• Research
  • Emissary
  • About
  • Experts
Carnegie Global logoCarnegie lettermark logo
DemocracyIran
  • Donate
{
  "authors": [
    "Andrei Kolesnikov"
  ],
  "type": "legacyinthemedia",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
    "Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center"
  ],
  "collections": [
    "Inside Russia"
  ],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
  "programAffiliation": "",
  "programs": [],
  "projects": [],
  "regions": [
    "Russia"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Political Reform"
  ]
}

Source: Getty

In The Media

What Are Russians Protesting About?

Recent demonstrations in Russia have not been led by a particular group or movement with grand political designs. Instead, protesters in Arkhangelsk – much like those in Yekaterinburg and even in Moscow – are simply people fighting for their government, finally, to treat them with the dignity and respect they deserve.

Link Copied
By Andrei Kolesnikov
Published on Jul 15, 2019

Source: Project Syndicate

Former finance minister Alexei Kudrin, now Chair of Russia’s Accounts Chamber, has warned that the country risks an “explosion” of protests caused by declining living standards and widespread poverty. He is wrong.

Kudrin is widely viewed as a standard-bearer for the cadre of liberal technocrats working within Russian President Vladimir Putin’s illiberal system, and his words carry significant weight among liberal-minded observers. But, in assessing today’s social unrest in Russia, Kudrin is confusing economic frustration with something much more fundamental: the struggle for dignity.

Of course, Russians do have serious economic grievances. The decline in real household income – which Kudrin cited as a major contributor to public frustration – has been consistent since 2014, when Putin made the costly decision illegally to annex Crimea from Ukraine. Unsurprisingly, private consumption has been weak. And last year, when the government implemented drastic pension reforms – which, among other things, raised the retirement age by five years – popular protests were formidable enough to force Putin not only to defend the policy publicly, but also to make some concessions.

Russians were not entirely convinced by Putin’s arguments, and public trust in the government fell. Although the protests against the pension reforms faded (in part with the help of some arrests by government forces), voters punished Putin’s United Russia party in September’s regional elections, and Putin’s approval rating – which had hovered around 80% – has fallen to 64-68% since October 2018.

Putin is thus roughly as popular now as he was before the annexation of Crimea, and the nationalist rhetoric that accompanied it, boosted support for him. Five years later, this tactic seems unlikely to work again: nowadays, Russians no longer seem to be persuaded by anti-Western discourse and militarist rhetoric.

With his favorite tool for shoring up public support having lost its efficacy, Putin is in an uncomfortable position. The fact remains, however, that his approval ratings, despite being lower than he might like, have stabilized, suggesting that Russians have largely accepted their economic plight as a “new normal.”

But that does not mean that Russians are willing to accept other “normal” behaviors by their government. Consider the protests that erupted in May in Yekaterinburg, Russia’s fourth most populous city, over government plans to build a new Orthodox cathedral in one of the city’s few remaining green areas.

The issue was corruption, not economics or even religion – even deeply observant Russians opposed the move. People are fed up with the relationship between government authorities, the Russian Orthodox Church hierarchy, and favored businessmen. Eager to preserve the support of his traditional base – ordinary Russians outside Moscow – Putin ordered the local authorities to suspend the project, at least for now. It was a rare win for Russian civil society.

Then there were the protests spurred by the arrest of Ivan Golunov, a respected investigative journalist reporting on corruption in the funeral businesses, on dubious drug charges, and his subsequent mistreatment in custody by the security services. The uproar and outrage were such that, in an unusual turn of events, the Kremlin quickly ordered that Golunov be released, instead of facing years in prison, as people in his position have come to expect. Yet again, Putin revealed his desire to appease the public, rather than risking the further erosion of popular support.

But appeasement has its limits. After Golunov’s release, police detained more than 500 demonstrators who remained in the streets of central Moscow, protesting Russia’s broader suppression of independent media and detention of political prisoners.

The most impressive recent case of civil disobedience occurred in Russia’s far north, in Arkhangelsk Province. Upon learning (by chance) of government plans to ship garbage from Moscow to be buried in the region’s pristine forests – beginning in the town of Shiyes – local people launched demonstrations that have lasted for a year and spread to neighboring regions.

Again, there is an economic component: the people of a poor region are rising up against incursions by wealthy Moscow. But they are not demanding action to raise their real incomes. Instead, they are defending their public spaces from occupation by the central government – not just by demanding an end to landfill construction, but also by calling for the resignation of their governor and, more recently, of Putin himself.

Though the government suspended its landfill plans in Shiyes in May, Putin has mentioned the protests only once, describing the dispute as purely regional. It is no coincidence that the topic did not arise on June 20, during Putin’s “Direct Line”: an annual live broadcast in which the president answers questions from Russians. The Kremlin, it seems, isn’t quite sure how to navigate this new kind of resistance.

And it is new. The Arkhangelsk protesters have demonstrated extraordinary firmness, professionalism, and insight about Putin’s government. The demonstrations have not been led by a particular group or movement with grand political designs. Instead, protesters in Arkhangelsk – much like those in Yekaterinburg and even in Moscow – are simply people fighting for their government, finally, to treat them with the dignity and respect they deserve.

This article originally appeared on Project Syndicate

About the Author

Andrei Kolesnikov

Former Senior Fellow, Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center

Kolesnikov was a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center.

    Recent Work

  • Commentary
    How the Putin Regime Subverted the Soviet Legacy

      Andrei Kolesnikov

  • Commentary
    Putin’s New Social Justice

      Andrei Kolesnikov

Andrei Kolesnikov
Former Senior Fellow, Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center
Andrei Kolesnikov
Political ReformRussia

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    What’s Having More Impact on Russian Oil Export Revenues: Ukrainian Strikes or Rising Prices?

    Although Ukrainian strikes have led to a noticeable decline in the physical volume of Russian oil exports, the rise in prices has more than made up for it.

      • Sergey Vakulenko

      Sergey Vakulenko

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    Russia Is Meddling for Meddling’s Sake in the Middle East

    The Russian leadership wants to avoid a dangerous precedent in which it is squeezed out of Iran by the United States and Israel—and left powerless to respond in any meaningful way.

      Nikita Smagin

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    Is Frustration With Armenia’s Pashinyan Enough to Bring the Pro-Russia Opposition to Power?

    It’s true that many Armenians would vote for anyone just to be rid of Pashinyan, whom they blame for the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, but the pro-Russia opposition is unlikely to be able to channel that frustration into an electoral victory.

      Mikayel Zolyan

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    Will Hungary’s New Leader Really Change EU Policy on Russia and Ukraine?

    Orbán created an image for himself as virtually the only opponent of aid to Ukraine in the entire EU. But in reality, he was simply willing to use his veto to absorb all the backlash, allowing other opponents to remain in the shadows.

      Maksim Samorukov

  • Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    How to Join the EU in Three Easy Steps

    Montenegro and Albania are frontrunners for EU enlargement in the Western Balkans, but they can’t just sit back and wait. To meet their 2030 accession ambitions, they must make a strong positive case.

      Dimitar Bechev, Iliriana Gjoni

Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Carnegie global logo, stacked
1779 Massachusetts Avenue NWWashington, DC, 20036-2103Phone: 202 483 7600Fax: 202 483 1840
  • Research
  • Emissary
  • About
  • Experts
  • Donate
  • Programs
  • Events
  • Blogs
  • Podcasts
  • Contact
  • Annual Reports
  • Careers
  • Privacy
  • For Media
  • Government Resources
Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.