As the United States closes the chapter on the global war on terror, Washington is seemingly committing itself to a new set of responsibilities that could bring the nation in direct military conflict with Russia and China. Several recent national surveys have revealed that African Americans are more reticent about engaging in a military conflict with Russia and China compared to other racial groups. To dig deeper, the American Statecraft program recently conducted a survey—comprised solely of Black Americans—that revealed that the community’s views are shaped by various demographics including education, immigration status, political affiliation, and income. In the runup to the 2024 election, African Americans’ varied opinions on hot-button foreign policy issues will be of concern to both political parties, especially as they attempt to burnish their reputation with Black voters over the coming months.
Introduction
Of all the instruments of U.S. foreign policy, arguably the one tool that has visibly converged with the lives of Black Americans has been U.S. military interventions. There is an esteemed body of scholarship that details the service and sacrifice of Black American soldiers in the nation’s military campaigns of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. As the United States ascended to a global power in the twentieth century, millions of Black Americans—amid a virulent domestic political landscape—proudly served and fought in the nation’s military conflicts (including World War I, World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War).1
Many veterans of the twentieth century’s wars achieved a level of upward mobility through their service in the form of funds for college education, unemployment insurance, and housing benefits. On the other hand, some still became victims of racial violence or were denied benefits that others received. For example, many Black World War II veterans, such as Maceo Snipes and Isaac Woodard, were attacked and lynched for attempting to progress civil rights in the segregated American South. Moreover, some African American leaders such as W. E. B Du Bois, A. Philip Randolph, and Martin Luther King, Jr. adopted anti-war stances cautioning African Americans from fighting in overseas wars while the promises of American democracy were not fully achieved at home.2
More recently African Americans proudly fought in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars and continue to form a significant demographic of the U.S. military: African Americans make up nearly 17 percent of the military but just over 12 percent of the national population.
This article is the first piece in a two-part series that attempts to extend the scholarship on African Americans and the U.S. military by asking, “How do African Americans feel about U.S. military interventionism in the twenty-first century?” Specifically, this article explores African Americans’ views on the use of military force abroad in the era following the war on terror, specifically the use of force to defend Ukraine and Taiwan. The survey revealed that half of African Americans were against sending troops to defend Ukraine (55 percent) and Taiwan (48 percent), while only two in ten respondents supported sending troops to either region. Contrary to the shift in the priorities of national political parties, Republican respondents exhibited a significantly higher level of support for the use of troops abroad (38 percent for Ukraine and 44 percent for Taiwan) compared to Democrats (22 percent for Ukraine and 20 percent for Taiwan).
This article draws on a new online survey of 1,150 people of African descent conducted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in partnership with the data and analytics firm YouGov.
The second piece in this series will explore African Americans’ attitudes toward two campaigns in the global war on terror—Afghanistan and Iraq.
Survey Design
The data analyzed are from an original online survey of 1,150 people of African descent—including African Americans (defined as individuals with residence in the U.S. for multiple generations), Afro-Caribbeans, and continental Africans—with residence in the United States who identify as Black or African American. The survey was designed by scholars at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and conducted by polling firm YouGov between September 8 and 13, 2022.
YouGov recruited respondents from its proprietary panel of nearly 2 million U.S. residents. Only respondents aged eighteen and above who are Black and reside in the United States were eligible to participate in the survey.
YouGov employs a sophisticated sample-matching procedure to ensure that the respondent pool, to the greatest extent possible, is representative of the African American community. All the analyses in this study employ sampling weights to ensure representativeness. The overall margin of error for the sample is +/- 3 percent. This margin of error is calculated at the 95 percent confidence interval.
The survey instrument contains a range of questions organized across three sections: support for troops to Ukraine and Taiwan, support for financial aid to Ukraine, and views on the U.S. role in the world.
Strengths and Limitations
One of the significant benefits of working with an extensive survey panel, such as the one maintained by YouGov, is that it provides access to large sample sizes that allow researchers to make reliable estimates about relatively small populations of interest. YouGov’s survey panel provides access to various demographics within the Black American community.
