Digital Technology, Strategic Adaptation, and the Outcomes of Twenty-First Century Armed Conflict

This is part of a series on “The Digital in War: From Innovation to Participation,” co-produced by Carnegie’s Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program and Swedish Defense University.

The Russian war against Ukraine has become the latest poster child for a technology saturated conflict, with the proliferation of GPS-guided munitions and social media posts documenting drones zipping around the battlefield. Yet, as some analysts have recognized, the trench-based, artillery-driven warfare in Ukraine still bears resemblance to European wars of the early twentieth century.¹ If digital technology is truly transforming the nature of armed conflict, why hasn’t one side leveraged advances in networked communications, information warfare, cyber power, or digitally driven intelligence, sensing, and targeting to decisively gain an upper hand?

The answers to these questions partly lie in the nature of digital technology itself. Digital technology is not like conventional weapons technologies, such as fighter jets, tanks, or explosives. As other analysts have observed, it is an enabling technology that is more akin to electricity or fuel than any individual weapons system.² Most digital technologies, including those employed by militaries, are developed by the private sector for commercial use, making them widely accessible. This accessibility has led to so-called open, constant innovation in their employment.³

In a number of armed conflicts, this era of open technological innovation has been characterized by rapid cycles of innovation, adaptation, and readaptation. These innovation-adaptation cycles offer one explanation for why some armed conflicts appear stalemated despite digital technology’s ubiquity and proliferation. In Ukraine, for example, Russia’s cyber attacks against the satellite networks Ukrainian forces depended on for communications, command, and control were blunted as Ukraine shifted to other communications technologies.

Similar patterns of adoption and adaptation have occurred in Nigeria, where the Boko Haram insurgency first exploited rising cellular network connectivity and then adapted to the Nigerian government’s use of these networks to collect intelligence on the group. It has also been the case in Somalia, where, despite being one of the world’s least technology rich theaters, internet and social media spaces have become key arenas of contestation between the insurgent group al-Shabaab and the Somali government and its backers.

In all three conflicts, while the employment of digital technology has precipitated tactical advantages and territorial shifts, cycles of readaptation and response have blunted and even in some cases reversed these advantages. The result is the appearance of prolonged stalemates even as digital technology becomes more widely exploited and used.

The Digital and Ukraine

The role of strategic adaptation in shaping the use of digital technology in the Russia-Ukraine war was evident since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022. At the beginning of its offensive against Ukraine, Russia launched a massive cyber attack against the American satellite company Viasat, which Ukraine’s military depended on for communications, command, and control. According to a senior Ukrainian cybersecurity official, the attack resulted in a “huge loss in communications at the very beginning of the war.”⁴ It marked the opening salvo of a concerted campaign by Russia to degrade the ability of Ukraine to communicate and coordinate its operations on the battlefield.

However, the advancement and ubiquity of communications technology meant that Ukraine in short order found viable alternatives. Ukraine contracted with billionaire Elon Musk to provide Starlink satellite–enabled military communications. These satellites arrived and began to be deployed throughout Ukraine on March 1, 2022, barely a week after the attack against Viasat.⁵ Because of the large number of satellites in low earth orbit, they are far harder for Russia to jam and enable Ukraine’s military to possess greater communications capabilities than at the start of the war.⁶ In fact, the use of Starlink, combined with Ukrainian-developed software platforms such as Diia and Delta, have enabled Ukraine to achieve a level of integration in command, coordination, communications, and control networks that have been long sought by, and are now the envy of, Western militaries.

Even without Starlink, it is unclear whether Russian efforts to sabotage Ukraine’s digital communications would have succeeded. As the Economist notes, Ukraine’s large number of internet service providers and the use of electric vehicle batteries as sources of power during blackouts would make a complete loss of connectivity exceptionally difficult to impose.⁷ Signal boosters using household materials can extend a mobile phone’s range up to 15 kilometers (9 miles) if nearby cell phone towers are destroyed. Even as Starlink was being deployed, Ukraine appeared to have been preparing to use signal boosters and short-wave ham radios to use as “a sort of alternative internet.”⁸ At the edge of the front, World War I–era wind-up phones are deployed to communicate between trenches to help Ukraine evade Russian electronic warfare capabilities.⁹

