After three decades of on-again-off-again fighting between Armenians and Azerbaijanis over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, the oldest frozen conflict in the former Soviet space appears to be over, at least for now. This should be a joyful moment, but there is little to celebrate. The agreement to end the fighting hammered out by Russia promises to be neither the end nor a new beginning. Instead, it is merely a pause in the long-standing imperial rivalries and religious and ethnic conflicts that have tormented the Caucasus for years.
Six Takeaways From Peace and Conflict
First, peace—if it really is peace—comes not as a result of a negotiation, but after six weeks of bloody war that cost thousands of lives on both sides, including both combatants and civilians, and left many more displaced. Armenia suffered devastating losses on the battlefield. Its Soviet-era arms and strategy were no match for the fast-moving, high-tech, twenty-first-century war that Azerbaijan, with Turkish support, waged. Yerevan had no choice but to accept the humiliating terms that the majority of Armenians in Armenia and in the diaspora view as another chapter in its national tragedy, a defeat at the hands of its historic enemy Turkey. There is no room for reconciliation here; instead, the Armenian struggle will continue.
Second, Armenia’s democratically elected government has been dealt a devastating blow. The lesson many will take from this loss is that democracy and national security are incompatible. The angry mob that roamed Yerevan and brutally beat the country’s parliamentary speaker was not a sign of the country’s democratic health, but ominously reminiscent of the country’s tragic legacy of political violence. With the opposition—including hardline, corrupt, and non-democratic elements—gunning to oust Armenia’s prime minister, the promise of the country’s Velvet Revolution is more uncertain than ever.
Third, Armenia’s defeat comes at the hands of the authoritarian hereditary Azerbaijani regime, which is backed diplomatically and militarily by the increasingly authoritarian Turkish leader in the form of a treaty dictated to Armenia from Moscow. Azerbaijan’s previously unpopular leader, who was facing splits in his own government, is now a national hero. Some have concluded that war is good and might is right. To them, authoritarianism is the winner while democracy is the loser.
Fourth, the so-called treaty or agreement forged in Moscow is more notable for what is not in it than for what is. The status of the disputed territory is uncertain, while the fate of refugees and internally displaced persons is left vague. There is no real plan for reconstruction, stabilization, or reconciliation. The role of Turkey, which is not a signatory, is not formally mentioned, making it unclear what role it and Baku claims it will have. This new so-called peace appears more brittle than the frozen conflict that preceded it. The only thing that is clear is that Russia is expanding its military presence in the region, and possibly Turkey too, at Azerbaijan’s behest. With Moscow and Ankara butting heads elsewhere in the world, this is a recipe for more tension, not less.
Fifth, memories of three occasionally hopeful post-Soviet decades of independence are rapidly fading. The Caucasus is once again being trampled by its neighboring heavyweights clinging to their imperial aspirations. Putin is enforcing what former Russian president Dmitri Medvedev once called Russia’s “sphere of privileged interests.” Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, apparently fueled by neo-Ottoman visions, is trying to reestablish Turkey’s sphere of influence in the Caucasus and Caspian Sea region. This is unlikely to result in a happy condominium between the two and promises more trouble for the region. Meanwhile, Iran, Israel, and the Gulf States—all of which have increased their engagement with the region in recent years—watch nervously as the geopolitical landscape shifts.
Finally, the world doesn’t seem to care. Europe and the United States are distracted by their own problems, and the fate of Armenians matters little to them. For nearly three decades, Washington and Paris pledged their support to a negotiated solution to the conflict, but in the end neither proved capable of helping. Russia, another party to the talks, stood by and watched its ally Armenia get crushed on the battlefield and then cynically used its defeat to assert its claim to regional leadership. Moving forward, Washington and Paris could try to re-insert themselves and play a useful role in the region’s reconstruction and reconciliation—something with which the West has far greater experience than Moscow or Ankara. However, the outgoing administration of U.S. President Donald Trump shows little desire to do so, and the future administration of President-elect Joe Biden will be left with limited leverage by January.
