The Hope and Skepticism Around the PKK’s Historic Move to Disarm

In February, Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan called on the outlawed Kurdish separatist group to disarm and disband. This week, the group announced its intention to do so. Below, two Carnegie fellows discuss the importance and implications of these developments for Türkiye and the region.

What’s behind this announcement?

Alper Coşkun: The PKK made a historic and monumental decision to disband itself after more than a four-decade-long armed struggle against the government in Ankara. This move has the potential to transform Türkiye, impacting its domestic trajectory and foreign and security outlooks. It will also have major regional implications.

The PKK’s decision to disband is the result of an unlikely sequence of events, precipitated foremost by developments in Syria, including the ouster of Bashar al-Assad. In Ankara’s view, the influence of external actors over the PKK, particularly in Syria, and their potential to instrumentalize the organization against Turkish interests had reached new and dangerous proportions and had to be stopped. Meanwhile, Öcalan, who is serving a life sentence after being convicted on charges of treason in 1999, had learned the hard way that external support for his struggle had its limits.

In October, Devlet Bahçeli—the leader of Türkiye’s far-right Nationalist Movement Party and a close ally of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan—made an earth-shattering appeal for the PKK to disarm and disband, suggesting that Öcalan may be granted parole as a result. Öcalan followed suit, stating that the era of armed struggle had come to an end—something the PKK has now embraced.

A self-induced end to such an armed struggle is rare, and complications are inevitable. Nevertheless, both the PKK and Türkiye’s leadership seem to concur—likely for their own reasons—on the need to chart a new way forward. Should this process be embraced within Türkiye and be respected by Kurds at large and the different branches of the PKK, Türkiye could emerge as a much more resilient and consequential actor.

What’s the reaction in Türkiye and among the Kurdish people?

Garo Paylan: Reactions are mixed. Pro-government circles are claiming victory, framing the PKK’s dissolution as a direct result of Ankara’s military pressure. Many Kurds cautiously welcome the move as a chance to pivot toward democratic struggle—but they remain skeptical about whether the state will follow through with meaningful reforms. Secular opposition voices are even more doubtful. They view these events as a calculated step by Erdoğan to engineer a new political climate that could justify constitutional changes that would allow him to extend presidential term limits and run again. For them, it’s less a peace breakthrough than a political maneuver aimed at regime preservation.

What about regional impacts?

Alper Coşkun: The PKK and its use of terror to advance a separatist agenda have been a primary security concern for Türkiye, defining its securitized outlook and overshadowing its international relations for several decades. These concerns were most acute at the regional level, due to the PKK’s ability to proliferate and have a continuing presence in safe havens, especially in Iran, Iraq, and Syria. The elimination of the PKK and its cross-border presences would relieve Türkiye of its natural inhibitions and create space in its foreign, economic, and security policies for more creative and positive engagements, which could nurture a much-needed positive momentum in the region.

The PKK was a factor in NATO expansion last year. How will these developments factor into Türkiye’s foreign policy and national security policy?

Alper Coşkun: The PKK’s ability to conceal its activities in democratic societies under different guises while sustaining its international recruitment and financing network has been a thorn in Türkiye’s relations with many countries, including some of its NATO allies. Western financial, training, and armaments support for the Syrian Democratic Forces in Syria, composed mainly of PKK elements, compounded the problem, prompting Türkiye to call on its current and aspiring NATO allies, including Finland and Sweden, to refrain from undermining Turkish interests.

With the PKK factor out of the picture, Türkiye’s main foreign and security policy concern would be resolved, boosting its self-confidence and ability to pursue a more creative and positive international agenda. Should Ankara be willing and able to couple this with a return to improved democratic standards and rule-of-law practices, the country’s international standing could be significantly enhanced.

What are the likely obstacles to progress?

Garo Paylan: The biggest obstacle is the lack of mutual trust and a clear political road map. Kurds want assurance that the government will follow this announcement with real reforms. Without concrete commitments on political representation, cultural rights, and the reintegration of Kurdish voices into public life, the move risks being seen as symbolic rather than transformative.

What’s needed for a durable peace is a democratic opening—and it’s unclear whether Erdoğan is willing to go that far. He appears to favor a quick political win over a comprehensive step toward reversing Türkiye’s democratic backsliding.

Further complicating matters is the situation in Syria. If talks between the Syrian Kurds and the new government in Damascus collapse, that could undermine the broader momentum for peace in Türkiye.

How might the PKK’s announcement factor into Türkiye’s democratic backsliding?

Garo Paylan: This moment could mark a path toward democratic renewal—or deepen authoritarianism.

The conflict with the PKK has long shaped Turkish politics, justifying hardline policies, sweeping authoritarianism, and fueling deep mistrust between Kurds and the state. A cessation of hostilities could not only reduce violence but also enable Türkiye to reimagine its social contract in a more inclusive framing. That’s the only way to restore democratic norms eroded in the name of anti-terrorism.

The secular opposition must also be part of this process. With Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu—Erdoğan’s main rival—still behind bars, many question the sincerity of the government’s intentions. If the peace process is used merely as a tactic to entrench one-man rule rather than to open space for broader democratic reform, the opportunity for genuine reconciliation will be squandered.

What implications does the announcement have for Turkish relations with the United States?

Garo Paylan: Turkish-Kurdish reconciliation has major implications for stability in Syria and is directly relevant to U.S. interests and troop presence in the region. Syrian Kurds support the peace process and have already signaled a willingness to restore relations with both Ankara and Damascus—a welcome development for Washington, which has long faced Turkish accusations of siding with “terrorists” in Syria. Since the process began, that accusation has lost traction.

The U.S. administration is likely to gradually withdraw troops from Syria. To do so responsibly, it needs a stable Turkish-Kurdish dynamic, which would secure continued pressure on ISIS. While President Donald Trump may not prioritize Türkiye’s internal political evolution, Washington should encourage Ankara to pursue both peace and democratic reform. It’s the only path to long-term stability in Türkiye and Syria.