Online surveys have some drawbacks. The way in which a question is phrased plays a critical role in how respondents interpret the question and can influence their response. Careful attention has been placed to ensure that questions are worded in a simple manner in the hope that all respondents interpret the question in the same or similar ways. Even then, one cannot prevent various interpretations among respondents. And, it must be taken into consideration that respondents’ political knowledge will vary. Since this survey focused on U.S. military conflicts that occur halfway around the globe, it is unlikely that all respondents will have the same level of understanding. This could have played a role in respondents’ answers.
Despite these limitations, this survey still serves as an important barometer in understanding African Americans’ views toward U.S. military intervention in the twenty-first century.
Respondents’ Personal Views on the U.S. Military
Several surveys in recent years have acknowledged a subtle shift in Americans’ views toward the U.S. military. The Carnegie survey asked respondents to place their personal views of the military on a four-point scale ranging from very favorable to extremely unfavorable. The vast majority—about 80 percent of respondents—had a favorable or somewhat favorable view of the military (see figure 1).
As noticed in other national surveys, political affiliation among respondents tends to be the demographic where opinion differs the most. However, in our sample, Democratic and Republican respondents exhibited similar views on the military (see figure 2).
Age was a differentiating factor, with older generations having more favorable views. More than half of respondents (56 percent) born between 1928 and 1964 (335 respondents) reported having very favorable views of the military. And only 8 percent of respondents in that demographic reported unfavorable feelings toward the military. On the other hand, younger generations—especially those born between 1977 and 2004—reported the least favorable views of the U.S. military. In fact, a third (33 percent) of those born between 1997 and 2004 (182 respondents) reported having unfavorable views toward the U.S. military, the highest for any age demographic in the survey. Only a quarter (24 percent) of respondents in this demographic reported very favorable views toward the U.S. military. A possible explanation for this divide could lie in the fact that the global war on terror would have been the first conflict that younger generations witnessed, and perhaps news about prisoner abuse at prisons like Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, as well as civilian casualties from predator drone strikes, would influence their perceptions of the U.S. military.
Hypothetical Support for Sending Troops to Taiwan and Ukraine
As American military assistance to Ukraine and Taiwan gains momentum, the prospect of a great power conflict has moved from a fringe scenario to a much more real possibility. As was the case in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, several recent surveys have revealed that African Americans exhibit lower support for sending troops to Ukraine and Taiwan compared to other racial groups.
The top-line results were interesting. A slim majority of respondents were not in favor of sending troops to either Ukraine or Taiwan in the event of a conflict. (See precise wording in figure 1.) This finding tracks with other similarly worded surveys that have revealed that a majority of Americans are against engaging in another military conflict. The most striking results from the Carnegie survey were the number of respondents in favor of sending troops. Only two in ten respondents (21 percent for Ukraine and 20 percent for Taiwan) supported sending troops (see figure 3).
The most significant split in the Carnegie survey was around the political affiliation of respondents: Democrats supported sending troops to Ukraine and Taiwan at 22 percent and 20 percent, respectively. However, respondents who identified as Republican were even more supportive of sending troops to Ukraine or Taiwan, at 38 percent and 44 percent, respectively (see figure 4).
Other polls—such as a 2022 Chicago Council poll of the overall American public—revealed a minimal partisan divide in support for war over Taiwan, while Democrats exhibited slightly higher support for military intervention in Ukraine. However, in Carnegie’s poll, Republicans were much more likely to support defending Ukraine militarily.
As Democratic leaders embrace a posture of support for Ukraine and Taiwan (even if this means full-scale conflict), the Carnegie survey revealed that those sentiments do not necessarily translate to Black Democrats. On the other hand, Black Republicans in our sample appeared to be more hawkish.
The growing diversity of Black America in recent decades has garnered much attention. A 2022 Pew Research survey reported that 10 percent of Black people living in the United States are immigrants. A bevy of sociological research explores the continuities and differences between Black immigrants (primarily from the Caribbean and Africa) and U.S.-born Black people (those that descend from U.S. chattel slavery or have been in the country for several generations). The data revealed significant differences in war support among, on the one hand, immigrants and those whose parents are immigrants and, on the other, individuals who are generationally African American (residence in the United States for more than two generations).
