance on Ukraine Is Trapped in the Past,” Bloomberg, March 14, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/03/14/latin-america-s-ukraine-war-stance-is-trapped-in-the-past/7da2ab8a-c257-11ed-82a7-6a87555c1878_story.html.
2 Ciara Nugent, “Argentina Radical Rightwinger Shakes Up Presidential Race with Primary Win,” Financial Times, August 13, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/612a09a1-af5b-4173-8897-0bd516a148e5.
3 Eliana Raszewski, “Argentina's Fernandez, in Russia, Says Must End Economic 'Dependence' on U.S., IMF,” Reuters, February 3, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/argentinas-fernandez-russia-says-must-end-economic-dependence-us-imf-2022-02-03/.
4 “Back and Forth: Argentina’s Changing Rhetoric on Russia’s War in Ukraine,” Buenos Aires Times, February 23, 2023, https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/argentina/back-and-forth-argentinas-changing-rhetoric-on-russias-war-in-ukraine.phtml.
5 Ibid.
6 “Ukrainian Chargé d’affaires Thanks Argentina for Aid,” Buenos Aires Times, February 24, 2023, https://buenosairesherald.com/world/international-relations/ukrainian-charge-daffaires-thanks-argentina-for-aid.
7 Michael Stott et al, “ ‘ We are for Peace’: Latin America Rejects Pleas to Send Weapons to Ukraine,” Financial Times, February 15, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/fc8d51c8-5202-4862-a653-87d1603deded.
8 Ryan Brobst, John Hardie, and Bradley Bowman, “Non-Nato Sources of Soviet and Russian Arms for Ukraine,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, July 6, 2022, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2022/07/06/non-nato-sources-of-soviet-and-russian-arms-for-ukraine/.
9 Jose Higuera, “Argentina Eyes Surplus GH-46 Helicopters as Mi-17 Replacement,” Defense News, September 21, 2023, https://www.defensenews.com/global/the-americas/2023/09/21/argentina-eyes-surplus-ch-46-helicopters-as-mi-17-replacement/.
10 Bala Chambers, “Argentina Rejects Sanctioning Russia: Foreign Minister,” Anadolu Agency, March 4, 2022, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/argentina-rejects-sanctioning-russia-foreign-minister/2523216; “President Fernández Questions Economic Sanctions Against Russia,” Buenos Aires Times, May 11, 2022, https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/economy/president-fernandez-questions-economic-sanctions-against-russia.phtml.
11 UN Comtrade Database, https://comtradeplus.un.org/.
12 “Mexico, Argentina Call for End of Economic Sanctions Against Cuba and Venezuela,” La Politica Online, April 6, 2020, https://www.lapoliticaonline.com/nota/127068-mexico-argentina-call-for-end-of-economic-sanctions-against-cuba-and-venezuela/.
13 “Argentine President Tells G7 Dialogue Was Needed to Solve Ukraine Crisis,” MercoPress, June 28, 2022, https://en.mercopress.com/2022/06/28/argentine-president-tells-g7-dialogue-was-needed-to-solve-ukraine-crisis; Sweta Desai, “Argentinian President Calls for Restoration of Peace in Ukraine,” Anadolu Agency, May 13, 2022, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/argentinian-president-calls-for-restoration-of-peace-in-ukraine/2587328.
14 “Ukraine's Zelenskyy Talks to Argentina, Chile Presidents,” AP News, July 1, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-zelenskyy-chile-argentina-a9f36566a7cf41ae3653ce396cf78229.
15 Ciara Nugent, “Radical Libertarian Javier Milei Seizes Victory in Argentina Presidential Election,” Financial Times, November 20, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/38f718d3-0289-4b12-8faf-245c19d65cb0.
16 “Persian Gulf Conflict Makes Argentina and Britain Allies,” New York Times, September 20, 1990, https://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/20/world/persian-gulf-conflict-makes-argentina-and-britain-allies.html.
17 “’New Scenario’ Opens for Argentina With BRICS Invitation, Fernandez Says,” Reuters, August 24, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/new-scenario-opens-argentina-with-brics-invitation-fernandez-says-2023-08-24/.