What the Future Holds
What next? The outlook is bleak. Jubilation in Azerbaijan over the victory can do little to fix its economy, which has been battered by low oil prices, widespread corruption, and the consequences of the coronavirus pandemic. Armenia, badly wounded on the battlefield, has to reckon with trauma, the betrayal by Russia, an uncertain domestic political future, and a similarly fast-growing coronavirus crisis, particularly among the displaced.
Neither of the two countries aspiring to regional hegemony in the Caucasus—Russia and Turkey—will do much to address the region’s long-standing underlying problems. Their jockeying for advantage, which extends to Syria and Libya, is hardly a precondition for peace and stability in the Caucasus, which they have turned into another part of their geopolitical chessboard. They may hammer out something resembling a more durable arrangement for ending the Armenian-Azeri conflict, but any peace resulting from it will remain fragile. Neither big power seems interested in a real economic or political stabilization effort. The frozen conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is being replaced by a frozen and stunted peace.
Comments(14)
This article isn't bleak enough... These are big ifs, but the outcome of the First Karabakh War for each country can actually serve as a lesson for the other on what they should not do. If regular Azerbaijanis can refrain from gloating, and regular Armenians can refrain from aspirations of revenge. If the Azerbaijani leadership can refrain from destroying regional monuments or rewriting their neighbor's out of the region's history. If the Armenian leadership can focus on solidifying its democracy and driving its economy toward one of technology and clean industry (as opposed to oil/mining and war)... This could be an end to the conflict. Big ifs. And people on both sides will stand in the way of this. Hopefully both sides will realize they have more in common historically and culturally than either with Russia or Turkey. And they can rebuild their economies together, with bigger trade partnerships that would hinder the developments of future conflicts. Too ideal? Not possible? Empathy. It's up to each and every one of you to put this into practice so that history doesn't repeat itself.
Mr. Dover, I wish your advice was more practical. It would be useful to consider the following facts prior to advising Armenians what they should do: Close to NINETY percent of historic Armenia is occupied by Turkey and is known as Eastern Turkey. Most diaspora Armenians hail from these occupied lands. So the loss is not ancient history. The current Republic of Armenia is the rump of Armenia--a tiny and mountainous land with few resources. In 1921, Stalin took two further regions of Armenia (Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan) and gave them to Azerbaijan because the Soviets were wooing Turkey and hoped Ankara would turn its gaze east and become at least socialist. Azeris are Turks and consider Turkey their older brother. When the Soviet Union was collapsing, the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh (with Armenia's help) liberated themselves from illegal and oppressive Azeri rule. Now 25 years later--thanks to petrodollars, Turkey, terrorist mercenaries, and deadly Israeli drones, Azerbaijan won and will get most of Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenians will never accept this unjust "agreement." Azeris won but the conflict is not over. Armenians have had enough of watching their ancient homeland melt into the hands of Turkey and Turkey Jr. They have occupied our lands, committed genocide, and now Aliev says all of Armenia belongs to Azerbaijan--Turks from Central Asia who have been Armenia's nemesis since they appeared in the Middle East in the Middle Ages. Aliev's victory jig will be short lived.
Mario, it is precisely this mindset that has brought the two countries to where they are right now - this perpetual struggle for who is more ancient, who is more civilized, etc. This is not how international law works. Hence no response from the global community.
An enforced unjust "peace" results in military action down the road.
You've misunderstood what I wrote, Mr/Ms Escobar. I cited the length of time Nagorno-Karabakh had been Armenian in the reasonable notion that if you are the first owner then you have priority. If you own a house and someone comes and takes it while you are living in it is illegal. You mentioned civilization. The ownership of Nagorno-Karabakh is not about civilization but about rightful ownership. Yes, when the Turkic tribes invaded the Middle East they were barbarians. Of course, in this age of politically correctness every culture is as civilized as any and the screech of a Jivaro in the Amazon is as valid musically as any of Beethoven's symphonies.