Respondents who were immigrants or first-generation supported sending troops to Ukraine and Taiwan at a rate of 30 percent and 28 percent, respectively. Respondents who reported being second-generation or more reported a willingness to send troops to Ukraine and Taiwan at 18 percent and 19 percent, respectively. This is a roughly 10-point differential between the two groups. This difference may partially be explained by the fact that individuals with longer residence in the United States have an extended history with U.S. wars and may be reticent about committing to another conflict that can potentially lead to casualties and the diversion of federal funds from domestic issues. At the same time, some generational Black Americans may not see the need for engaging in conflicts halfway around the world while their communities at home suffer. This is not to say that foreign-born Black Americans do not share the same concerns. However, due to their international disposition (depending on the country of origin), immigrants may be more inclined to see the necessity of the United States as an arbiter in world conflicts.
Support for overseas intervention also increased with income. Households that reported an income less than $50,000 annually reported support for Ukraine and Taiwan by 17 percent and 16 percent, respectively. In comparison, households that reported an income more than $80,000 annually supported sending troops to Ukraine and Taiwan by a respective 26 percent and 25 percent.
Views on the $40 Billion Assistance Package to Ukraine
In May 2022, the U.S. Congress approved a $40 billion emergency military and humanitarian aid package to be sent to Ukraine. Since then, the White House has asked Congress to allocate billions more in aid to the conflict. Washington’s unprecedented financial support has been praised by some who believe it is a necessity in defense of Ukraine’s national sovereignty. Others have criticized the assistance package, arguing that the aid could possibly escalate the conflict with Russian President Vladimir Putin and potentially sideline domestic initiatives. The Carnegie survey asked respondents if they supported Congress’ decision to approve a $40 billion aid package in May 2022.
Respondents were divided on the issue, with a third (36 percent) approving of the aid package and 39 percent against it. A quarter (25 percent) of respondents did not have—or did not reveal—an opinion on the matter (see figure 5). It is important to note that respondents exhibited a much higher level of support for aid to Ukraine (36 percent) than for sending military forces to the region (21 percent). The nearly split opinion on aid to Ukraine might be explained by concerns about overseas federal spending that could otherwise be spent on domestic issues. However, the higher rate of support for aid to Ukraine than troops to the region might be explained by the belief that aid to Ukraine will diminish the need for the use of armed forces in the region.
Similar to respondents’ views on sending military forces to Ukraine and Taiwan, opinions on this question varied slightly based on political affiliation. Interestingly, Democrats (42 percent) and Republicans (37 percent) displayed similar levels of support for aid, with independents displaying the lowest approval of the aid package (26 percent). Republicans had the strongest views on the matter, with only 12 percent of respondents selecting “don’t know.” In comparison, 23 percent of Democrats and 28 percent of independents did not have—or did not share—an opinion on the question.
There was not much variation when we controlled for ethnic background and immigration status, unlike the questions on sending troops to Ukraine and Taiwan. However, college-educated respondents and those in the higher income brackets were more supportive of the aid package. There was a roughly 10-percentage-point difference for education: 41 percent of college-educated respondents were supportive versus 33 percent of those with a high school education. And there was a similar differential by income: 45 percent of respondents with annual household income above $80,000 supported the aid package compared with 33 percent with annual household income less than $50,000.
Opinion on U.S. Role in the World
Various think tanks have attempted to capture the American public’s view of how engaged the United States ought to be in the world. The Carnegie survey asked respondents if they felt “it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs” to understand what respondents think should be the United States’ global modus operandi. The results were striking. A plurality of respondents (42 percent) felt the United States should “stay out” of world affairs. Just 30 percent believed the country should take an “active part,” and 28 percent did not express an opinion (see figure 6).
The highest levels of support for the United States taking an active role in world affairs were among respondents who were college-educated (38 percent in support), men (40 percent), and Republican (42 percent), as well as those who reported a household income more than $80,000 (42 percent). In comparison, support for an active U.S. role in world affairs was lowest among women (22 percent in support), high school–educated respondents (27 percent), and those in the lowest income bracket (29 percent).
A third (34 percent) of respondents who identified as Democrat selected “active part,” compared to 42 percent of participants who identified as Republican (see figure 7).
This finding is illuminating. There is a cultural shift in how the American left and right thinks about military engagement, one that journalists have acknowledged. On a national level, the Democratic Party is moving toward a posture of increased intervention and international engagement while a growing group of Republicans have become more reticent about America’s traditional world role. However, the Carnegie poll shows that among African Americans, Republicans still lean slightly more toward international engagement than Democrats and independents do.