At the same time, the conflict remains a stalemate. Some might argue that Starlink and other technology prevented Ukraine from complete capitulation. On the flip side, neither Western support nor Ukraine’s digital innovations have enabled a decisive Ukrainian victory. This is partly because of well-documented Russian advantages in manpower and munitions. Yet it is also because Russia, while perhaps not to the extent of Ukraine, has itself taken advantage of ubiquitous digital technology to advance its communications and electronic warfare capabilities. Despite the risks, cell phone usage among Russia’s military units is reportedly widespread and is at times used by units who either do not have or cannot afford more secure methods of communication.¹⁰ Commercial off-the-shelf apps, such as AlpineQuest GPS, provide Russian forces with tactical intelligence on Ukrainian equipment and positions.¹¹ Social media apps like Telegram are used for propaganda purposes and to address logistical needs, while Discord live feeds drone footage to command centers.¹² While Starlink is banned in Russia and internet access is limited on the front, Russian elite formations that can afford Starlink are themselves beginning to deploy it in Ukraine.¹³ More recently, they have deployed advanced capabilities to the front that enable them to jam Ukraine’s Starlink service.¹⁴

In short, while the evidence would indicate that Ukraine has won the greater benefit from and moved more rapidly to integrate digital technology into its doctrine, the low costs, ubiquity, and accessibility of digital technologies of all kinds have enabled Russian strategic innovation as well. Both sides exist in an environment with many varieties of digital technologies available to them, with considerations such as cost, bandwidth, levels of risk, use cases, and ease of access all influencing how each digital technology is deployed. In this ecosystem of rapid innovation and ubiquitous technology, an enduring advantage is hard to come by.

Cellular Networks and the Boko Haram Insurgency

The Russia-Ukraine war may be on the bleeding edge of the employment of digital technology for military purposes, but similar patterns have played out elsewhere. For example, the rise of the Lake Chad Basin’s Boko Haram insurgency—which began in 2009 and saw violence peak between 2014 and 2015—coincided with the rapid spread of cellular coverage in Nigeria. Between 2004 and 2014, mobile phone penetration increased tenfold, to include close to three quarters of the population.¹⁵

For the first several years of the insurgency, Boko Haram used Nigeria’s cellular networks largely unopposed. The ways in which mobile devices enabled the group were manifold. It used mobile phones to coordinate, plan, and even conduct attacks, making consistent and devastating use of cell phone triggered explosive devices.¹⁶ Researchers Jacob Udo-Udo Jacob and Idorenyin Akpan describe a wide variety of tactics enabled by mobile communications, including activating and coordinating remote units placed close to a target location; coordinating simultaneous so-called dummy raids to distract and overstretch security forces; and, in some cases, attacking phone masts to prevent communities being raided from calling for help from security forces.¹⁷

The state of Nigeria’s efforts to stem the tide of the Boko Haram insurgency by restricting its communications can be traced to early 2011, when the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) passed a law that mandated the registration of all the country’s mobile phones. This enabled security services to leverage Nigeria’s communications networks for intelligence purposes and paid immediate dividends in early 2012, when several key Boko Haram commanders were captured.¹⁸ In 2013, as the insurgency continued to spread, the Nigerian military further escalated its response by initiating a shutdown of all telecommunications networks in the states where the insurgency was most active. The intent, according to a senior military commander, was “to cripple [Boko Haram] in the current campaign because without communication they cannot coordinate and that will put them in disarray.”¹⁹ The three-month shutdown reportedly coincided with a significant reduction in the number of Boko Haram attacks and an increase in the number of Boko Haram operatives killed.²⁰

However, the insurgency undertook several adaptations that enabled its persistence. In 2012, Boko Haram responded to these setbacks by attacking the infrastructure networks of all four of Nigeria’s major telecommunications providers, damaging 150 masts and base stations.²¹ These tactics have continued, with the group’s main intent being to deny state forces intelligence about its intentions and movements.²² In addition, Boko Haram took steps to reduce its own reliance on Nigeria’s telecom networks. More attacks were coordinated via face-to-face meetings, through satellite phones, or by taking advantage of emerging messaging platforms, such as Skype or WhatsApp.²³ Boko Haram also relocated its headquarters to the Sambisa Forest, where it was less vulnerable.

Today, Boko Haram remains a rural-based insurgency that is a persistent threat to state authority. Just as in Ukraine, even as digital technology has become more ubiquitous in Nigeria, cycles of adaptation and re-adaptation have helped prevent Boko Haram from seriously threatening the state and the state from fully eliminating Boko Haram. In the early stages of the insurgency, Boko Haram appeared to have leveraged novel information and communication technologies to enable its growth and spread. The state response to assert increasing control over Nigeria’s telecommunications sector has limited this spread but has been far from sufficient to end, or even significantly curtail, the insurgency.

