Donald Trump’s victory in the 2024 U.S. presidential election has not only dramatically reshaped the international discourse around the Russia-Ukraine war; it has also had a profound impact on Ukraine’s internal politics. As the Trump administration has pushed for direct talks with Russia, President Volodymyr Zelensky has had to tread a careful path between engaging constructively with Washington and defending his country’s interests. The disastrous Oval Office meeting with Trump and Vice President J.D. Vance in February boosted Zelensky’s political ratings at home as Ukrainians rallied around the flag in support of their leader. But so did his subsequent embrace of Trump’s proposed unconditional ceasefire in the ensuing weeks. As the costs of war continue to mount, Zelensky’s renewed positioning as a peace-seeking leader has resonated with a war-weary public.
Amid the flurry of leader-level meetings on Ukraine in August and September, there were signs that the domestic political landscape is starting to thaw. In July, Zelensky announced a major government reshuffle. The highly anticipated move appeared designed to buy him time by managing public discontent, preserving elite cohesion, and maintaining political control while formal electoral processes remain suspended during martial law. The appointment as prime minister of Yuliya Svyrydenko, a hard-working protégée of the head of the Office of the President, Andriy Yermak, has further consolidated the Cabinet of Ministers under the latter’s influence.
Days after the new government was appointed, Zelensky suffered a major political setback when he signed a law curtailing the independence of two key anticorruption agencies and was then forced to backtrack amid widespread protests and Western pressure. This tarnished his public image and damaged trust between his office, the parliament, and the security services. The public backlash was significant: in one poll, 69 percent of respondents said they supported the protests, highlighting the fact that the president’s wartime mandate is not a blank check. The protests united civic activists and opposition parties, and, although it was loose and tactical, this coalition was the first serious counterweight to Zelensky’s unquestioned political dominance.
Beneath these maneuvers lies deeper unease within the security establishment that a long war of attrition could ultimately jeopardize the country’s sovereignty and statehood. This anxiety is compounded by mounting Russian military pressure, unpredictable U.S. policy moves, and a restless domestic front. The assassination in August of Andriy Parubiy, a former speaker of parliament—the fourth high-profile killing in a year—underscored the mounting divisions within society and how internal security will be an even more pressing concern after the war.
Martial Law and Electoral Calculations
As the political thaw begins, Ukraine’s formal democratic processes remain constrained under martial law. The state of emergency in place since 2022 has given Zelensky powerful tools of political control. Martial law, which the parliament recently voted to extend for the sixteenth time until at least November 15, expressly prohibits the holding of parliamentary elections. However, there is ambiguity about whether a presidential election can be held, as the prohibition against one during wartime is only codified in law. It is widely accepted in Ukraine that Zelensky’s five-year term, which expired in May 2024, will continue until the next election, which will occur after martial law is lifted unless a special law is adopted before then.
Earlier this year, the Office of the President started to explore the possibility of holding an early presidential election. This effort was partly an attempt to deflect criticism from the Trump administration that Zelensky was breaching democratic norms, and also a calculated move to capitalize on his high approval ratings and dominant media influence. However, polls have showed little demand for holding elections until after the war.
Zelensky’s political standing partly reflects deeper shifts in society. As a leading sociologist has noted, the war has redefined national identity—intensifying social cohesion, reinforcing collective resilience, and reshaping public expectations of security and governance. Amid widespread war fatigue, Ukrainians have developed a new appreciation for basic stability—such as uninterrupted electricity and water—while remaining committed to the long-term struggle for national survival.
Amid widespread war fatigue, Ukrainians have developed a new appreciation for basic stability—such as uninterrupted electricity and water—while remaining committed to the long-term struggle for national survival.
Yet it remains uncertain whether Zelensky can convert this “emotional” support into another electoral victory, whenever the next vote takes place. The former commander-in-chief of the armed forces, Valery Zaluzhny, who has avoided a public split with Zelensky since being appointed ambassador to the United Kingdom, consistently tops public opinion polls. But Zelensky’s camp still views him as a hesitant political actor—one they believe can be managed through pressure points such as corruption allegations or contentious wartime decisions. Aside from Zaluzhny, there are no credible challengers to Zelensky—a reflection of the narrowing of political space and the structural effects of wartime governance, which has decisively shifted power toward the executive.
Industrial Transformation and Militarization
The war has fundamentally reshaped Ukraine’s economy, with the defense sector emerging as its new industrial core. Over the past three years, the military-industrial complex has become a cornerstone of national resilience, supplying the armed forces with essential equipment and weaponry. This sector is now entering a new phase of expansion. The evolving national security strategy—popularly known as the Danish model—aims to attract direct European investment in the defense industry while integrating Ukraine’s production capacity into Europe’s restructured defense posture and industrial base.