As you say, it will be an even greater tragedy if Armenian democracy is a casualty of this outcome. But is there not a case for searching self-criticism on the Armenian side? They sat on their gains from war in the early 1990s, which included control not only of Armenian-populated areas of NK but also of larger formerly Azeri-populated areas, generating and perpetuating a big refugee problem in Azerbaijan. And they relied on Russia to help them maintain that state of affairs, while allowing Azerbaijan to cultivate Turkey and build up military superiority. Surely it should have been foreseen that sooner or later Azerbaijan would exploit this situation to recover much if not all of the disputed territory, which has now happened...
Thank you for this brief but insightful analysis. This conflict, or whatever happens on that part of the world, seems of absolutely no interest to US media and thus, your article is a great source of information.
The chief reason that Armenia did not receive the support it hoped for from Russia or the West is the fact that Azerbaijani troops were fighting on their own soil, for their own soil. With the exception of Shusha and Hadrut, Azerbaijan advanced into districts outside Nagorno-Karabakh proper, which were populated by hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis prior to their expulsion by Armenian forces in the 1990s. Armenia – and many observers – term this war an aggression by Azerbaijan but this description just doesn’t fit common sense or international law. The things would have been very different had Azerbaijan moved into Armenia or made large inroads into Armenian-populated areas of Nagorno-Karabakh, in which case Armenia would most certainly have obtained a far stronger response from the international community. It is Armenia’s refusal to give up these districts that has stalled the negotiations for 26 years until Armenia Prime Minister Pashinyan’s highly provocative and nationalistic statements and demands destroyed the peace process altogether, leading to this horrendous war that decimated Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s youth and was characterized by the shelling of residential areas and other war crimes on both sides. But perhaps the most important factor driving this conflict is government-sanctioned instilment of extreme mutual hatred on both sides, which led to deep mistrust between the two nations. This tragic conflict can – and I have no doubt eventually will – be resolved when leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan each stop dehumanizing the opponent and engage in goodwill rather than zero-sum politics. The big powers will be powerless when the two nations genuinely want to live in peace.
biased article. Little mention to the azeri prespective, little mention to the fact that the UN recognizes the whole area as part of azerbijan, little mention to the fates of 800k displaced azeri people who deserve to go back home as well, little mention to the importance of israeli weapons to the success of the azeri army.
To quote Emile Zola: "If something is wrong it is still wrong even if 50 million people it." The UN is wrong. Nagorno-Karabakh has been Armenian since the 6th century BCE, according to Strabo and Pliny the Elder. It was 96 percent Armenian-populated when Stalin handed it to Azerbaijan because the Kremlin was wooing Turkey--the older brother of Turkuc Azerbaijan. When the Soviet Union was collapsing Nagorno-Karabakh was part of Azerbaijan. In a bizarre decision, the UN considers the status quo sacred...unless it's Yugoslavia in which case splicing it into seven states was O.K.because it was the wish of NATO.
Mario, first of all, ancient history is not a factor in international relations. Otherwise the modern city of Rome should have been claiming lands all across the Mediterranean. Second of all, no one "gave" Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh. If you consult the 1921 document, it says that the committee had decided to "keep Mountainous Karabakh within Azerbaijan". The word "keep" means that it had already been within Azerbaijan.