The Internet and Al-Shabaab

The pattern of digital strategic adaptation is evident even in theatres where digital technology is relatively limited. Somalia remains one of the world’s least connected countries, with an internet penetration rate in early 2024 of just 27 percent of the population.²⁴

Nevertheless, the spread of the internet has had a crucial impact on the development of Somalia-based al-Shabaab, which is among Africa’s largest and longest-running insurgencies. In the early days of the insurgency, al-Shabaab used the internet to recruit, spread propaganda, and raise a significant amount of money from a vast and supportive Somali diaspora. By 2010, al-Shabaab had its own media foundation that produced high-quality videos, online news and news distribution networks (including local affiliates), radio stations, and social media accounts.²⁵ Its videos were translated into English, French, Somali, and Swahili, which helped drive recruitment, particularly externally—as many as 1,000 al-Shabaab recruits were non-Somali, as high as one-third of the group’s total strength during that time.²⁶ Al-Shabaab was the first Islamist militant groups to be active on Twitter, which it used to devastating effect to record and disseminate propaganda during its 2013 attack against Kenya’s Westgate mall.²⁷

Yet even as al-Shabaab became known for its digital savvy, its enemies did not sit still. Antiterrorism and sanctions laws made it substantially harder for the group to receive web-based funding from abroad. Major social media platforms, including Facebook and Twitter, began systematically removing al-Shabaab content.²⁸ And starting in 2011, much of al-Shabaab’s leadership was killed in targeted drone strikes, which were likely enabled through the tracking of their mobile device and internet usage. In 2014, al-Shabaab’s leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane, was killed in one such strike, hundreds of which were launched over the following decade.²⁹

Like with Boko Haram, while these attacks may have helped blunt the insurgency’s momentum, they were far from sufficient to end it. In the intervening years, al-Shabaab has continued to leverage digital technology in ways that have enabled its persistence and survival. Immediately after its leaders were killed, al-Shabaab briefly foreswore the use of the internet in its territory entirely and continues to limit access; this may be one reason why internet penetration across much of Somalia remains low.³⁰ Within its territory and disputed areas, al-Shabaab has either contested or completely co-opted telecommunications networks and companies, paying its fighters through e-money transfer services.³¹

Finally, though al-Shabaab’s efforts to reestablish official social media accounts have been somewhat suppressed, it has maintained a persistent presence on social media by establishing entities that do not appear to be directly affiliated with it but that often post or link to pro-al-Shabaab content. Shahada News Agency, which is owned by al-Shabaab, recently announced the launch of accounts on Facebook and X, and its intent “to include coverage of all countries in the Islamic world.”³² A 2022 investigation by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue found the Islamic State and al-Shabaab operating largely unencumbered on Facebook, maintaining thirty public pages with close to 40,000 followers, 445 supportive profiles, and 850 videos garnering 450,000 views.³³

Despite being the least technology saturated theater, the al-Shaabab case illustrates a similar dynamic to both Ukraine and Nigeria. Even when a group has been denied access to digital technology completely or concluded that the risk of relying on digital technology outweighed the costs, it has found ways to persist and thrive.

Can’t Win With It, Can’t Win Without It

In all three conflicts, even as the use of digital technology proliferated, its employment did not lead to a decisive victory for one side over the other. Today’s era of open technological innovation, with its rapid innovation and adoption cycles, may help explain why certain conflicts have stalemated. Digital technology’s low cost and wide availability give combatants many communication options. Even in cases where one side possesses significantly less-advanced digital capabilities than their adversary, as is the case with Boko Haram and al-Shabaab, it is possible for that side to remain a potent threat.

These cases demonstrate the degree to which accessible digital technology has saturated the world’s armed conflicts. Due to this accessibility, strategic adaptation and innovation are continuous. In such a world, the choices about how to employ digital technology, respond to how an adversary employs digital technology, and adapt to constant evolutions in digital technology are paramount. In cases in which both sides have adapted digital technology to suit their doctrine and force structure, victory may not be achieved by digital technology alone.

In other words, in a technology-saturated world, a premium is placed on strategic decisionmaking. This helps explain how some conflicts appear stalemated even as digital technology becomes more integrated into battlefield operations. Like fuel or electricity, it is impossible to wage modern war effectively without digital technology. Yet bombs and brains, not ones and zeros, determine the victor.