The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is offering the United States access to its mineral resources in an effort to ensure peace and stability in the country. The offer, made against the backdrop of U.S.-China competition over critical minerals, is designed to motivate Washington to play a decisive role in the security crisis in the eastern DRC. Unlike in 2012, when then president Barack Obama threw his weight into pressuring Rwanda to halt its support for the M23 (March 23) rebel movement, more recent U.S. administrations, past and current, have struggled to play a decisive role in the conflict raging in the eastern DRC, where the Congolese government is battling Rwandan-backed M23/AFC (Alliance Fleuve Congo) rebels.
Washington, however, cannot be blamed for a lack of engagement in resolving this crisis. The United States was the first United Nations (UN) Security Council country to identify Rwanda’s involvement in the crisis, condemning its intervention in the DRC and calling for the withdrawal of Rwandan troops. Beginning in 2022, Joe Biden’s administration was involved in mediating the conflict and secured a ceasefire in December 2023, which the belligerents briefly respected. The agreement supported the Nairobi and Luanda regional peace processes, with a particular preference for the Luanda process led by Angolan President João Lourenço. In July 2024, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added the AFC (as the political branch of the M23) and one of its leaders, Bertrand Bisimwa, to its sanctions list. More recently, Rwandan Minister of Regional Cooperation James Kabarebe and M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka also were added to this list.
However, these initiatives were not enough to get Rwanda to halt its support for the M23 rebels, nor to convince the Congolese government to negotiate with the rebellion. The collapse of the promising Luanda process in December 2024 was followed by an offensive by the M23 rebels, who succeeded, between late January and mid-February 2025, in taking the cities of Goma and Bukavu, provincial capitals of North and South Kivu, respectively.
How the International Community Reacted
The international community’s response was an initial flurry of condemnation, followed by collective or bilateral measures. At the multilateral level, on February 21, 2025, the UN Security Council eventually voted unanimously for Resolution 2773, condemning Rwanda’s intervention and calling for its withdrawal from Congolese territory.
At the European level, on February 14, 2025, the European Union (EU) Parliament passed a resolution condemning the Rwandan presence and demanding the withdrawal of its troops from the DRC. It also urged the EU Commission to suspend the Memorandum of Understanding on critical minerals with Rwanda. EU foreign ministers met in Brussels on February 24 but failed to reach a consensus on sanctions against Rwanda. Still, they decided to suspend defense consultations with Rwanda, reached a political agreement on the need for sanctions in case of escalation, and promised to reevaluate the memorandum of understanding on critical minerals.
The most vigorous measures were taken at the bilateral level. On February 26, the United Kingdom suspended part of its aid and military cooperation with Rwanda. This move followed Rwanda’s decision to suspend its development program with Belgium after criticism of its involvement in the eastern DRC. In early March, Canada and Germany also took similar measures against Rwanda. A day before the OFAC sanctions, U.S. Chargé d‘Affaires ad interim to the UN Dorothy Shea said that if the crisis were to persist, the United States was ready “to leverage all the tools at its disposal in order to hold accountable those responsible for sustaining armed conflict, instability, and insecurity in the DRC.”
All these measures and decisions have led to a fragile lull in the fighting on the various front lines. However, there is no sign of Rwandan troops withdrawing from DRC territory or of the rebel movement leaving the cities of Goma and Bukavu.
Given the U.S. role in opposing the first M23 rebellion in 2012, its political influence in the region, and its involvement in the current crisis, the Congolese authorities believe that Washington could bring the conflict to an end if it wanted. However, with no key appointees in charge of Africa in place to deal with the crisis, compounded with the lack of decisive actions against Rwanda, there is a legitimate feeling in the DRC that Washington lacks the proper motivation to intervene decisively. The feeling is compounded by the overall perception that the Trump administration does not seem to prioritize Africa—except, maybe, for instances of countering China’s influence and accessing critical minerals.
Minerals for Peace, Stability, and Regime Survival
The current stalemate led Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi to change his approach and incentivize the United States to invest in peace and stability in the DRC. In a late February interview with the New York Times, Tshisekedi expressed his willingness to give American and European companies access to the DRC’s mining resources in exchange for peace and security. The country’s position as a key source of critical minerals is evident in the fact that the DRC holds 60 percent of the global coltan reserves. It also is the world’s largest producer of cobalt, amounting to 70 percent of world production in 2024. China already exerts considerable influence over the DRC’s major cobalt reserves. Tshisekedi’s strategy is designed to help the Trump administration achieve two significant objectives for U.S. foreign policy: securing access to critical minerals and curtailing China’s expansion within the mineral supply chain.
Tshisekedi’s contact with the Trump administration started before the inauguration on January 20, 2025. During the presidential transition period, he sent emissaries to Washington to meet with people around the new administration. It has been reported in some of those meetings that Tshisekedi’s emissaries reminded their contacts of the role the DRC could play in securing critical minerals for the United States. At the time, observers speculated that the priority of these meetings was more about getting closer to the new administration to secure political support to strengthen Tshisekedi’s regime, which already was hinting at a constitutional revision. However, in light of M23’s escalation since mid-January, the priorities of the Congolese government have become peace and stability. In the face of M23’s threats to advance to Kinshasa and overthrow Tshisekedi, the top priority for the DRC may well be regime survival.
