This piece is part of a Carnegie series examining the impacts of Trump’s first 100 days in office.
Türkiye’s ruling elite rooted for Donald Trump in the U.S. presidential election. Their assumption was that it would be easier to find common ground with Trump to introduce momentum to the stagnating bilateral relationship. This belief was driven by a positive, albeit selective, memory of Trump’s first term in office, when he had been accessible to Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was receptive to the idea of working together, and showed some understanding on difficult matters burdening the Turkish-American partnership. Otherwise bitter experiences—such as when Trump belittled Erdoğan in a scathing letter, threatened to obliterate the Turkish economy, or imposed sanctions on the country, which are still in effect—were set aside.
Erdoğan’s bet on Trump is so far paying off. The two have spoken several times since the November U.S. election, satisfying the Turkish desire to have regular contacts. Türkiye’s foreign minister has already visited Washington to follow up on these discussions—something that took fifteen months during former president Joe Biden’s administration—and reports indicate that a presidential visit may be in the works.
Alongside this momentum, the tone struck by Washington on matters related to Ankara has been meeting official expectations. Days after the controversial arrest of Ekrem Imamoğlu, mayor of Istanbul and Erdoğan’s main political rival in the next presidential elections, Trump praised Erdoğan as “a good leader.” Trump’s Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, anticipated a bright future for Turkish-American relations, referencing a recent “great and transformational” conversation between the two leaders. Witkoff also spoke of “a lot of positive, good news” coming from Türkiye. Clearly, neither Trump nor Witkoff shares the anxiety of Turkish protesters who took to the streets in nationwide support of the imprisoned Imamoğlu, worried about the future of truly competitive elections and Türkiye’s democracy. More than 130 of these protesters now face prison sentences of up to three years, while Imamoğlu’s indictment could result in a prolonged prison sentence and political ban, undermining the most credible prospect for political change in the country.
Erdoğan sees a lot of himself in Trump and his policies. Trump’s desire to shake up American institutions and its established bureaucracy, his polarizing rhetoric on the domestic scene, and his distaste for liberal, progressive agendas align with Erdoğan’s playbook, as does Trump’s sense of urgency in achieving a ceasefire in Ukraine.
Trump, in turn, is an avowed fan of Erdoğan. He takes pleasure in saying so, as he recently did in the presence of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Trump offered to help resolve Turkish-Israeli differences while, to Ankara’s delight, insisting that Netanyahu had to be reasonable.
Trump and Erdoğan are transactional partners with converging mindsets. They both recognize this and want to seize the opportunity to work together. Where their policies do not align, Trump will assume he can pressure Erdoğan, who will, in most instances, look for a face-saving way forward and hope to leverage his collaborative spirit elsewhere. Erdoğan, in effect, is practicing the art of deal-making, which Trump would appreciate.
This is the context in which Turkish-American relations will evolve under the stewardship of two overconfident leaders. As far as Erdoğan is concerned, Trump’s disposition to do business without regard for the diminishing standard of Türkiye’s democratic credentials and rule of law practices is particularly useful. Erdoğan will see this as a license to push his oppressive domestic agenda.
European reactions to political developments in Türkiye were somewhat subdued, but nevertheless stronger than those from the United States, partly due to Türkiye’s status as a candidate country for EU membership. This makes Washington’s reticence especially valuable: Ankara will see it as an opportunity to offset potential political and economic falling-outs with Europe. Such a free hand from Washington, alongside the ones already accorded by other major actors such as Russia and China, could hasten Türkiye’s gravitation further away from EU criteria and its membership goal, possibly even precipitating a conclusive debate on the matter.
Trump’s economic and foreign policy chaos brings both challenges and opportunities for Türkiye. Türkiye’s export-driven and cash-strapped economy is vulnerable to trade disruptions and global economic uncertainties that affect investment flows, especially as it struggles with high inflation and low growth. The current global economic volatility is a challenge in that respect, but Türkiye has been hit by the lowest reciprocal tariffs Washington imposed, which could give it a comparative advantage against other actors in the U.S. market. Türkiye’s moves toward becoming a leading destination for U.S. liquified natural gas exports and widening its energy cooperation could bring the countries closer to the goal of $100 billion in bilateral trade volume.
Regarding the evolving security landscape, NATO membership is the cornerstone of Türkiye’s deterrence and defense. Its demise would spell disaster, and the picture would only worsen if an EU-centered construct or any other constellation that excludes Türkiye emerges as the centerpiece in the future European security architecture. Türkiye will try to prevent that by upholding its commitment to NATO while leveraging its geopolitical clout, military capabilities, and growing defense industry capacity in discussions on European strategic autonomy. Either way, Türkiye will do what it takes to keep a seat at the table on European security, though it may face greater headwinds if its relations with Europe sour further.
As in Europe, Türkiye will also try to capitalize on Washington’s desire to withdraw from the Middle East. Ankara has shown readiness to do more to confront ISIS in Syria, including through regional schemes, which would decrease the need for U.S. commitments.
Türkiye and the United States do not see eye to eye on every matter, and the two have lingering differences. But Erdoğan and Trump are intent on developing a cooperative agenda that is mutually beneficial and empowering. What that will mean for Türkiye and its society at large in the long run, including the country’s democratic trajectory and relations with Europe, may be another story.
Read more from this series:
- India Sees Opportunity in Trump’s Global Turbulence. That Could Backfire.
- Saudi Arabia Has Outsized Influence in Washington. Can It Hold?
- Trump Isn’t Helping Korea’s Alliance Anxieties
- Russia Is Playing Along With Trump’s Hopes for a Rapprochement
- Is Canada’s Relationship With the United States Over?
- Japan Is Trying to Be a Model Partner. Trump Is Pushing It Away.
