The Six Areas in Trump’s Executive Orders that Countries in Africa and the Global South Should Pay Attention to

Given America’s heft as the world’s largest economy and preeminent military superpower, President Donald Trump’s sweeping agenda will surely be felt around the world. A few hours after his inauguration, Trump issued an unprecedented forty-four executive orders and memos across a wide range of areas—from bureaucratic reorganization to trade, energy, and migration—that  communicated his intention to swiftly implement his policy agenda and campaign promises. The ripple effects of some of these policy shifts are likely to be significant for low and middle-income countries (LMICs) for which the United States is a major provider of development assistance, an important trade partner, and source of investments and technologies.

There are six key issues addressed by Trump’s initial executive orders (EOs) that low- and middle-income countries in Africa and the Global South should pay close attention to: foreign aid, reframing energy diplomacy, the Global Tax Deal and U.S. FDI, global trade relations, WHO and global health, and spillovers of adversarial relations with China. While the Trump administration continues to implement these EOs, and indeed, facing the prospect that many aspects will be challenged in the courts, these initial executive orders provide a sense of the overarching policy direction.

A Review of U.S. Foreign Aid

One of the most prominent executive orders signed by Trump calls for a ninety-day pause and review of all U.S. foreign aid obligations and disbursements. Specifically, the EO Reevaluating And Realigning United States Foreign Aid directs “all department and agency heads with responsibility for United States foreign development assistance programs . . . [to] immediately pause new obligations and disbursements of development assistance funds to foreign countries and implementing non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and contractors pending reviews of such programs for programmatic efficiency and consistency with United States foreign policy, to be conducted within 90 days.” A significant restructuring of U.S. foreign aid will likely follow this review process.

This directive will have global ramifications. The United States is the world’s largest aid donor, disbursing $64.7 billion globally and $14.9 billion to Africa in 2023. These resources are disbursed bilaterally through U.S. federal agencies including USAID, the Department of State, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and then multilaterally via the UN system, multilateral development banks, and other transnational platforms such as the G7, GAVI, and so on. There is also a network of hundreds of implementing organizations, consultancies, NGOs, research and policy institutes, and so on that carry out U.S. aid-funded projects on the ground.

Therefore, some near-term and medium-term implications include:

• Immediate stoppage of ongoing projects: The Department of State under Marco Rubio has moved swiftly to implement the EO. Notably, it has issued a “stop-work” order on all U.S.-funded development projects around the world, with the exception of emergency food and humanitarian aid, and assistance to Egypt and Israel. The impacts are already being felt particularly in health intervention, agriculture and food programs, and with some NGOs and contractors facing the prospects of job cuts in the coming weeks. While an exemption was secured for the HIV/AIDS program PEPFAR, most projects have been stopped.
• An impending restructuring and reallocation of U.S. aid: These directives are unlikely to result in a permanent cessation of U.S. official development assistance (ODA) flows. However, U.S. ODA will be restructured, reallocated and potentially reduced in very profound ways following the ninety-day review. Per the EO, “no further United States foreign assistance shall be disbursed in a manner that is not fully aligned with the foreign policy of the President of the United States.” That foreign policy is unambiguously one that is “America First. . . . Which puts America and its interest first,” per another EO on an America First Foreign Policy.  What might the aid priorities of an explicitly “America First Foreign Policy” be? According to Rubio, “every dollar we spend, every program we fund . . . must be justified with the answer to . . . : Does it make America safer . . . stronger . . . prosperous?” Already, USAID, the world’s largest development agency and the main entity tasked with disbursing U.S. foreign aid, has apparently been folded into the U.S. State Department and its staff placed on administrative leave, with plans to downsize from over 10,000 employees to under 300, all pointing to a major restructuring underway.
• Elements of an America First foreign aid agenda: Drawing on information from official press releases, memos, and other policy blueprints such as the Project 2025 Mandate for Leadership (pages 253-279), we have a rough sense of what could be prioritized after the ninety-day review is completed.
  
