Ruto and Biden standing outside the White House

Presidents William Ruto and Joe Biden at the White House on May 23. (Photo by Mandel Ngan/AFP via Getty Images)

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A New Chapter in U.S.-Kenya Relations Links Silicon Valley and Silicon Savannah

Ruto’s state visit to Washington resulted in a historic foreign policy moment with technology cooperation at its core. Now, the Kenyan president has the enormous responsibility to capitalize on these opportunities.

Published on June 13, 2024

State visits are a high honor—accompanied by pomp, ceremony, and presidential meetings—and Kenyan President William Ruto’s state visit to Washington last month was no exception. The first for an African leader in sixteen years and the third ever by a Kenyan president, the visit commemorated sixty years of diplomatic ties between the two countries, dating back to 1963, when the Kenyan republic was born. However, the visit also had a more modern aim: enhancing both the U.S. and Kenyan technology sectors. A series of announcements together marked a new and historic foreign policy moment centered on technology cooperation between Nairobi and Washington.

The inclusion of technology in foreign policy is becoming increasingly prominent, with many governments prioritizing it as part of their diplomatic agendas and designating technology ambassadors to enhance technology policy cooperation and coordination. Washington had previously signaled its commitment to expand digital access in Africa, increase commercial engagement between U.S. and African companies, support digital literacy, and strengthen digital enabling environments across Africa through the Digital Transformation with Africa initiative (DTA), which launched at the Africa Leadership Summit in 2022. The new U.S.-Kenya digital commitment seeks to expand on the DTA while merging it with Washington’s own technology goals.

The new technology cooperation is based on three main goals: cybersecurity; digital connectivity; and secure and resilient supply chains, established via a new semiconductor and technology partnership. Each of the priority areas is supported by collaboration pledges that seek to connect the United States’ Silicon Valley and Kenya’s so-called Silicon Savannah—“a perfect match,” according to Ruto.

A key feature of the digital cooperation announcement is the involvement of the private sector in the various commitments and its position as a stakeholder in this new foreign policy. Big Tech made headlines alongside the visit with significant announcements like Google’s Umoja undersea cable, which will connect Africa and Australia, and Microsoft and G42’s $1 billion 1-gigawatt data center—the largest single private-sector digital investment in Kenya’s history. The Microsoft data center will be strategically located in Naivasha, Kenya’s ground zero for geothermal energy, and will support the climate agenda, another key component of the state visit.

These (and other) commitments are exciting firsts that have the potential to transform Kenya’s technology environment and ecosystem in unprecedented ways, exposing Kenyan talent to a larger global audience and propelling the Silicon Savannah to new heights. The boldness of the commitments, as well as their timing and prominence, indicates the importance of technology in the state visit. Together with other firsts, such as the U.S. announcement designating Kenya as a major non-NATO ally, highlight other complexities at play: geopolitics.

Geopolitics is not explicitly mentioned in the technology agenda, yet its influence is conspicuous. For example, President Joe Biden’s administration brokered the Microsoft-G42 cooperation, which ensures United Arab Emirates AI company G42 access to Nvidia chips and prohibits use of Huawei equipment—a deliberate measure to limit Chinese access to AI. The deal also commits both parties to extend AI and digital infrastructure to other countries—now evidenced by the Kenya announcement. In addition, the United States chose Kenya as the first African country actor to receive funding for semiconductor chips through the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, aimed at growing the U.S. semiconductor supply chain and countering China. These nuances cannot be ignored, as they create new political configurations that demand unprecedented maneuvers from Ruto.

It is no secret that Kenya has a long-standing history with China. China has made large investments in Kenya’s technology infrastructure, including the National Optic Fibre Backbone Infrastructure and the Konza data center, which holds key government data. The commitments from the new U.S.-Kenya digital cooperation introduce a geopolitical dimension into Nairobi’s relationships, especially with China. This is a crucial foreign policy dynamic that Kenya will have to address, and it will require political and diplomatic acumen, as demonstrated by Ruto in a recent CNN interview. When asked if he preferred investments by China or by the United States, Ruto paraphrased Ghanian leader Kwame Nkrumah: “We are neither facing West nor East. We are facing forward, because that is where the opportunities are.”

The narrative of U.S.-China competition is commonplace in Washington and drives conversations in many circles. However, at this moment, and in a revived Kenya-U.S. foreign policy engagement, Washington must not lose sight of another reality: the benefits that this technology cooperation offers to Kenya’s economy.

The U.S.-Kenya digital cooperation is an excellent opportunity to actualize Ruto’s Digital Superhighway agenda, which aims to lay 100,000 kilometers of fiber optic cable, digitize over 80 percent of government services, and connect every ward and village to the internet to ensure that all Kenyans have access to e-commerce, digital jobs, and digital education in order to boost Kenya’s economy. The commitments can serve as much-needed stepping stones to grow an indigenous Kenyan digital economy and leapfrog the Silicon Savannah several levels ahead.

Take the semiconductor commitment. Semiconductor manufacturing is a multibillion-dollar industry dominated by advanced economies: South Korea, Taiwan, China, Japan, and the United States. The industry has seen overwhelming demand compounded by the fact that many countries lack production capacity. The potential for Kenya to produce this technology that powers the modern world—enabling both advanced systems and everyday products, from highly controlled defense equipment to cars and household appliances—is a momentous opportunity that must be fully harnessed.

This moment is akin to the golden ticket awarded to outstanding performers on American Idol—a coveted offering that gives competitors an opportunity to fast-track through the competition, skipping a number of intermediate rounds and getting closer to the grand prize. For Kenya, this U.S.-Kenya digital cooperation agreement is a foreign policy golden ticket: a rare opportunity to accelerate its digital transformation and grow its economy, creating much-needed jobs.

However, getting a golden ticket does not guarantee victory—that depends on the holder’s capacity to maximize opportunities for success. Ruto and his administration now must configure and translate commitments, such as semiconductor manufacturing, into strategic national projects. These projects must be supported by institutional frameworks, generational investments, and the necessary skills—while being safeguarded from the politics of kleptocracy that so frequently afflict Kenyan grand projects. As recipients of the golden ticket, Ruto and his administration now hold the enormous responsibility of moving forward the state visit’s commitments, especially digital cooperation, to the next level. Doing so would entrench this moment as one worthy of celebration sixty years from now.

This piece has been updated to clarify that Google is investing in the undersea portion of the Umoja cable.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.