The militarization of public finances is overwhelming: all domestic tax revenue is now directed to the defense budget while Western financial assistance funds the remainder of the state’s major functions. This wartime fiscal model has made defense not only the organizing principle of economic planning but also a central axis of governance. Its influence permeates society: educational institutions—from schools to universities—now serve as sites for cultivating a resilient national identity. Myths and symbols of resistance have assumed central roles in shaping collective memory and sustaining a wartime ethos.
Most Ukrainians now appear to accept the long-term securitization of the state, with visions of a “Fortress Ukraine” or “Big Israel” prevalent in political discourse, at least while the war is ongoing. The informal political influence of well-equipped and vocally patriotic battalions within the armed forces will surely endure, with units like the Azov Regiment, the 3rd Assault Brigade, and the 13th Khartiia Brigade already forming the backbone of the new army structure. These units are already being carefully managed by the Office of the President, which is positioning them as the nucleus of a reformed military under younger commanders. Yet the transition from war to peace will bring enormous challenges: demobilization, veteran reintegration, economic reconstruction, and restoring the integrity of law enforcement. In all these areas, sustained support from the EU will be decisive.
Ukraine’s volunteer movement, a key part of the war effort since 2014, has evolved into a vital logistical and technical backbone. In the latest phase of the war, volunteers have helped spur a decentralized ecosystem of small and medium-sized drone manufacturers. Built on informal networks, rapid prototyping, and agile supply chains, these enterprises form an adaptive production base increasingly central to Ukraine’s ability to respond to frontline needs.
After the war, this ecosystem linking defense industries, volunteer networks, and technical innovators is likely to have substantial political weight. It represents not only a new economic foundation but also a networked constituency with wartime legitimacy, organizational capacity, and deep public trust. It is likely that key players from this industrial-volunteer nexus will help shape the future of reconstruction, elite formation, and state-building as postwar political life takes shape.
Anti-Corruption Counteroffensive
The rapid militarization of the state has not come without significant internal strain. Chief among these is the ongoing mobilization effort, which has been plagued by widespread corruption. A shadow economy has emerged around the draft process, estimated to generate up to $2 billion. This illicit market thrives on fake medical exemptions, fabricated disabilities, and fraudulent travel documents, which enable wealthier Ukrainians to evade conscription while poorer ones disproportionately shoulder the burden of mobilization.
The resulting inequities have provided fertile ground for Russian propaganda, which seeks to amplify perceptions of injustice and to fracture national cohesion. More damaging still is the erosion of public trust in the institutions tasked with implementing wartime duty. Recruitment offices, often implicated in profiteering schemes, have become symbols of dysfunction rather than national service. Attempts to strengthen oversight have met with limited success, as enforcement agencies themselves are vulnerable to corruption, which further undermines morale and weakens compliance.
The number of corruption cases in the defense sector investigated by Ukraine’s network of independent anti-corruption agencies, which has developed since 2014 with sustained Western support, has declined significantly. Out of all corruption cases, those with suspects from the defense sector have fallen from 9.7 percent in 2023 to 3 percent in 2024. However, these agencies’ activities have recently touched individuals close to the highest echelons of power, including longtime associates of Zelensky. Reacting in panic, the leadership sought to place the agencies under direct control with the abovementioned law.
While Zelensky was forced to retreat, investigations into defense procurement have placed specialized anti-corruption agencies in direct confrontation with the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), turning corruption probes into a battle over institutional control. For the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, targeting defense-related schemes is a mandate but also a political minefield. Such cases strike at the heart of wartime state spending, touching sensitive networks that the SBU also claims authority over. The stakes are especially high because the issue of corruption in the defense sector can sway politics, as demonstrated by the Hladkovsky case in which revelations of illicit profits from military contracts fatally undermined President Petro Poroshenko’s reelection bid in 2019.
The deepening confrontation between the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and the SBU represents an even greater challenge. The anti-corruption protests demonstrated that state-society relations are fraying, and the clash between the two agencies is compounding wartime vulnerabilities. Moreover, the convergence of the anti-corruption fight and the skyrocketing need for external financing—now depending almost entirely on the EU—has made the financial situation more precarious.
The Quiet Revival of Political Competition
Well into the fourth year of full-scale war, political competition is slowly reemerging, though it remains largely confined to closed-door negotiations and informal maneuvering. Electoral strategy is being discussed in cafés, political offices, and private gatherings, yet genuine party activity, let alone electoral campaigning, is paralyzed, largely due to fear of state retaliation.
The Office of the President, backed by the security services and the National Security and Defense Council, has used wartime powers to marginalize critics through legal pressure, attacks on the media, selective use of sanctions and law enforcement action, and even targeted mobilization summons. As of September, over 8,300 citizens were under domestic sanctions for ties with Russia—a mechanism devised by Zelensky’s administration before the 2022 invasion, but now increasingly viewed as an unconstitutional tool of political control.