  o   There will be a complete overhaul of U.S. health assistance, which for instance accounts for around 22 percent of total U.S. ODA disbursements, with a discontinuation of sexual and reproductive health and gender equality initiatives, and a new focus on protecting “women, children and families” and “protecting life” through initiatives launched in Trump’s first term, such as the Geneva Consensus Declaration on Women’s Health and Protection of the Family.
  
  o   A revival of the Journey to Self-Reliance framework introduced in Trump’s first term that roughly aligns with the “localization agenda” in the global development world. This approach will channel more aid funding toward local organizations instead of the complex of international NGOs and consultancies that have traditionally implemented U.S. aid projects. However, this America First version of localization is likely to prioritize faith-based organizations as local partners, as indicated in the Project 2025 Mandate for Leadership document (see pages 254 and 260).
  
  o   Finally, Trump’s new foreign aid agenda will hew closely and explicitly to America First priorities in other ways such as leveraging aid dollars to support America’s security and private sector abroad. In particular, U.S. ODA is likely to be used toward supporting the export of U.S. capital and technologies with entities such as the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) playing a central role; stopping all climate projects; reducing or even eliminating U.S. financial contributions to many multilateral organizations (defunding and even withdrawal from UN agencies such as the WHO among others, but increased emphasis on others like the World Food Program).
• A secular decline in ODA: Beyond the United States, other OECD-DAC donors have been cutting, realigning, and reallocating their aid budgets. In a recent analysis we conducted, many of the ten largest donors have decreased their ODA budgets (see figure 1). This raises the question, is there a more long-term trend of consistent decline in American and European foreign aid flows? With continued economic stagnation in the Eurozone and the UK—where economic growth has averaged less than 2 percent in over a decade—and financial pressures from the war in Ukraine, aid spending from the region is unlikely to increase in the medium term.

Reframing Energy Diplomacy

Trump signed at least three EOs (Declaring a National Energy Emergency, Unleashing American Energy, and Putting America First In International Environmental Agreements) that reframe America’s energy policy priorities as “energy security.” According to these EOs, achieving energy security means to support economic growth, lower domestic energy prices and reduce inflation, reduce dependence on adversaries especially for rare earth and other critical minerals, and establish dominance on this front globally. This overriding energy security approach will comprise a variety of domestic policies with significant international ramifications. Whereas the reduction in foreign assistance will have negative impacts for some of the poorest countries in the Global South, Trump’s effort to reframe energy policy could be a net positive.

One policy direction indicated in the orders is to increase production across all energy sources. This includes expediting approvals for liquefied natural gas exports and increasing domestic production and use of oil, coal, hydropower, biofuels, critical minerals, and nuclear energy resources. There is also an emphasis on removing regulatory red tape associated with all forms of energy production on federal lands, and any restrictions that “impose an undue burden on the identification, development, or use of domestic energy resources.” In his first official policy statement, the Secretary of Energy Chris Wright says the Department of Energy’s “goal will be to unleash the great abundance of American energy required to power modern life.”

There is also a strong emphasis on “restoring America’s [critical] mineral dominance.” Domestically, this will entail increasing the mining and processing of these commodities, updating the U.S. Geological Survey list of “critical minerals,” and deregulating the permitting process. Internationally, the EO authorizes the use of trade policy and assessment of the use of forced labor in mineral production in certain jurisdictions and recognizes the importance of some multilateral fora such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue on this front.

Finally, Trump has withdrawn the United States, yet again, from the Paris Climate Accord and other international environmental agreements that he argues encumber America’s ability to unleash its full energy dominance. Specifically, Putting America First In International Environmental Agreements authorizes the U.S. “withdrawal from any agreement, pact, accord, or similar commitment made under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change” and immediately revokes all financial commitments under these frameworks.

