On March 31, Türkiye’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), led by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, suffered its worst performance since entering the political arena in 2002. Garnering only 35 percent of the vote in the country’s local elections, the AKP watched as the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) claimed 38 percent of the nationwide vote and victory in key cities including İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir, and Bursa—their best result since 1977.
The electoral outcome reflects a broader change in Turkish politics, which had become increasingly narrow following the 2017 constitutional referendum. By moving Türkiye from a parliamentary to a presidential system, the referendum facilitated Erdoğan’s complete consolidation of control over key pillars of governance—the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, and the media—and altered the country’s democratic landscape. The parliament, reduced primarily to budget approval, was forced to abandon its traditional roles in decision-making and policy formulation.
Since this shift towards one-man rule in Türkiye, elections have been largely framed as battles between pro- and anti-Erdoğan forces. For instance, in the 2018 elections, Erdoğan's party AKP and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) formed the People's Alliance. The opposition parties, the majority made up of executives from center-right and nationalist parties that had been in politics with Erdoğan before, came together to form the National Alliance—with their opposition to Erdoğan as the only common factor. This alignment distanced the CHP from its foundational principles of social democracy, and may have cost the party votes.
Despite significantly lower turnout and Erdoğan’s absence from the ballot, the March 31 elections have broken this trend. Moving beyond the binary pro- and anti-Erdoğan rhetoric, voters expressed their dissatisfaction with the AKP and its handling of the escalating economic crisis. In March, Turkey's inflation rate soared to 68.5 percent, and many voters believed that President Erdoğan's unorthodox economic policies were to blame. Cities that were traditionally AKP strongholds, such as Bursa, Balıkesir, Uşak, and Adıyaman, transferred their allegiance to the CHP. Similarly, conservative districts like Üsküdar in Istanbul and Keciören in Ankara also favored the CHP. This suggests that economic issues, rather than steadfast support or opposition to Erdoğan, influenced the electorate's decision-making.
Furthermore, parties known for their nationalist rhetoric, such as the MHP, the Good (İYİ) Party, and the anti-immigrant Victory (Zafer) Party, also lost support during these elections. This shift signifies diminished voter attraction to the nationalist policies and discourse long promoted by Erdoğan's government. Notably, the main opposition, the Republican People's Party (CHP), deliberately avoided populist anti-immigration rhetoric in the lead-up to the local elections. Given that Türkiye hosts nearly 4 million refugees, the electorate's move away from nationalist parties points to a broader appetite for change.
The New Welfare Party, an Islamist party in Türkiye, secured over 6 percent of the vote, capturing a portion of the AKP’s conservative base. They did so in part by criticizing the government's policies towards Israel: despite Erdoğan's public criticisms of Israel's actions in Gaza, Türkiye has maintained substantial trade with the country, exporting goods valued at $319 million. Moreover, a significant portion of these exports were conducted by members of the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (MUSIAD), an organization of Islamist businessmen closely allied with Erdoğan.
Erdoğan's influence in Turkish politics is expected to persist, given his party’s extensive control over the media. Yet the outcomes of the recent elections reveal a general mood of political revival, which extends beyond the local and municipal levels. Given that Erdoğan's increasingly authoritarian rule has served to stifle political engagement, the elections are a promising sign for the future of Turkish democracy. As voters grow weary of Erdoğan and the polarization of Turkish politics, the AKP’s power may be further reduced—paving the way for a potential shift back to a parliamentary system.
Emre Caliskan is a research fellow at the Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford. Follow him on X @calemre.
