• Research
  • Emissary
  • About
  • Experts
Carnegie Global logoCarnegie lettermark logo
DemocracyIran
  • Donate
{
  "authors": [
    "John Stuart Blackton"
  ],
  "type": "commentary",
  "blog": "Sada",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"
  ],
  "collections": [],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
  "programAffiliation": "",
  "programs": [],
  "projects": [],
  "regions": [
    "Iraq"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Political Reform",
    "Democracy"
  ]
}
Attribution logo
REQUIRED IMAGE

REQUIRED IMAGE

Commentary
Sada

First Impressions of Iraq's Interim Constitution

On March 8, the Iraqi Governing Council signed Iraq's new interim constitution, known as the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). The TAL is expected to go into effect on July 1, 2004 and may foreshadow elements of a permanent constitution. It will remain in force until a new government, scheduled to be elected by January 31, 2005, enacts a permanent constitution.

Link Copied
By John Stuart Blackton
Published on Aug 22, 2008
Sada

Blog

Sada

Sada is an online journal rooted in Carnegie’s Middle East Program that seeks to foster and enrich debate about key political, economic, and social issues in the Arab world and provides a venue for new and established voices to deliver reflective analysis on these issues.

Learn More

On March 8, the Iraqi Governing Council signed Iraq's new interim constitution, known as the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). The TAL is expected to go into effect on July 1, 2004 and may foreshadow elements of a permanent constitution. It will remain in force until a new government, scheduled to be elected by January 31, 2005, enacts a permanent constitution.

When reflecting on the significance of the TAL, it is useful to recall the basic functions of any constitution:
· A constitution identifies the original source of authority and legitimacy (that is, the people, the king, the Bible, or the Quran);
· It establishes the scope of national sovereignty;
· It allocates power among the branches of government;
· It provides a diagram of how authority flows (for example, who can appoint a judge, who can command the army, who can enact a law or a decree, or who can veto a law or decree)
· It frames the overall legal principles of the state and defines the role of law; and,
· It enumerates the rights and duties of individuals vis-a-vis the state and the responsibilities of the state vis-a-vis individuals.

In the first four areas—sources of authority, scope of sovereignty, allocation of power and flow of authority—most Arab constitutions are quite similar. They draw their basic structural features from the French Third Republic. The underlying architecture of Arab civil law and Arab criminal law is similarly a reflection of Third Republic law, ultimately derived from Napoleonic code and from Lex Romanus. Some Arab constitutions are written for monarchies, some for republics. Some define unitary states, while others define federal states.

Most Arab constitutions, however, exhibit certain common features. They do not seek explicitly to balance power among the branches of government; rather, they provide for the direct dominance of the executive branch over the legislative branch and for indirect dominance over the judiciary. All Arab constitutions posit some relationship between Islam and the sources of original legal authority, although the specificity and closeness of that relationship varies widely among nations in the region. Iraq's interim constitution falls comfortably within the range of modern constitutional traditions in the Arab world. It does not break significant new ground in terms of structure or broad constitutional principles.

The TAL was crafted as an aspirational document, setting out general principles that the authors hope will guide the drafting of the permanent constitution. In notable contrast to most Arab constitutions, the TAL provides for a federal structure in which there is some effort to create a balance among the three branches of government. The TAL defines Iraq as a federal state with considerable authority handed to individual regions. The TAL at least makes a nod in the direction of judicial independence. Other principles and provisions expressed in the TAL include the following:

· Iraq will be governed by a directly elected national assembly whose members will choose a president, a prime minister and a pair of vice presidents.
· The president will make decisions on the advice of the two vice presidents, and will share power with a prime minister and cabinet.
· The prime minister will be vested with executive power.
· The president will have veto power over the laws and resolutions passed by the national assembly.
· The official languages of Iraq are Kurdish and Arabic.
· Islam is the official religion; Islam is a source for legislation but not the primary source. The TAL's language on Islam and the state effectively says that the role of Islam as a source for legislation will not compromise individual rights or democratic principles. (The ambiguity of this provision could, in the view of many experts, prove problematic. A failure to specify precisely where Sharia law applies and what specific Islamic legal traditions will govern its application may invite haphazard efforts to discard civil laws as un-Islamic.)
· Kurds are allowed to maintain their "peshmerga" militia groups for the moment. (The status of other militias, such as those affiliated with Shiite political forces, is not specifically addressed.)
· The TAL has a 13-article bill of rights, including protections for free speech, religious expression, assembly and due process. The TAL includes an explicit provision that Iraqis are equal in their rights regardless of gender. Special language makes clear that when the Arabic text uses masculine pronouns they should be read as "he or she." The "target" (not quota) for representation of women in the transitional assembly is 25 percent.

By itself, the TAL does not signal a new direction in Arab governance. In the crucible of real-life Iraqi politics, the interim constitution could simply provide the foundation for another constitutional autocracy. Alternatively, and with luck, it might set the stage for a brave new democratic political experiment in the region.

John Stuart Blackton served as director of the United States Agency for International Development missions in Pakistan and Afghanistan. After leaving government service, he directed a multi-year USAID program in Cairo to modernize court administration. He consults on governance and security issues in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Muslim region of the Philippines.

About the Author

John Stuart Blackton

John Stuart Blackton
Political ReformDemocracyIraq

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Sada

  • Commentary
    Sada
    Digital Dissent in Morocco: A Sociological Analysis of the Generation Z Movement

    From anime heroes to online gaming communities, Morocco’s Gen Z is building a new protest culture. What does this digital imagination reveal about youth politics, and how should institutions respond?

      Abdelilah Farah

  • Commentary
    Sada
    A House Divided: How Internal Power Struggles Shape Iraq’s Foreign Policy

    Iraq’s foreign policy is being shaped by its own internal battles—fractured elites, competing militias, and a state struggling to speak with one voice. The article asks: How do these divisions affect Iraq’s ability to balance between the U.S. and Iran? Can Baghdad use its “good neighbor” approach to reduce regional tensions? And what will it take for Iraq to turn regional investments into real stability at home? It explores potential solutions, including strengthening state institutions, curbing rogue militias, improving governance, and using regional partnerships to address core economic and security weaknesses so Iraq can finally build a unified and sustainable foreign policy.

      Mike Fleet

  • Commentary
    Sada
    A War Fueled by Hate Speech: Sudan’s Fall into Fragmentation

    Hate speech has spread across Sudan and become a key factor in worsening the war between the army and the Rapid Support Forces. The article provides expert analysis and historical background to show how hateful rhetoric has fueled violence, justified atrocities, and weakened national unity, while also suggesting ways to counter it through justice, education, and promoting a culture of peace.

      Samar Sulaiman

  • Commentary
    Sada
    Kuwait’s Bureaucracy at a Crossroads: Why Government Innovation Stalls and How Analytics Can Reignite Reform

    Kuwait’s government has repeatedly launched ambitious reforms under Kuwait Vision 2035, yet bureaucratic inefficiency, siloed institutions, and weak feedback mechanisms continue to stall progress. Adopting government analytics—real-time monitoring and evidence-based decision-making—can transform reform from repetitive announcements into measurable outcomes.

      Dalal A. Marafie

  • Commentary
    Sada
    Sana'a: The Crisis of Chaotic Street Naming and Absent Urban Planning

    The chaos of street naming in Sana’a reflects the deep weakness of the Yemeni state and its failure to establish a unified urban identity, leaving residents to rely on informal, oral naming systems rooted in collective memory. This urban disorder is not merely a logistical problem but a symbolic struggle between state authority and local community identity.

      Sarah Al-Kbat

Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Carnegie global logo, stacked
1779 Massachusetts Avenue NWWashington, DC, 20036-2103Phone: 202 483 7600Fax: 202 483 1840
  • Research
  • Emissary
  • About
  • Experts
  • Donate
  • Programs
  • Events
  • Blogs
  • Podcasts
  • Contact
  • Annual Reports
  • Careers
  • Privacy
  • For Media
  • Government Resources
Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.