On September 10, Jordan held parliamentary elections against the backdrop of unprecedented regional and domestic challenges, including the Israeli war on Gaza and Lebanon, a growing decline in public trust in state institutions, and constitutional amendments perceived as empowering the Royal Court and sidelining the government.
The elections saw widespread voter apathy, with initial official figures showing a turnout of 32 percent among 5.1 million eligible voters—slightly higher than the 29 percent turnout in the 2020 elections which were viewed as undemocratic.
The low voter participation reflects widespread public dissatisfaction with the dire economic situation and rising prices in Jordan, where young people—who make up two-thirds of the population—have been particularly affected. Unemployment exceeds 21 percent, and a significant 48 percent of citizens are considering leaving the country, one of the highest rates among Arab countries. A recent opinion poll further revealed that Jordanians have low trust in political institutions, particularly the government and parliament, with only 16 percent expressing strong confidence in parliament and just 37 percent in the government.
Islamists’ Strong Showing
The election results defied expectations as the Islamic Action Front Party, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, emerged as the largest bloc in the Jordanian parliament, securing 22.5 percent of the seats with a total of 31 out of 138. Of these, seventeen seats were won through party lists and fourteen through local lists. In contrast, other parties, such as the Al-Irada Party and the Al-Mithaq Al-Watani (National Charter) Party—both closely aligned with the authorities—failed to achieve significant results on the party lists, collectively securing only forty seats, primarily from local lists.
The total number of voters for the Islamic Action Front represented 44.8 percent of the electorate, marking a significant improvement over previous elections, in which the Front won only ten seats in 2020 and fifteen seats in 2016, out of a total of 130 seats.
Widespread sympathy for Palestinians in Gaza has undoubtedly contributed to increased support for Islamist groups. The Islamic Action Front has actively organized demonstrations against Israeli aggression, resulting in the arrest of some of their activists. They have also been at the forefront of a public movement calling for a boycott of U.S. and Western companies perceived as pro-Israel. Support for Hamas, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, has similarly surged. Polls indicate that 72 percent of Jordanians believe the situation in Gaza amounts to genocide, and 93 percent reported participating in the boycott campaign.
Government -Sponsored Reforms
The elections are part of the official gradual vision outlined in the political modernization plan, which aims to facilitate the formation of a parliamentary government in its third phase in 2023. According to the plan, party representation in parliament will gradually increase over three electoral cycles, reaching 50 percent by the 2028 elections, up from the current 30 percent, and eventually reaching 65 percent by the 2032 elections. This gradual reform is based on the recommendations of the Royal Committee for the Modernization of the Political System, which issued two key laws governing elections and political parties.
However, this plan was preceded by a series of constitutional amendments passed in 2014, 2016, and 2022, which critics argue have weakened the general mandate of the Jordanian government while expanding the powers of the king. Opponents claim these amendments contradict the principles of the 1952 constitution, which defined the country’s political system as a “constitutional monarchy.”
And despite the significant reforms to the country’s electoral and political parties’ laws and the praised integrity of the recent elections, human rights reports have documented how the Jordanian authorities have increased political arrests, suppressed freedom of expression, and enforced restrictive laws, such as the cybercrime law, which has been criticized for imposing tight control over Jordanians’ online activities.
The contrast between the recent fair elections, which saw the victory of the largest opposition party, and the increasingly restrictive laws imposed by the government has left the public in a state of confused skepticism regarding the potential for genuine political reform. Some liken the political modernization plan to what might be called “political engineering,” where the political process is shaped to favor the authorities’ policies rather than fostering true democratic change.
While the Islamists' victory is not unprecedented, it is particularly significant given twenty years of internal conflict and strained relations with the authorities. Their win reflects a political will to ensure electoral impartiality, a key element of the political modernization plan, but it does not represent a major qualitative shift in the political landscape. The elections were preceded by a series of restrictive laws and practices limiting freedoms, creating the impression that Jordan is not making steady progress toward genuine political reform.
Despite the observed fairness of the elections and the victory of the Islamist opposition, limited voter participation and laws restricting freedoms undermine the elections’ effectiveness in achieving meaningful political reform. The authorities must implement further reforms to safeguard freedoms, build public trust, and encourage broader political engagement in order to strengthen support for the reform plan and foster active participation from all sectors of society.
Opportunities and Challenges
Despite low voter turnout, a struggling economy, and the widespread desire among young Jordanians to emigrate, political reform presents an opportunity to revitalize political life and facilitate the establishment of a parliamentary government, similar to the situation in 1956. However, achieving this will require the government to take several steps to restore public confidence in political institutions, including revisiting restrictive laws, such as the cybercrime law and those governing assembly and demonstrations. Additionally, constitutional reform reinforcing the general mandate of the government is essential.
Economic reform is also crucial for the success of the modernization plan, as it is essential for creating job opportunities and attracting foreign investment, particularly given Jordan’s reputation for its skilled and highly educated labor force, which the country exports to other job markets. However, achieving economic transformation requires a strong commitment to transparency and anti-corruption policies that ensure social protection and support for low-income and marginalized groups.
While this may seem like a long and challenging path, delaying reform will only exacerbate the hardships ahead.
