report

WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications

A groundbreaking report details what the U.S. and international intelligence communities understood about Iraq's weapons programs before the war and outlines policy reforms to improve threat assessments, deter transfer of WMD to terrorists, strengthen the UN weapons inspection process, and avoid politicization of the intelligence process.

Published on January 8, 2004

Summary
This new study details what the U.S. and international intelligence communities understood about Iraq's weapons programs before the war and outlines policy reforms to improve threat assessments, deter transfer of WMD to terrorists, strengthen the UN weapons inspection process, and avoid politicization of the intelligence process.

The report distills a massive amount of data into side-by-side comparisons of pre-war intelligence, the official presentation of that intelligence, and what is now known about Iraq's programs.
 

Click on the link above for full text or the links to the right for specific sections of this Carnegie report.

About the Authors
Joseph Cirincione is a senior associate and director of the Non-Proliferation Project. Jessica T. Mathews is president and George Perkovich is vice president for studies of the Carnegie Endowment. Alexis Orton is a Junior Fellow with the Non-Proliferation Project.

This is a web-only publication.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.