Mr./Ms. Escobar, Please allow me to correct your version of how Azerbaijan was illegally gifted with Nagorno-Karabakh (N.K). As People's Commissar of Nationalities from 1917 to 1923, it was Stalin that pushed for the pro-Azeri decision despite Foreign Minister Georgi Chicherin's advice to Stalin that N.K. should belong to Armenia. On July 4, 1921 the Plenum of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Communist Party decided that Karabakh should be integrated into Armenia. However, the next day, Stalin intervened and it was decided N.K should go to Azerbaijan. The decision was taken without local deliberation or plebiscite. Stalin gave N.K. and Nakhichevan (Armenian also) to the Azeris to please Turkey, the older brother of Azerbaijan. Stalin was wooing the Turks to persuade them to shift towards the east and to socialism. Ask yourself: "How can one give the land to Azerbaijan when it has been traditionally Armenian and Armenians make 94 percent of the population?" In the next 70 years, Azerbaijan followed a policy to sever the ties between N.G. Armenians and Armenia. It practiced a cultural "de-Armenization" policy. It brought Azeri settlers to change the demographics of N.K. It neglected the needs of Armenians and didn't invest in infrastructure. It was forbidden to publish books in Armenian. As a result of Azeri policies, N.K's population declined from 300,000 (1922) to 162,200 in 1979 while the Armenian percentage declined from 94 percent to 76 percent (123,000). Azerbaijan also liquidated 300 village--all Armenian. No Azeri village was liquidated. So, please don't tell us N.K. belongs to Azerbaijan. You don't want to support the illegal decision of Stalin, one of the most ruthless and lawless dictators of the 20th century.
Mr. Dover, I wish your advice was more practical. It would be useful to consider the following facts prior to advising Armenians what they should do: Close to NINETY percent of historic Armenia is occupied by Turkey and is known as Eastern Turkey. Most diaspora Armenians hail from these occupied lands. So the loss is not ancient history. The current Republic of Armenia is the rump of Armenia--a tiny and mountainous land with few resources. In 1921, Stalin took two further regions of Armenia (Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan) and gave them to Azerbaijan because the Soviets were wooing Turkey and hoped Ankara would turn its gaze east and become at least socialist. Azeris are Turks and consider Turkey their older brother. When the Soviet Union was collapsing, the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh (with Armenia's help) liberated themselves from illegal and oppressive Azeri rule. Now 25 years later--thanks to petrodollars, Turkey, terrorist mercenaries, and deadly Israeli drones, Azerbaijan won and will get most of Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenians will never accept this unjust "agreement." Azeris won but the conflict is not over. Armenians have had enough of watching their ancient homeland melt into the hands of Turkey and Turkey Jr. They have occupied our lands, committed genocide, and now Aliev says all of Armenia belongs to Azerbaijan--Turks from Central Asia who have been Armenia's nemesis since they appeared in the Middle East in the Middle Ages. Aliev's victory jig will be short lived.
Although understandable from the standpoint of who pays CEIP's bills, this article misrepresents the near parties' roles. Turkey actively fought in this war, running reconnaissance and electronic warfare from its own territory, as well as funding and equipping proxy fighters from Idlib, and re-equipping Azerbaijan. Israel, which maintains a military presence in Azerbaijan in the guise of spying on Iran and Russia, equipped and trained the Azeri forces and developed the tactics, such as droning ancient AN-2s, that made their own Harops all the more effective. Russia did not abandon Armenia. Following the US-sponsored revolution, Armenia partly abandoned its defense agreements with Russia, and at some point it may become another location for covert US nuclear missile presence in the guise of AA/radar role. Notwithstanding Armenia's partial treachery, Russia reaffirmed that it would fight on Armenia's side, following their treaty, if Armenian sold was invaded. It prepared accordingly. And the conflict ceased within 24 hours after Azerbaijan - by all accounts mistakenly - shot down a Russian aircraft over Armenian soil. The one objective peace maker in this, and ceasefire maker along the way, has been Russia. As for the remote parties, this is an abysmal failure for the US which, since sponsoring the Armenian revolution, has accomplished nothing other than facilitating the Israeli presence in Azerbaijan. France, likewise, has failed thoroughly as the third Minsk Group Co-Chair. The peace may be fragile, but only one external party has created it without fueling war: Russia.
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