The Logic of the DRC’s Offer
The Congolese president’s offer is predicated on a central narrative: the conflict minerals narrative, which connects violence and instability to the exploitation of natural resources, including minerals that are critical to the production of modern consumer electronics. Rwanda has made significant efforts to plunder Congolese natural resources for American and European multinationals, and the DRC is relying on the U.S.-China geopolitical rivalry to spur the United States into action.
In a thread of posts on X, Tshisekedi’s spokeswoman Tina Salama directly linked the Congolese president’s proposal to the war in the eastern part of the country and to the role of Western companies. Her thread reads:
“President Félix Tshisekedi invites the #USA, whose companies buy strategic raw materials from Rwanda, which plunders them by massacring our populations, to come and buy them directly from us, who are the real owners.
“And it’s not just the Americans, it’s also being offered to Europeans and all the fences on our resources that are supplied from Rwanda.
“After the sanctions against Rwanda and the M23 via Kabarebe and Kanyuka, fencing will become increasingly complicated.
“The President proposed it to the Americans first because what had been hidden and maintained for 30 years has just been revealed by the Trump administration.”
The conflict minerals narrative is incomplete and limited, but nevertheless the Congolese authorities and a large part of the international community have framed it as the explanatory paradigm for the instability in eastern DRC. Previous efforts to make use of this narrative include the “blood in your mobile” public awareness campaign, which denounced the complicity and responsibility of major international technology companies in the war in the eastern DRC. This same narrative explains why the Congolese government sued Apple’s Belgian and French subsidiaries in Paris in December 2024 for using conflict minerals sourced in the DRC. These accusations prompted Apple to instruct all its suppliers to stop sourcing minerals from this region. Subsquently, however, a court in Paris dismissed the Congolese government’s lawsuit and dropped the case. Seen in this light, Tshisekedi’s offer encourages the United States and U.S. companies to bypass the conflict minerals “middleman”—Rwanda—and deal directly with the DRC.
U.S.-China Competition for Peace and Stability?
If the abovementioned conflict minerals framing of the issue does not offer enough motivation to the United States, the geopolitical angle might. The most significant impetus for action might be the underlying geopolitical competition between China and the United States over critical minerals access.
Since the Biden administration, the United States has invested heavily in efforts to weaken China’s presence and contain its expansion in the DRC’s cobalt and copper industries. In late February 2025, the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee Republican majority posted on X, urging the Congolese government to block the bid of Norin Mining, a subsidiary of Chinese weapons manufacturer Norinco, for a promising cobalt and copper project. The post followed Congolese mining company Gecamines’s second snub of Norin Mining’s $1.4 billion takeover bid for Chemical of Africa (Chemaf)—a stance that the United States previously backed.
By leveraging access to DRC’s mineral wealth, and thereby offering the United States the opportunity to counter China’s influence in critical minerals, Félix Tshisekedi hopes to provide enough impetus for Washington to act against Rwanda and subsequently protect his regime. The Congolese government has enlisted the services of Omnipoynt Management Solutions, a strategy consulting firm in Washington, D.C., to present its proposals. In a letter addressed to Secretary of State Marco Rubio and other members of the U.S. Congress, Aaron Poynton, Omnipoynt CEO and president of the Africa-USA Business Council, detailed the Congolese offer. The offer includes not only access to critical minerals and control of the Banana deep-sea port in the west of the country, but also military cooperation in which the DRC offers access to its territory for U.S. bases to protect strategic resources.
Final Considerations
Even though the DRC offer mirrors the Ukraine minerals deal (tweaking the Chinese “mines for infrastructure” for “mines for security” barter model) and seems to make political sense, there is no guarantee of success. The DRC has considerable mining potential, but it remains a high-risk jurisdiction for international mining companies.
Previous U.S. administrations’ commitment may not be enough to guarantee success, as private U.S. companies may not be interested in investing in the DRC. President Donald Trump’s suspension of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in February may not be enough to motivate companies that must deal with more pressing concerns than business-related corruption. Moreover, risks in the Congolese mining sector go far beyond the situation in the country’s east. These structural problems hinder effective governance and accountability in the mining sector and create the conditions for political instability, such as that seen today in the east.
From a geopolitical perspective, the threat posed by the M23 rebellion has sufficiently motivated the Congolese president to turn to the United States despite the risk of upsetting China. Without proposing a viable alternative, Gecamine’s repeated objections to Norin Mining’s offers can now be seen in a different light. They may be driven by political and geopolitical considerations rather than purely economic ones. Tshisekedi’s stance and actions subtly raise questions about the future of his relationship with China.
The peace and stability that the DRC is seeking today will not be guaranteed by a simple trade and security agreement that would ensure the survival of the regime in Kinshasa. Rather, the DRC needs fundamental structural reforms that can address the underlying causes of almost three decades of national instability and at the same time create the optimal conditions for investments and comprehensive development that will benefit the country as a whole. If the Trump administration intends to play a positive role in the DRC, it may be well served by engaging in this structural reform process.