Some near-term and medium-term implications for LMICs include:

• The reframing of “energy transition” to “energy security” loosens restrictions on energy production in the Global South: How will America’s international energy engagements be shaped by this pivot from “energy transition” to “energy security”?¹ U.S. diplomats and representatives at global fora will probably deemphasize the emissions mitigation that underlies the “energy transition,” push for loosening restrictions on financing, and reframe intellectual debates surrounding energy sources and technologies hitherto thought to be “controversial”—from hydrocarbons to nuclear energy to carbon capture and storage. Leaders of various LMICs could, therefore, choose to have their own context-specific definitions of “energy security” that allow them to address energy poverty, loosen the externally imposed strictures on the use of their domestic energy resources, especially hydrocarbons, or even to signal their alignment with Trump. Finally, U.S. influence may cause the multilateral development banks, particularly the World Bank Group, to soften their hard opposition to policy reforms and technical assistance associated with the hydrocarbons industry in LMICs.
• An impending crisis of legitimacy for the UN climate process: U.S. absence in international climate fora will be felt and will underscore the UN climate process’s deepening crisis of legitimacy. In fact, some experts like Vijaya Ramachandran and Ted Norhaus at the Breakthrough Institute, are proposing that poor countries follow Trump’s lead to also pull out of “a process that has clearly not served them and, indeed, has often justified their continuing impoverishment” (although there have been rebuttals). When the major commercial banks and asset managers that signed up to the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero have now publicly dropped their commitments to the net-zero transition by 2050, the gridlocked UN climate process could face further criticism in the wake of the second U.S. exit.
• The deprioritization of multilateral initiatives on energy policy: Trump has also charged all departments and agencies that coordinate international energy agreements to “prioritize economic efficiency, the promotion of American prosperity, consumer choice, and fiscal restraint in all foreign engagements that concern energy policy.” This directive has many dimensions that are too numerous to cover. For instance, what happens to U.S. funding for multilateral climate finance initiatives such as the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) for South Africa, Indonesia, and Vietnam? Will the Mineral Security Partnerships—a collaboration of fourteen countries and the EU to catalyze public and private investment in responsible critical minerals supply chains globally—survive? All are areas to monitor closely in the coming months.
• Critical minerals offer an opportunity:  The Trump administration is clearly interested in achieving U.S. critical minerals supply security through domestic action and international engagements. Since the specific policy direction is yet to be defined, there is an opportunity for many resource-rich countries in Africa and the rest of the Global South to appeal to Trump’s inclination for dealmaking. Critical minerals may be the key leverage to negotiating mutually beneficial trade and investment relationships with the U.S., other factors permitting (see point 4 below on U.S. FDI). For instance, the U.S. interest in securing critical minerals supplies could spur reauthorization of trade preference programs such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).

Rescinding the Applicability of Global Tax Deal Could Affect U.S. FDI Flows

Trump has released the United States from any commitments to the OECD Global Tax Deal, which set a minimum tax rate of 15 percent for multinational companies. In a memorandum for the secretary of the treasury, Trump directed that “commitments made by the prior administration on behalf of the United States with respect to the Global Tax Deal have no force or effect within the United States.” The United States will also investigate and take punitive actions toward countries (and their citizens) that are not in compliance with tax treaties with the United States or that levy “discriminatory” taxes toward U.S.-based multinationals.

At least two implications of this memo are both straightforward and potentially quite significant to global efforts at mobilizing investments for development financing.

• Undercuts global efforts at combating tax evasion and avoidance by multinationals. If other wealthy countries follow Trump’s lead in jettisoning the Global Minimum Tax, LMICs could find themselves once more in a race-to-the-bottom to offer excessively generous tax incentives to foreign investors. These increase investment flows in the short term but lead to harmful long-term consequences on domestic tax revenues. Such an outcome would deprive LMICs of crucial money for public services such as education, healthcare, and infrastructure; affect broader efforts at domestic resource mobilization; and ultimately prevent the poorest countries from reducing their reliance on foreign aid. The global tax deal was meant to help stem the tide of illicit financial flows from Africa which amount to nearly $90 billion per annum, exceeding the $60 billion the region receives in development assistance. A situation in which LMICs lose foreign aid flows, per the discussion above, and collect less domestic tax revenues would be dire for many of them.
• U.S. FDI flows into LMICs. This new directive could help or hurt U.S. investors in LMICS. Large middle-income economies, such as Brazil, Indonesia, and South Africa, that are attractive to investors from multiple countries, could be more skeptical of U.S. investment flows given the threat of punitive measures even for abiding by the Global Tax Deal. These middle-income countries might decide that, for instance, digital technology exports from U.S. companies are suddenly less attractive compared to Chinese alternatives that are not associated with the threat of sanctions. Poorer countries with limited options will, of course, be less discerning.