Conclusion
Conversations about war support among the public, especially racial minorities, are layered and complex. These conversations should be welcomed as Black Americans willingly form a significant share of the armed forces and continue to give their lives in overseas campaigns, as they have in the past. Such conversations illuminate the tension between the fight for democracy and American interests abroad, while simultaneously ensuring that U.S. foreign policy is not harming the most vulnerable communities at home.
Such conversations can sometimes paint African Americans as a monolith and obscure the subtle nuances in a diverse community of 47 million. This survey revealed that African American communities’ views are shaped by various factors, including their ethnic heritage, income, education, and gender.
Like most of the U.S. population in 2022, the majority of survey respondents were reticent about another military campaign. Perhaps most striking is the minimal support (two in ten respondents) for military engagement. Despite these top-line results, there is significant variation in war support across demographics. Democrats, households with an annual income less than $50,000, and those who have resided in the country for more than two generations reported the lowest support.
Respondents were decidedly split on their views on the $40 billion assistance package to Ukraine. However, support for financial aid to the region was about 15 percentage points higher than support for sending troops. In the new era of American foreign policy, a plurality of respondents was in favor of the United States staying out of world affairs. Again, respondents greatly differed based on their ethnic origin, household income, and education.
The lack of interest in new military conflicts should not be viewed as a lack of belief in the efficiency of the U.S. Armed Forces. In fact, close to 80 percent of respondents reported having favorable views of the armed forces. The results should be understood in the context of the storied history African Americans have with the U.S. military. Given the enduring legacy of the U.S. military’s relationship with Black America, it can be understood why African Americans report minimal support for U.S. engagement in another military conflict.
In the spirit of crafting a U.S. foreign policy that benefits the American people, the surveys top-line results are a reminder to policymakers to consider policies that will help avoid a protracted attritional war in Ukraine and a conflict in Taiwan altogether. Moreover, in a moment in which the nation’s major political parties are rethinking their outlook on the projection of U.S. power abroad, this is an opportune time for engagement with Black voters. In fact, Black voter turnout in the 2022 midterm elections dipped, raising concern for both parties as they prepare for the 2024 presidential election.
Black Americans almost monolithically vote for the Democratic Party. However, Black support for the Republican Party, although minimal, has ticked upward since 2012. Black voters play a critical role in determining election outcomes (as shown when Georgia flipped blue in the 2020 election and won Democrats the Senate). This is an opportune moment for both parties to engage Black voters and elucidate how outcomes in Ukraine and Taiwan will impact domestic well-being. Domestic and foreign policy are not two disparate fields, with the latter only being of concern to Washington, DC’s political elite. Tying the two sets of issues together could sustain, if not potentially increase, voter turnout among Black Americans.
Acknowledgments
The author is grateful to the plethora of individuals that helped bring this research to its final form. Special thanks to Alexis Essa, Alexander Marsolais, and their colleagues at YouGov for their help with the design and execution of the survey. Christopher Chivvis, Jennifer Kavanagh, and Milan Vaishnav were instrumental in designing the survey questionnaire and offered invaluable feedback on the research approach. Genevieve Slosberg and Aurora Lopez gave vital feedback and played a critical role in data analysis. Haley Clasen, Lindsay Maizland, Jocelyn Soly, Amy Mellon, and Amanda Branom provided excellent editorial, graphic design, and publication assistance.
Notes
1 See Chad Williams, Torchbearers of Democracy: African American Soldiers in the World War I Era (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2010); Adriane Lentz-Smith, Freedom Struggles: African Americans and World War I (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010); Shirley A. J. Hanshaw, Remembering and Surviving: African American Fiction of theVietnam War (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2020); and Matthew Delmont, Half American: The Epic Story of African Americans Fighting World War II at Home and Abroad (New York City: Viking Press, 2022).
2 See Cameron McWhirter, Red Summer: The Summer of 1919 and the Awakening of Black America (St. Martin’s Griffin, 2012); Delmont, Half American; Simon Hall, Peace and Freedom: The Civil Rights and Antiwar Movements in the 1960s (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005); and Daniel S. Sucks, Selma to Saigon: The Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2014).