Although the Beijing agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran was the result of arduous negotiations brokered by China, other factors prompted the two countries to sign the deal and re-establish full diplomatic relations. It is likely that the most prominent of these factors is the ongoing game of regional power politics that both Riyadh and Tehran have been playing for decades. For Riyadh, the fear of losing leverage in the Levant and the hope of curbing Iran’s support to the Houthis in Yemen, as well as the desire to focus more on domestic development policies, were motives for signing a deal with its sworn enemy.
In fact, for many years, the Saudis vehemently ruled out any possibility of rapprochement with their Shiite nemesis. Yet having exhausted all possible means to undermine Iran’s role in the region, either by attacking its allies or by targeting its domestic security—as Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman once confessed in an interview—they were left with no other choice.
Over the past decade, Iran and Saudi Arabia have been on opposite sides of a number of regional conflicts, and Riyadh was tirelessly, but unsuccessfully, trying to reduce Tehran’s influence and to increase its own in countries such as Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon.
In order to secure its interests in Syria, Riyadh took the risk of supporting armed opposition militias to overthrow the Assad regime. However, as the war in Yemen raged on, the cost of this support grew intolerable, and the Saudis realized that their efforts to oust Assad were doomed to failure. The material and moral costs that the Saudi adventure in Syria entailed were an unwelcome burden, added to faltering internal development policies and the fragmentation that afflicted the ruling family after Mohammed bin Salman obtained the mandate of the covenant. Mohammed bin Salman’s desire to secure an environment conducive to assuming power after the death of his father made him susceptible to a more lenient path that would mitigate external conflicts and allow him to focus more on domestic affairs.
In Iraq, the kingdom tried to take advantage of the political mayhem that the Islamic State’s occupation created in the north of the country in 2014 to expand its influence and subvert Iraqi Shiite militias, such as the Dawa Party. Soon enough, this policy proved counterproductive to Saudi interests as Iran’s rapid intervention and support for the Popular Mobilization Forces after the Islamic State’s occupation of Mosul proved instrumental in establishing Tehran’s influence yet detrimental to Riyadh’s project in Mesopotamia.
Saudi Arabia also tried and failed to take advantage of its political alliance with the Shiite leader, Muqtada al-Sadr, who controlled the largest parliamentary bloc in Iraq. Al-Sadr, who the Saudis hoped would be an asset as he became closer to them relative to Iran, was unable to change the balance of power in his favor despite his threat to resign and to start a civil disobedience campaign that he hoped would push for the formation of a government in which he had the largest share. The Saudi failure allowed Iran to remain the strongest external party at play in the war ridden country.
In Lebanon, Riyadh tried to shift the balance of power in favor of its own allies. In 2017, the Saudis temporarily detained the Lebanese Prime Minister, Saad Hariri, and forced him to resign in order to pressure President Michel Aoun and Hezbollah to make concessions. Later on, under Saudi pressure, Hariri announced that he was withdrawing from political life—a move that created a vacuum in Sunni community leadership and caused it to become scattered, weak, and unable to pursue its interests. To further pressure Iran and Hezbollah (the kingdom’s strongest rival in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria), the Saudis refused to support the election of Hezbollah’s presidential candidate, Suleiman Franjieh. In fact, Charles Jabbour, a spokesman for the Lebanese Forces party, an ally of Saudi Arabia, announced after the signing of the Beijing agreement that his party would not secure the parliamentary quorum needed to elect Suleiman Frangieh under any circumstances. Jabbbour’s announcement came in anticipation of any settlement that could place Hezbollah’s candidate at the lead of the presidential race at their expense.
A comparison of how Saudi Arabia and Iran deal with their allies shows that the Saudis have a history of abandoning their allies, with their behavior towards Saad Hariri in Lebanon and the opposition militias in Syria serving as prominent examples. Iran, on the other hand, is more loyal and more committed to the allies it makes, always seeking to strengthen their presence along its side at every political and military juncture. Therefore, it is expected that Riyadh’s relations with its local allies will witness a significant change in priorities in the short term.
The Beijing agreement will undoubtedly strengthen Iran’s position in the region because it will reduce the potential of costly military conflicts, especially in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, where turmoil frequently erupts. Riyadh, on the other hand, is likely to reap the long-term advantages of the deal as the alleviation of the burden of military involvement will offer the Saudis an opportunity to follow policies that are somewhat independent of Washington.
It is abundantly clear that Saudi Arabia, upon re-examining its choices, has found that a settlement with Iran is less costly than a confrontation with it.
Abbas Assi holds a PhD in International Relations from the University of Leeds in the UK. He previously worked at the Center for Arab Unity Studies. Follow him on Twitter: @DrAbbasAssi.