Military leaders and prominent volunteer commanders have emerged as new political contenders. Figures such as Zaluzhny, chief of the main intelligence directorate (HUR) Kyrylo Budanov, and 3rd Army Corps commander Andriy Biletsky have gained significant public followings, reflecting a shift toward militarized, security-focused leadership. In contrast, members of the traditional political elite like Poroshenko, former prime minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, and former deputy prime minister Yuriy Boyko have seen their influence wane, with their support networks weakened by the war and by changing societal expectations.
Then there is Zaluzhny, who is Zelensky’s most credible challenger even though he has not announced an intention to run for president. Zaluzhny, who is seen as a father figure, remains the most supported and the most trusted political figure in Ukrainian society. One open question is whether Zaluzhny will retain his post as ambassador to the United Kingdom amid the ongoing reform of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and announced rotation of ambassadors.
Zelensky’s rhetorical pivot toward peace through strength and support for Trump’s ceasefire initiative have reinforced his appeal even amid growing discontent.
Meanwhile, Zelensky’s rhetorical pivot toward peace through strength and support for Trump’s ceasefire initiative have reinforced his appeal even amid growing discontent. And as a Carnegie-sponsored survey in 2024 suggested, Ukrainians do not necessarily want a military person to be the country’s postwar leader. Zelensky’s personal ratings are far above those of his party, which can be attributed to his dominant media presence, his central role in the emerging peace narrative, and the unmatched messaging capacity of Kvartal 95, his production company turned de facto state communications engine. However, mass displacement and pervasive wartime self-censorship have made it challenging to conduct reliable opinion polling.
When martial law is eventually lifted, the political field is likely to feature figures associated with the old guard and new titans alike, as well as an attempt by traditionally powerful oligarchs to regain some of the political influence they once held. In any case, the war has reinforced a defining feature of governance in Ukraine: the rapid accumulation of wealth through close ties to the state. Whereas in previous eras the most lucrative contracts could be earned in the energy and metallurgical sectors, now it is in the defense sector, where most public spending is concentrated.
A more worrying trend is the growing centralization of authority in the Office of the President, which has intensified pressure on local governments and mayors of key cities, especially those unwilling to align themselves politically with Zelensky. Nowhere is this tension more visible than in Kyiv, whose mayor, Vitaliy Klychko is one of the few high-profile figures with institutional independence and a national profile. At the administrative level, martial law has in effect reversed the pre-2022 decentralization reforms. Local communities have lost much of their fiscal autonomy, with key budgetary and personnel decisions now tightly controlled by the central government. This reversion to a vertical system of governance tends to privilege loyalty to the center over local initiative. After stripping Odesa Mayor Hennadiy Trukhanov of his Ukrainian citizenship in October over allegations that he also holds a Russian passport, Zelensky authorized the creation of a military administration for the key port city, a move that may signal an emerging trend toward tighter central control over strategic urban centers.
The Office of the President has near-total control over the domestic information environment. The government-run “Telemarathon” functions as a rolling platform for presidential messaging, systematically excluding opposition voices—and shedding its audience along the way. The diverse oligarch-controlled television networks have largely fallen into line under wartime pressure. In response, much of the domestic audience has now migrated to alternative platforms, particularly to Telegram and YouTube channels, many of which operate anonymously and are susceptible to pay-to-play forms of digital journalism and Russian disinformation efforts. Importantly, the Office of the President continues to wield significant informal influence over Telegram and YouTube channels, using indirect pressure, sanctions, and other means of control.
Ukraine’s traditional oligarchs, long dominant in politics and media, have seen their overt political influence wane during the war. In exchange for turning patriotic and pro-government, many have grown wealthier—especially through state procurement, wartime real-estate speculation, and export-based industries. Their return to formal political life is widely expected once martial law is lifted and mobilization ends. At that point, they are likely to reinvest in political parties, media outlets, and candidates, and to restore patron-client dynamics that have been suspended but not dismantled.
Deteriorating economic conditions are widening social cleavages. While most Ukrainians face worsening poverty, government officials and civil servants are seeing their incomes rise.
Meanwhile, deteriorating economic conditions are widening social cleavages. While most Ukrainians face worsening poverty, government officials and civil servants are seeing their incomes rise. The trend began in 2024, when the Cabinet of Ministers bypassed parliament to raise salaries. Recently adopted legislation will nearly double salaries for government officials this year. Ordinary ministry staff now earn 40,000–50,000 Ukrainian hryvnia per month (about $1,000–$1,200), and top officials over UAH 200,000 (nearly $5,000). This far exceeds an estimated average monthly salary of approximately UAH 24,500 (about $600). Today, the nearly 2.5 million civil servants form a privileged bureaucratic class, benefiting from relatively secure incomes and access to state-funded housing and services. This new administrative elite could become a key part of Zelensky’s electoral base.
