Is Morocco’s migration policy protecting Sub-Saharan African migrants or managing them for political and security ends? This article unpacks the gaps, the risks, and the paths toward real rights-based integration.
Soufiane Elgoumri
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The war will likely continue for at least another several brutal months—and yet there remains an urgent need to consider the Strip’s political future.
Despite U.S. insistence on the need to plan for post-war governance in the Gaza Strip, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu continues to refuse to outline any strategy for the day after or to cede control to the Palestinian Authority (PA). For its part, the PA also has rejected the idea that it will re-enter the Strip on the back of an Israeli tank. Under these circumstances, one of the following scenarios is most likely:
While Netanyahu has expressed a desire to transfer control of the Gaza Strip to a civilian government under Israeli security control, the feasibility of such a transition appears unlikely. All members of civil society, including local leaders and businessmen, are hesitant to collaborate with Israel as long as the devastating war continues, fearing accusations of national treason. However, in the absence of a functioning security infrastructure and reliable humanitarian aid, there is a possibility that Gazans would opt to establish a local body to oversee humanitarian affairs and emergency operations, aiming to prevent total chaos. This arrangement might allow the Israeli army to maintain control over the Strip's borders, and carry out limited ground incursions and aerial bombardments.
The Israeli media has suggested coordinating with Palestinian tribes in Gaza to bring humanitarian aid into the Strip. In response, the tribal council issued an official statement rejecting post-war cooperation with Israel. But despite this position, the anticipated chaos after the war may compel the tribes to act to protect their extended families. This could take the form of protection committees, comprised of youth from each family, to defend property from theft and to facilitate access to humanitarian aid in coordination with international organizations, rather than with Israel. These committees may not have any political role but would instead focus on overseeing the general welfare of each clan, while the Israeli security presence in the Strip continues in some form.
Given the complexity of the situation in Gaza, the formation of an international coalition—in collaboration with NATO or any other global entity—could be the most pragmatic solution to minimize security risks. It would also spare the PA the embarrassment of directly returning to Gaza in collaboration with Israel. The recent visit of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Turkey suggests a potential partnership between the two countries, given Turkey's significant role in NATO and its positive relationship with Palestinians. If accepted by the Palestinian public, these international forces could focus on limited roles such as maintaining security, facilitating humanitarian aid, and overseeing the reconstruction of Gaza. Subsequently, a national committee might be established to engage with the PA and gradually transfer control of Gaza, or to prepare for future parliamentary and presidential elections to usher in a new phase of governance.
If the PA is prevented from returning to Gaza, and international forces are unable to enter the Strip, remaining members of Hamas and other militant factions may form armed militias. These groups could assume an unofficial role in governing the Strip, but intra-Palestinian violence would also flare up in the clash with perceived Israeli collaborators. If the Israeli army continues to conduct occasional ground and air operations in Gaza, conflict with these militias would also be inevitable. Consequently, the Israeli blockade would likely persist, with the Rafah crossing closed and the reconstruction of Gaza delayed until a comprehensive solution is reached—one that ensures the formation of a national government with formal authority over the Strip.
Ultimately, it must be affirmed that only Palestinians themselves, supported by Arab nations and members of the international community, should determine the shape of their government. External powers, including Israel, cannot dictate these decisions. However, facing the impact of a prolonged occupation and a devastating war, Palestinians might find themselves compelled to accept any scenario that promises a swift end to the intense conflict and a return to the homes from which they were displaced.
Reham Owda is an independent Palestinian author and political analyst from Gaza, with a Ph.D. in political science. Follow her on X @RehamOwda.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
Is Morocco’s migration policy protecting Sub-Saharan African migrants or managing them for political and security ends? This article unpacks the gaps, the risks, and the paths toward real rights-based integration.
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