In a public address on May 2, 2021, Ali Khamenei, supreme leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, signaled a potentially diminished role for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in shaping the nation’s foreign policy. This pronouncement followed leaked audio recordings in which Javad Zarif, the then-foreign minister, lamented the limited authority of the MFA. Khamenei asserted that, “across the globe, foreign policy is not dictated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but by higher echelons of power.”

Since assuming the highest executive office three years ago following Hassan Rouhani’s term, Ebrahim Raisi had pursued a diplomatic approach closely aligned with the supreme leader’s vision for Iran. In November 2023, the government submitted a “Combating Sanctions” bill to parliament, establishing a working group to address the issue.

The introduction of this bill outlines its primary objectives: the "necessity of effective and principled confrontation with sanctions," "adequate support for citizens affected by sanctions," "preventing the impact of these sanctions on the country's territory," and "establishing guarantees for suitable implementations to address sanctions and their enforcers."

Notably, the bill relegated the MFA to a role equivalent to that of the president’s legal counsel, the head of state television, and the Ministry of Intelligence. The move, which Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian ultimately endorsed, underscored the diminished influence of the MFA under Raisi’s leadership.

Over the past three years, a series of actions have undermined the MFA’s role in Iranian foreign policy. A noteworthy example emerged in October 2023 with the adoption of the Seventh Development plan. This Plan is Iran's five-year strategy (2024 - 2029) aimed at economic, social, and cultural growth. It is a legislative bill with 22 chapters across seven key sections, including economic development, infrastructure, cultural and social advancements, science and technology, foreign policy, defense and security, and administrative reforms.

 This plan demonstrably sidelined the MFA by granting decision-making authority to nontraditional actors in Iran, including the armed forces, the Atomic Energy Organization, and the Ministry of Intelligence. These entities were explicitly exempted from coordinating their overseas activities with the MFA, further eroding its central role in Iranian diplomacy.

In recent years, a notable shift has occurred in Iran’s diplomatic landscape. Two key agreements highlight this change: the March 2023 rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and the twenty-five-year strategic pact with China signed in March 2021. The China-brokered Iran-Saudi deal stands out for the minimal involvement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Instead, Ali Shamkhani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and Khamenei’s representative, took center stage in these talks. Similarly, the twenty-five-year Iran-China agreement saw Khamenei bypassing the Foreign Ministry. He entrusted the crucial task of negotiating and finalizing the pact to his political adviser, Ali Larijani.

These developments point toward a broader trend: Khamenei’s growing influence in foreign policy. He has established parallel power structures, both within the military and through a network of advisers, to exert greater control. This approach appeared to continue unhindered during the Raisi administration. Since Raisi’s inauguration in 2019, Iran’s foreign policy has undergone a significant shift. Relations with Western countries have deteriorated, while ties with Russia and China have flourished. This eastward tilt aligns with Khamenei’s preferences, as evidenced by his warm reception of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

On July 19, 2022, during a visit to Tehran, President Putin met with Khamenei. During this meeting, Khamenei remarked to Putin that if Moscow had not intervened in Ukraine, the opposition would have instigated a conflict through their actions. Additionally, photographs from the meeting depicted Khamenei warmly holding Putin's hands—a notable gesture, given that Khamenei's office typically does not release such images from his meetings with various dignitaries. In a previous encounter in November 2017, Khamenei had praised Putin, describing him as a person "with a strong personality and a man of decision and action."

Talks to revive the 2015 nuclear deal with the United States remain inconclusive. Meanwhile, Iran has actively pursued membership in non-Western institutions, joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and expressed interest in the BRICS group. Furthermore, Iran reportedly provided military support to Russia during the war in Ukraine by supplying weapons.

It is important to note that, according to an unwritten rule in the Islamic Republic, the Foreign Minister is always chosen with the supreme leader’s approval before a name is presented to the Islamic Consultative Assembly for a vote of confidence. This unwritten rule is accepted and common principle in Iran. For example, Hadi Tahan Nazif, the spokesman of Iran's Guardian Council, said in an interview: "It is a common tradition that two or three ministers are chosen in coordination with the Supreme Leader."

During this period, non-elected offices under the supervision of the Supreme Leader of Iran, which are also involved in foreign policy, have seen an increase in their scope of authority. Consequently, these institutions have become more prominent, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been sidelined. They have gradually increased their influence in foreign policy, thereby reducing the role of the Ministry. It is highly unlikely that the election of a new president will alter this process; the process of marginalizing the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Notably, among the six candidates permitted to participate in the presidential election on June 28, 2024, five of whom are politicians loyal to Iran’s supreme leader. Even the sixth candidate, Masoud Pezeshkian who is backed by the reformists, has repeatedly emphasized his loyalty to Khamenei and stated that the supreme leader's directives should be followed in foreign policy.

Over the past years, Khamenei has pursued a strategy of weakening and sidelining political factions that advocate for improved relations with the West. This approach is underpinned by his doctrine of “Western unreliability,” which posits that the West cannot be trusted, regardless of who holds power. To strengthen his subordinate institutions, Iran's Supreme Leader has deliberately weakened the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, over which he may not have strict control. He has also entrusted sensitive foreign policy matters to his trusted aides, thereby minimizing the risk of losing control over these critical areas.