Politics: Actors and Players
The opposition is fragmented and largely composed of familiar figures. Poroshenko remains the most visible one but his political future hangs in the balance. Already sanctioned by the National Security and Defense Council and facing further sanctions or potential criminal prosecution, he appears to be weighing whether to back another presidential candidate—possibly Klychko, who himself faces intensifying legal and political pressure from the central government, or even his wife, Maryna Poroshenko.
The second-tier veterans of the post-2014 political order—former prime ministers Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Volodymyr Hroysman, and former interior minister Arsen Avakov—lack constituencies and credible platforms. They are politically inert, emblematic of a bygone era of coalitions with little relevance in today’s wartime landscape. Nevertheless, their resources and lingering ambition suggest they will still attempt to secure a share of seats for their parties in the next parliamentary elections.
Rinat Akhmetov, Ukraine’s wealthiest oligarch, is investing in new political configurations. Kyiv insiders speculate that he has financed political movements linked to Tymoshenko, former speaker of parliament Dmytro Razumkov, and world champion boxer Oleksandr Usyk (who is courted by others, too). Of these, only Usyk has gained real traction in public opinion, and the Office of the President has tried to maintain a close relationship with him. With high trust ratings in major urban centers and broad name recognition, Usyk may emerge as a potent, if unconventional, political front man. His ties to religious networks, especially the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (which is influenced by Akhmetov’s allies), could enhance his appeal in more conservative southern and eastern regions.
Fringe elements of the political spectrum are experimenting with nationalist and populist rhetoric. Calls for a negotiated peace—framed not as capitulation but as strategic realism—are resurfacing.
Fringe elements of the political spectrum are experimenting with nationalist and populist rhetoric. Though openly pro-Russia positions remain politically toxic, calls for a negotiated peace—framed not as capitulation but as strategic realism—are resurfacing. This space, politically unrepresented yet socially present, is not insignificant. It underpinned the electoral breakthroughs of Poroshenko in 2014 and Zelensky in 2019, both of whom campaigned on a peace platform. A Make Ukraine Great Again message could resonate, but it has yet to be embraced by any mainstream political figures.
Compared to the fragmented and reactive opposition, the Office of the President is assembling a more centralized and sophisticated structure of managed political alternatives. This strategy—rooted in preemptive design and controlled plurality—is not new but its current scope marks a significant departure from past practices. Political insiders suggest that several blocs are being quietly cultivated to cover key segments of the electorate while the center retains overall control.
These formations include a rebranded presidential bloc, potentially led by Zaluzhny, if he cooperates, or by Mykhailo Fedorov, the popular and tech-savvy deputy prime minister. Another idea circulating in Kyiv political circles is the creation of a military-patriotic party anchored by Budanov and elite combat units like the Azov Regiment and 3rd Assault Brigade, designed to mobilize veterans and nationalists. The liberal-democratic flank can rally around urban progressive figures like Serhiy Prytula, a showman turned activist, and Revolution of Dignity-era activist Serhiy Sternenko. (The two men run Ukraine’s largest foundation, which collects donations for the army). The Office of the President is also reportedly looking to curate an “opposition” movement aimed at eastern constituencies, possibly fronted by the independent member of parliament Vadym Stolar or by Yevhen Shevchenko, another parliamentarian who is currently detained under charges of high treason but is still influential.
These various initiatives suggest a strategic effort by the Office of the President to dominate the postwar political arena rather than allow open competition. Yet even within the presidential orbit, cohesion is under strain. The head of the Servant of the People parliamentary faction, Davyd Arakhamia, is reportedly thinking of launching his own political project. One concept under consideration sees him teaming up with influential mayors—including those of Dnipro, Kharkiv, and Odesa—in a new “centrist” formation. Zelensky’s recent move to rein in Odesa’s mayor could be part of a strategy to disrupt or contain such a movement. In any case, it would represent a challenge emerging from the core of the system—a potential reshuffling of power rather than an outright rupture.
While martial law has suspended formal democratic processes, it has not extinguished Ukraine’s democratic ambitions and track record of competitive politics and media freedom. The country is in a stage of suspended competition—animated by quiet rivalries, emerging alliances, returning political violence, and the gradual reconfiguration of power. Electoral politics will return, likely next year.
What remains uncertain is not only who will lead the country, but whether the next chapter will renew Ukraine’s democratic contract or merely stage a new performance on a familiar political set. The next parliament is unlikely to yield a single-party majority as in 2019, signaling a return to genuine pluralism. And while wartime conditions have elevated military figures in the public imagination, the postwar moment may instead see a renewed preference for civilian leadership—opening the political field in ways far less predictable than today’s power configuration suggests.
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