Last month, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan made a historic announcement from prison. He called on the internationally outlawed terrorist group to disarm and disband itself—a move that could mark the end of its more than forty-year-long violent fight against Türkiye.
The significance of this possible shift cannot be overstated: Türkiye would be transformed, and the effects would ripple beyond its borders. Türkiye’s resources would no longer be consumed by the constant need to counter PKK-related challenges. This would create space in its foreign, economic, and security policies for more creative and positive international engagements and bring relief to the securitized outlook on the domestic scene. It could usher in a new era of democratic opportunity—contingent, of course, on the government’s political will.
Getting to such a point will not be easy, and it is far too early to hold one’s breath. Modern Turkish history is riddled with Kurdish uprisings. The PKK represents the latest and longest-lasting iteration of this challenge, and many obstacles will have to be navigated before the PKK can go down in history as the first Kurdish armed movement to end at the behest of its founding leader.
The background of what tempted Öcalan to take such a decisive step at this juncture is still unclear, and a question on everyone’s mind is: Why now? Öcalan’s aspirations have changed over time. In the early 2000s, he gravitated toward the idea of a confederal solution for Kurds finding themselves spread across different countries. And this is not the first time he has spoken about the PKK laying down its arms, though past attempts have, for one reason or another, failed. There are legitimate grounds for skepticism, including whether his call will be heeded and produce actual results.
Nevertheless, Öcalan’s plea is monumental. He definitively asserted that the ideological foundations on which the PKK was built no longer exist and that the organization has essentially become obsolete. There is no other way to read this other than that the time has come to turn the page. He cited changing circumstances—both in Türkiye and the world at large—compared to when the PKK was founded, and he prescribed a new way forward by referencing the need for Turks and Kurds to stand in unity against “hegemonic powers.” As noted by some analysts, this is reminiscent of Ankara’s official narrative expressing a strong distaste for meddling in the region by distant actors.
This similarity is not coincidental. The carefully calibrated content of Öcalan’s message is likely the result of intensive negotiations with Turkish officials. It is designed to reflect a common understanding on a way forward with Ankara that envisages the end of the PKK, while setting the stage for reconciliation with Türkiye’s Kurds through democratic reforms and, ultimately, the rewriting of the country’s constitution. Öcalan presumably would hope to spearhead such a historic outcome for the Kurds and, along the way, either be pardoned (he was convicted on charges of treason in 1999 and is serving a life sentence) or at least have his internment conditions improved.
Turkish officials characterize what is taking place exclusively as an attempt to cleanse Türkiye of terror, and nothing else. The potential for a nationalist backlash against a larger process involving openings to the Kurds, as well as the overall risk of failure in the current efforts, leads them to be cautious and tread lightly. This tactically narrow framing should not fool anyone. The background against which Öcalan chose to speak up is important in this regard. The PKK leader essentially responded to an appeal from Turkish far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli. In October, Bahçeli suggested Öcalan could be granted parole if he disarms and disbands the PKK. Öcalan delivered. The like-minded nature of their indirect public exchange is exceptional. Even if for different reasons, the leader of a notorious militant Kurdish organization (Öcalan) and his archenemy and the embodiment of hardline Turkish nationalism (Bahçeli) are in effect working toward the same goal. Having the MHP on board in this effort is a game-changer: It flips the disruptive role the MHP traditionally would play toward any openings toward the Kurds.
In the words of Sırrı Sürreya Önder—a parliamentarian from the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) who has been involved in both past and recent efforts, including by acting as Öcalan’s messenger—the main difference this time lies in the MHP’s constructive stance and Bahçeli’s personal involvement. The situation is an alignment never seen before, he said: Bahçeli’s initial appeal, Öcalan’s ensuing call for an end to the conflict, the PKK leadership’s unconditional endorsement of Öcalan’s call, and positive reactions from within Türkiye—ranging from government circles to the opposition—alongside widespread international support. He argued that the hardest lifting has already been done and that 50 percent of the path to peace has been traversed.
Önder’s assessment may be overly optimistic, but the situation seems to be moving in the right direction. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who had remained conspicuously muted for a long time after Bahçeli’s appeal to Öcalan, reacted to the latest developments by saying that Türkiye had entered a new phase in its effort to free the country of terror. If not in so many words, he seems to be in agreement with the way things are evolving—he and Bahçeli likely have been closely coordinating this effort from day one.
Erdoğan and Bahçeli, the president’s ally, surely have many calculations and motivations for this move. Foremost, Türkiye’s two-term restriction currently disqualifies Erdoğan from running in the 2028 presidential election unless elections are called early by parliament, or the constitution is revised. Reconciliation with the Kurds is one pathway to overcoming that limit, which Bahçeli supports. Promising the DEM Party an opening toward the Kurds could enlist its support in parliament for early elections or to amend the constitution to enable Erdoğan to run again.
However, presidential politics is not the only factor: another major one is national security-related.
Türkiye has always been concerned with the PKK’s growing international recruitment and financing network, as well as its safe havens in Iran, Iraq, and Syria. The PKK has also proliferated over the years with several offshoots, such as the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK) in Iran and the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its military wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), in Syria. The YPG forms the bulk of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which the United States has been partnering with since 2014 in the fight against the Islamic State.
Over the years, the PKK and its offshoots’ third-party partnerships have become a central concern for Türkiye. At the forefront has been the evolution of Washington’s engagement with the SDF. Türkiye had been assured that the collaboration would be temporary, tactical, and transactional. However, it has turned into a lasting relationship, now casually characterized by Washington as an alliance.
To make matters worse, other NATO allies have also developed relations with the SDF. One of the reasons why Türkiye delayed Sweden’s accession to NATO, for instance, was its support for the SDF, which Sweden later stopped. Türkiye also recently rebuked Iran for its contacts with PKK elements in Syria, triggering a cycle of ambassadorial summonings in both capitals. Maybe most concerning of all for Ankara is that Israel made public statements of support for the SDF. Now, Israel is reportedly lobbying in Washington about its concerns regarding Ankara’s role in Syria.
At the top of Türkiye’s wish list from the new regime in Syria is for it to dismantle the SDF and eliminate any PKK-linked presence. Ankara calculates that this is the only way to offset the challenge posed by anti-Turkish entities across its borders, and it is pressing Iraq to do the same.
The Turkish government said it interprets Öcalan’s call as binding to each and every part of the PKK, including its offshoots and affiliates abroad. It also described the end goal in Turkish policymakers’ minds: to terminate any form of cross-border PKK presence that poses a security threat, receives support from third countries, and could eventually be manipulated at Türkiye’s expense.
The PKK’s first act of terror in Türkiye dates back to 1984. More than forty years later, and after the loss of tens of thousands of lives, this is a watershed moment. If the process is successful, Türkiye would benefit enormously by ending its leading, decades-long national security concern. As for the United States, any positive momentum could facilitate a long overdue result-oriented conversation on how to stabilize Syria together—and how Türkiye could facilitate an orderly withdrawal of American troops while ensuring that ISIS cannot resurge. Harmony between Ankara and Washington on Syria policy would also facilitate collaboration between Türkiye and the EU on stabilizing Syria and setting it on a sound trajectory in a manner that is also palatable for Israel.
The disbandment of the PKK could also lead to an atmosphere in Türkiye that is conducive to some much-needed democratic reforms. As pointed out by a veteran Turkish journalist, the sudden turnabout toward a more democratic mindset is hard to imagine, but the positive disruption from the end of the PKK and some form of reconciliation with the Kurds could trigger useful momentum toward larger openings that would benefit Turkish society, the region, and the world.