Global Trade Relations

The America First Trade Policy EO advances one of Trump’s central campaign pledges: to overhaul U.S. global trade relations. There are two aspects that might concern LMICs. First, Trump is directing the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to review all U.S. trade agreements and recommend revisions to achieve reciprocity and concessions from partner countries. Second, the USTR is authorized to negotiate bilateral or sector-specific trade agreements to obtain export market access. Furthermore, the recent threat and application of tariffs on Canada, Mexico, and China indicates that Trump is serious about overhauling U.S. global trade relations.

This EO was highly anticipated, but it contains little by way of immediate policy actions—although Trump has since begun to announce tariffs on U.S. trade partners. All the same, the directive raises crucial questions around the direction that the Trump administration will take upon the conclusion of the USTR’s reviews.

• How will preferential trade programs, that cover LMICs, be included in the reviews? The United States has four main preferential trade programs,² which provide the U.S. market duty-free access to thousands of products from dozens of low and middle-income countries. Combined, these programs cover nearly 120 countries with the objective of enabling them to use trade to grow their economies and climb out of poverty instead of relying solely on foreign aid. Of the four programs, the GSP expired in 2021 and is awaiting congressional reauthorization. AGOA is set to expire in September 2025. There are a lot of uncertainties here. One possibility from Trump’s policies is that the USTR may add a reciprocal element to these preferential trade programs that are meant to provide nonreciprocal access to the U.S. market. Would the administration’s plans for levying universal tariffs on all U.S. imports also apply to beneficiaries of these trade programs? If these programs are retained and reauthorized, what conditions and criteria might be added to determine eligibility (for example, a commitment to not engage with China and other adversaries, or the labor and environmental standards proposed during the Biden administration)?
• What countries and sectors will be prioritized for bilateral trade agreements? On the African continent, would a Kenya free trade agreement resurface? (It was introduced during Trump’s first term, and became a “strategic trade and investment partnership” under the Biden administration.) Will there be an appetite for negotiating more critical mineral agreements (CMAs), even if they are likely to be rebranded? Since the first CMA with Japan was concluded in March 2023, several countries—from the UK to Indonesia to the EU—have lined up for consideration for CMAs.

Withdrawal From the WHO to Reshape U.S. Engagement in Global Health Policy

Another EO withdraws the United States, yet again, from the WHO after Trump’s first attempt in 2020 was rescinded by Joe Biden in January 2021. This latest withdrawal notice has paused the future transfer of U.S. government funds, support, and resources to the WHO, which provides crucial development assistance for health programs in dozens of countries around the world. The EO also directs the recall and reassignment of U.S. government personnel and contractors working in any capacity with the WHO. It authorizes the identification of “international partners” (presumably countries or organizations) to assume necessary activities previously undertaken by the WHO and will rescind and replace the 2024 U.S. Global Health Security Strategy.

Implications:

• Direct impact on the WHO’s budget and authority. The United States is the largest donor to the WHO’s budget, contributing about 15 percent of the total budget. This withdrawal will hit the organization’s bottom line. Will other major donors, particularly those in Europe with right-leaning governments, follow U.S. footsteps in retracting their financial support for the WHO? Taken together with the pause in U.S. foreign aid funding, Trump’s decision to withdraw from the WHO could decisively shape the direction of global health programs and the associated policy discourse.
• Would China or the Gates Foundation make up for the WHO’s loss of U.S. financial support? This is a space to closely watch, because it seems like low-hanging fruit for China to step in to expand its influence in a critical global health organization. More likely, the Gates Foundation, currently the third-largest contributor to the WHO at approximately 10.5 percent of the total budget, will step in to shore up the organization’s budget. Despite U.S. exit, the organization still has 192 member states.
• Scaling down and redirecting U.S. support of global health programs. The U.S. departure from the WHO as well as the temporary stoppage to global health aid programs are presaging a significant scaling down and redirection even if not a permanent retreat. What might a recalibrated U.S. global health strategy entail?  Based on the EOs released to date, it may largely be informed by a comprehensive approach to protecting “women, children and families” and “protecting life,” working with faith-based organizations and improving coordination, as outlined in the Project 2025 Mandate for Leadership document. The State Department is now promoting new U.S.-led multilateral initiatives that align with America First global health priorities such as the Geneva Consensus Declaration on Women’s Health and Protection of the Families. Trump has also restored the Protecting Life in Global Health Assistance (PLGHA) policy first announced in 2019, widely known as the “Mexico City Policy,” which directs that “no U.S. taxpayer money should support foreign organizations that perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family planning in other nations.”

Spillovers From More Adversarial Economic Relations With China

A major component of the America First Trade Policy EO is a likely overhaul of the United States’ economic relationship with China in ways that could have second order effects on low- and middle-income economies that maintain strong relations with both countries. There is an enormous amount of uncertainty about how this will play out, but LMICs stand to benefit if U.S. trade is moved away from China and toward them. They could also suffer, however, if a trade war undermines confidence in the global economy.

The EO calls for a comprehensive review of trade and economic relations with China across different dimensions. This review includes an assessment of policies and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation associated with industrial supply chains. It will also aim to identify and eliminate loopholes in existing export controls on strategic goods, software, services, and technology to countries seen as strategic rivals and their proxies (that is, from China and other actors) as well as an assessment of imports that threaten U.S. national security. The EO calls for action following the review of the Economic and Trade Agreement with China (signed by Trump in his first term) and an assessment of legislative proposals on U.S. Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China.

This EO mostly targets China but could be applicable to other countries. It directs the U.S. Treasury to “counter currency manipulation . . . that provides trading partners with an unfair competitive advantage in international trade.” In 2019, the U.S. Treasury designated China as a “currency manipulator” and is likely to do so again. In the event of increased U.S. tariffs on its major trade partners, an expected response of the exporting economy would be a managed devaluation of that country’s currency to absorb the costs of tariffs.

There are at least two ways in which the impending adversarial U.S.-China economic relations could spill over to LMICs in Africa and the Global South.

• Externally induced Chinese economic crisis will hurt LMIC exports. If these reviews lead to punitive measures and sanctions, China’s economic growth may slow down further, reducing Chinese demand for imports from countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and other regions. For a vast majority of these countries, China is their largest trading partner. Therefore, a further slow down of China’s economic growth induced by U.S. pressure could result in declining Chinese demand for exports, particularly commodities from LMICs.
• Secondary sanctions on third party LMICs. If these anticipated punitive actions by the U.S. to rebalance its trade relationship with China fail to yield desired results, then the Trump administration could consider using the threat of secondary sanctions to pressure third parties in Africa and the Global South to “choose sides” in isolating China. This could be comparable to the Biden administration’s announcement of secondary sanctions in 2024 on financial institutions in third countries that continued to do business with Russia in a wide range of industries.   

Conclusion

One thread that runs through the international dimensions of the America First agenda is the explicit deprioritization of multilateral initiatives in favor of bilateral and unilateral initiatives led by the United States. The UN system in particular is viewed with great skepticism by the new administration. This is especially the case for international energy and climate policy, trade, and global health. But it is not yet clear what stance the administration will take regarding multilateral development banks, particularly the World Bank Group and the IMF, in which the United States is a major shareholder, as well as regional banks such as the African Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank, in which the United States retains significant financial and political influence.

Overall, these executive orders represent the initial phase of advancing this policy agenda, and therefore offer a glimpse into the changes that are afoot. Understanding these changes will be critical for LMICs to devise frameworks for engaging the new administration.