18 Natalie Alcoba, “Argentina’s Yuan Lifeline Sign of Brinksmanship Between China, US,” Al Jazeera, July 17, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/7/17/argentinas-yuan-lifeline-sign-of-brinksmanship-between-china-us.
19 Santiago Gomez, “Gabriel Merino: ‘Belonging to the BRICS Means the Possibility of Accessing Credit Without the Conditions of the IMF,’” Agencia Paco Urondo, September 4, 2023, https://www.agenciapacourondo.com.ar/politica/gabriel-merino-pertenecer-al-brics-significa-la-posibilidad-de-acceder-credito-sin-los; “Brazil’s Lula in Favor of Argentina Joining BRICS Bloc,” Reuters, August 22, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/article/brics-summit-brazil-idAFKBN2ZX0XO.
20 “President Fernández Calls for Argentina's Incorporation into the BRICS Group,” Buenos Aires Times, June 24, 2022, https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/amp/world/president-fernandez-calls-for-argentinas-incorporation-into-the-brics-group.phtml.
21 “New Boost to Strategic Relations With China,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, https://www.cancilleria.gob.ar/en/news/newsletter/new-boost-strategic-relations-china#:~:text=China%20is%20the%20second%2Dlargest,16%20billion%20dollars%20per%20year.
22 Fermin Koop, “Alberto Fernández Eyes China in Bid to Alleviate Argentina's Debt Crisis,” Buenos Aires Times, February 22, 2020, https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/economy/alberto-fernandez-eyes-china-in-bid-to-alleviate-argentinas-debt-crisis.phtml.
23 Margaret Myers, “China-Latin America Commercial Loans Tracker,” Inter-American Dialogue, https://www.thedialogue.org/map_list/.
24 “China, Argentina Pledge Closer Ties on Currency, 'Belt and Road,'” Reuters, February 6, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/china-argentina-pledge-deepen-partnership-expand-trade-2022-02-06/.
25 “Argentina Could Help the World by Becoming a Big Lithium Exporter,” Economist, Nov 15, 2022, https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2022/11/15/argentina-could-help-the-world-by-becoming-a-big-lithium-exporter.
26 Cassandra Garrison, “China's Military-Run Space Station in Argentina is a 'Black Box,'” Reuters, January 30, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-space-argentina-china-insight/chinas-military-run-space-station-in-argentina-is-a-black-box-idUSKCN1PP0I2; Guillermo Saavedra, “China Pressures Argentina to Build Naval Base,” Dialogo Americas, January 3, 2023, https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/china-pressures-argentina-to-build-naval-base/.
27 Manuela Tobias, “Argentina’s Top Presidential Candidates Reject BRICS Membership,” Bloomberg, August 24, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-08-24/argentina-s-top-presidential-candidates-reject-brics-membership?in_source=embedded-checkout-banner&sref=QmOxnLFz#xj4y7vzkg.
28 “An Interview with Javier Milei,” Economist, September 7, 2023, https://www.economist.com/news/2023/09/07/an-interview-with-javier-milei.
29 “Argentine President Tells G7 Dialogue Was Needed to Solve Ukraine Crisis,” MercoPress, June 28, 2022, https://en.mercopress.com/2022/06/28/argentine-president-tells-g7-dialogue-was-needed-to-solve-ukraine-crisis.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
The risk posed by Lukashenko today looks very different to how it did in 2022. The threat of the Belarusian army entering the war appears increasingly illusory, while Ukraine’s ability to attack any point in Belarus with drones gives Kyiv confidence.
Artyom Shraibman
Washington and New Delhi should be proud of their putative deal. But international politics isn’t the domain of unicorns and leprechauns, and collateral damage can’t simply be wished away.
Evan A. Feigenbaum
Senior climate, finance, and mobility experts discuss how the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage could unlock financing for climate mobility.
Alejandro Martin Rodriguez
The EU lacks leadership and strategic planning in the South Caucasus, while the United States is leading the charge. To secure its geopolitical interests, Brussels must invest in new connectivity for the region.
Zaur Shiriyev
Instead of a guaranteed ally, the Kremlin now perceives Armenia as yet another hybrid battlefield where it is fighting the West.
Mikayel Zolyan
