In Egypt, the approaching 2005 presidential referendum and parliamentary elections as well as the likelihood that a leadership succession will take place within the next few years—President Hosni Mubarak is seventy-six and was hospitalized in Germany this summer—have energized politics and led to fresh efforts at cooperation among opposition groups. Pressure from Washington, the international discourse about Arab political reform, and growing public frustration at the continuing domestic economic crisis and boiling regional conflicts in Iraq and the Palestinian territories have also convinced the Egyptian opposition that the time is ripe to push for a restructuring of the rules of the political game.
Last month, the country's three main legal opposition parties—the right-of-center Wafd Party, the left-wing National Progressive Unionist Party (the Tagammu Party), and the leftist Arab Nasserist Party—joined with the Islamist Labor Party, which has not been allowed to operate or to publish its newspaper since 2000, in an "Alliance of National Forces for Reform." The Alliance presented its agenda on September 21 to coincide with the annual conference of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP).
The Alliance is calling for six main reforms: (1) an end to the emergency law which has been in effect since President Anwar Al Sadat's assassination in 1981; (2) a constitutional amendment to allow direct election of the president from among competing candidates and to impose a limit of two 5-year presidential terms; (3) the guarantee of free elections under judicial supervision; (4) greater freedom to establish political parties; (5) loosening of government controls over unions, syndicates and civil society groups; and (6) an end to the ruling party's dominance of state media.
The three main parties have also reached an "agreement" (tawafuq, as opposed to tahaluf, which is a more formal pact) with the illegal but powerful Muslim Brotherhood on the most important elements of reform. According to the General Secretary of the Wafd Party, Al Sayid Al Badawi, these are constitutional, administrative and legal reform, the establishment of an independent electoral commission, and changes in the laws governing political parties and elections.
A second opposition coalition—made up of civil society groups such as the Hisham Mubarak Law Center, banned organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood and the Communist Party, and independent intellectuals—has also formed. This coalition, calling itself the March 20th Movement for Change (in reference to the date of large protests held in Cairo against the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq), goes further than the Alliance by calling on President Mubarak not to seek a fifth term and by rejecting the prospect that Gamal Mubarak, the president's younger son, would "inherit" power. The groups in the March 20th Movement are also more radical than those in the Alliance and less constrained by the rules that govern legal party politics.
Cooperation between secular and Islamist forces in Egypt is hardly new; the Wafd formed an electoral alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980s. But the number and ideological diversity of organizations that are currently mobilizing around a core set of demands is a noteworthy development and illustrate a growing frustration with the status quo that spans the political spectrum. Yet, the recent initiatives are unlikely to produce concrete results. Egypt's opposition parties remain structurally weak and are plagued by aging leadership, a history of infighting, and petty personal politics. The Wafd, Tagammu, and Arab Nasserist parties lack large constituencies and the ability to build popular support; what little influence they do possess comes primarily from the limited-circulation newspapers they publish. Unlike the banned Muslim Brotherhood, these parties lack the ability to mobilize tens of thousands of Egyptians onto the nation's streets.
The emergency law has also stunted the development of parties and of the nation's political life more generally. The law prohibits parties from holding rallies without prior permission, which is rarely granted, and gives the security forces vast and unchecked powers to arrest and detain individuals. The law also prohibits strikes and demonstrations and gives the government powers to censor and shut down newspapers—actions it has not hesitated to take.
The outcome of the NDP's recent conference, which essentially dismissed the opposition's reform agenda out of hand, makes clear that the Egyptian government is not interested in implementing measures that would fundamentally change the character of Egyptian politics. The moment of opportunity that has led opposition forces to become bolder in their demands and attempt to band together may very well prove fleeting.
Samer Shehata teaches at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University in Washington, DC.
